THE MOSLEM FACES THE FUTURE

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

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
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

THE MOSLEM FACES THE FUTURE

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE MOSLEM WORLD

By T. H. P. SAILER



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NEW YORK

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PREFACE

THE title of this book indicates that it looks forward and not back. It is not a discussion of the historical development of Islam, but an attempt to understand present and prospective problems of Moslems from the standpoint of the Christian Church. Such understanding demands some knowledge of the past, but it must select those factors whose influence will be most felt in days to come. The sub-title indicates that the book undertakes to be an introduction to the study of the Moslem world, not, of course, for the specialist, but for the intelligent American Christian. In order that it may help in the understanding of current literature, it seeks to put the reader in touch with many issues and terms which find frequent mention in recent books and magazines.

This book has mainly in mind a group which seems to be growing especially among our college students and graduates, a group which professes to be Christian, but finds itself becoming impatient with many of the manifestations of modern Christianity. It suspects that many points of view and methods could be revised to advantage. It encounters in many missionary publications statements which it hesitates to accept. It is not merely willing to sit among the audience and swell the applause. It wants to be taken behind the scenes and to see things at closer range. In particular it wants to know, not only of the successes of missionaries, but their discouragements, problems, and failures. These are the things in any enterprise that interest and challenge it most. The presentation of a difficult and complex situation does not puncture its enthusiasm, but calls forth its energy. Persons who cannot sympathize with such an attitude will

probably find much in this book which will not appeal to them.

While it is intended and hoped that this book will be used as a basis for discussion groups, the division into chapters does not indicate the amount to be "got over" at each of six consecutive sessions. The first two chapters undertake to provide a general background, without which discussion would be to little purpose. Chapter III contains material for several discussions. More specific suggestions as to use will be made in the "Suggestions to Leaders," issued by the various denominational boards.

Most of those who use this book will probably have some general knowledge regarding Islam. No attempt will therefore be made to review the principal facts of the life of Mohammed and the teachings of the Koran and the theologians which have been so frequently presented. A brief statement of some of the most important of these will be found on pages ix-x. There is also a glossary of more or less technical terms which the student will be sure to meet in further reading on the subject.

Many missionaries have contributed opinions or items of information from different parts of the Moslem world. It is known that some of these would prefer not to have their names mentioned. It seems best, therefore, not to present a complete list, but merely to acknowledge very gratefully the valuable help that has been rendered by those on the field and in this country.

T. H. P. Sailer

New York City
March
1926

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A FEW FACTS ABOUT ISLAM

ISLAM, more than most religions, reflects the personality of its founder, Mohammed. He was born in Mecca, near the western coast of Arabia, about 570 A.D. When he was about forty years of age, he had a series of experiences which he interpreted as visions from God. These ordered him to attack the idolatry and worldliness of his fellow citizens, and to proclaim one supreme God and a day of judgment. Converts at first gathered slowly, and they were subject to persecution.

In 622 A.D. the Hijrah, or flight, to Medina took place, from which the Moslem calendar came to be reckoned (A.H., Anno Hejirae). In Medina Mohammed soon became head of the community and ruler as well as prophet. At the time of his death, in 632 A.D., not only Medina, but Mecca and practically the whole of Arabia had accepted his doctrine. The subsequent rapid spread of Islam to other regions is sketched in the text.

The sayings of Mohammed, which are considered inspired and are believed to have been dictated word for word to him by the Angel Gabriel, were later gathered together and they constitute the Koran. This scripture is divided into *suras,* or chapters, arranged roughly, according to length rather than in any chronological order. The Koran is the Bible of Islam, considered verbally infallible. Since it is often obscure, and since it failed to prescribe conduct or attitudes to be observed in subsequent situations that arose, it was early supplemented by traditions as to what Mohammed said or did under various circumstances. These rules of conduct were, in time, codified into legal systems.

The five principal observances of Islam are: (1) the

recitation of the creed—"There is no God but God, and Mohammed is his Prophet"; (2) worship, the set forms of which are to be performed five times a day; (3) alms, a certain proportion of the income being prescribed from those of means for the benefit of the poor; (4) fasting from sunrise to sunset during the month of Ramadan; (5) making the Haj, or pilgrimage, to Mecca once in a lifetime by those who are able.

Among various prohibitions are wine, usury, sculpture, and games of chance. On the other hand, Mohammed's relations with women led him to permit four legal wives, and to recommend the seclusion of women. The Jihad, or war against countries controlled by unbelievers, has always been considered a duty. As in other religions, all these observances have been much relaxed in practise.

In the first century of its existence Islam split into two principal sects, the Sunni, which is in the majority in most Moslem countries, and the Shia, containing the bulk of Persians, about half of Iraq, and smaller communities in other lands. In addition to these, there have been many other sects.

Moslem theology has emphasized the unity and power of God, and has been especially severe on anything that seemed like polytheism or idolatry. At the same time saint worship has been quite general; also much superstition, together with mystical or emotional exercises. The points of similarity to medieval Christianity are striking, as is indicated in Chapter III.

INTRODUCTION

THE Moslem faces the future. His past has been shaped by a remarkable culture which, like that of ancient Judaism, has been a social and political as well as a religious system. In order to appreciate the situation of our Moslem brothers and sisters—240,000,000 of the world's population, scattered in a great field from Morocco to the East Indies and extending far to the north and south—we must ask ourselves some questions:

1. What is this religion like that has cut such a swath in history?

2. How did Islam happen to spread, and what are its circumstances today?

3. Why does the future cause such anxiety today to the Moslem and to those who are interested in his welfare?

4. How are Moslems themselves reacting to the changes that seem inevitable?

5. What sort of program does this create for the Christian Church? What should be our specific objectives in such a situation?

6. In what sense, if any, has the Christian Church of America a mandate for the Moslem world?

This book has sought to present a variety of opinions, from those of the Moslem apologist and the detached scholar to those of the militant critic. It has omitted much that might be said with perfect truth. Its aim is not to create antagonism towards Islam but friendship toward Moslems.

To take up in order the problems with which the book deals:

1. It is not a difficult thing to invent a religion. The thing has been done by persons of the most ordinary mentality. The difficulty arises in persuading others to *accept* a religion that has been discovered or invented. A religion that spreads must be able to kindle conviction by containing some appealing idea. It must meet some deeper need which has hitherto been unsatisfied. Even children make up crude religions which are soon outgrown. The multitude of savage religions surviving today in very restricted areas is a tiny fraction of those which have been practised since the beginning of history. In more civilized surroundings it requires only a person with a commanding personality and a sense for the occult to found a sect among the credulous. But the overwhelming majority of these religions are dead or dying. Only a few will be even mentioned in histories of religion. They grow best in isolation and where other faiths lack vitality. Contact with a belief that has blood and life in it saps their stamina. Such a religion as Islam, therefore, that has lasted already for thirteen hundred years, the only one that has ever displaced Christianity on a large scale, that has made converts of the most diverse races, that has survived rude shocks, that has produced some fine characters, that still draws forth the enthusiastic loyalty of a large part of the world's population, demands some careful study. It must have contained some appealing ideas and have met some deep needs.

A great religion is an extraordinarily difficult thing to understand. If it were a clear-cut die that stamped itself on inert metal, every resulting impression would be identical and we should then learn to distinguish its products without much more effort than the coinage or

postage stamps of a foreign country. But, in the first place, a religion is not a rigid die, and, in the second, individuals are not like inert metal. Religions are more than creeds. They are impersonated in great founders who are far above the average individual in sensitiveness to spiritual influences, with a strength of character to assimilate and embody these influences, and a magnetism of personality to foster them in others. These influences are more like the intuitions of poetry than the propositions of prose. They are, as Horace Bushnell put it, "appeals to the imagination." Creeds afterward undertake to reduce these experiences to formulas. They cannot of themselves convey the original life, which escapes complete formulation.

There is a further change because individuals differ so much in receptivity. Pint cups cannot hold quarts. Small personalities cannot take in all of big ideas. Every man according to his individual ability carries about with him a different reflection of the founder's thought and life. Moreover, he meets new conditions and is shaped by them, willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously.

A great religion is therefore a difficult thing to understand because it grows and changes. No single cross section of it represents it adequately. We must trace its development in response to its environment. We must take account of its great diversity of manifestations, sometimes so different as practically to constitute new religions. We must note its borrowings—social, political, intellectual, and spiritual—from various sources. We must allow for its surroundings, so very different from those we have known.

This is said by way of warning that a brief sketch of

a religion like Islam is of real value only as it stimulates further study. If it confines itself to a few of the principal types, it gives no idea of the wide variations of the different regions and periods. If it attempts to mention the bulk of these variations, it becomes a mere catalog. To steer between these limits is not easy. Nevertheless, we must try, first, to furnish some minimum essentials for an understanding of the inheritance with which the Moslem faces the future.

There are some subjects on which it is especially difficult to preserve a judicial attitude. Islam is one of these. Its positiveness and aggressiveness as a religion, its sweeping claims, its long-standing hostility to Christianity which has included some harsh persecution, its treatment of women,—all these tend to arouse prejudice among many at the outset. On the other hand, the notable products of a remarkable if arrested civilization, and the fine traits of certain individual Moslems cannot but attract. There is much that repels and many things to admire in the religion of Mohammed. It is difficult to disentangle altogether the influence of Islam as a religion from other factors that have made Moslems what they are, and accurately to assess its credit or blame. Those who dispose of this problem with a few easy assertions are probably leaving something out of account.

2. In answering our second question as to the circumstances of Islam's growth and spread and the general situation of the Moslem world today, we again face a dilemma. A statement that undertook to name the facts of large significance could no more than name them and would become a mere skeleton. One which tried to add a little color would be forced to confine itself to a few

representative situations. The second alternative has been chosen in the text, which should be read in connection with the table of principal events and the maps.

3. Having outlined the background, we now come to grips with the main issue. What is the future bringing to the Moslem? Chapter III presents the thesis that after a brilliant period of growth, Moslem civilization half a dozen centuries ago became practically static. Since that time its contacts with Christendom have been mainly limited to external pressure. Now a period of internal penetration is beginning that is bound to pierce like a two-edged sword to the dividing of soul and spirit and of the joints and marrow of Islam. Moslems all over the world are being called upon to pass out of medievalism into modernism in a single generation. The chapter traces in turn the political, economic, social, intellectual, and religious influences that Moslems are facing today, arranging the countries mentioned in the same order in each case. It was thought that this method of presentation would bring out the widespread character of each type of influence more strikingly than would the discussion of each country separately.

4. Chapter IV collects various typical reactions of Moslems who are feeling the oncoming of the future. Some of these are very different from those that have been met in the past. It is safe to say that the notes they strike will be more familiar in the days to come.

5. The Moslem faces a future for which we are largely responsible. It is our civilization, with its democracy and nationalism, organized industry and amassed capital, social freedom and craving for excitement, scientific method and control of nature, religious skepticism and idealism, that is flooding him out. We

cannot withhold those elements of Western civilization which are demoralizing. These, unfortunately, seem to be just the influences that transmit themselves most automatically and irresistibly. If we let things take their course, the future will bring to the Moslem intimate acquaintance with all the seamy side of our civilization and very fragmentary and imperfect knowledge of its best side. The situation therefore creates for us a sharp and insistent challenge to make our contribution felt. What we have done in the past is an inadequate criterion of what we must undertake from now on. Just what sort of program and what specific objectives are demanded? For this reason we stress, not what has been done, but what needs to be done.

6. The word "mandate" conveys to many an unpleasant significance. It stands for international hypocrisy, the invasion of the right of self-determination of weaker peoples by those who are strong, for an obligation which is admitted when it coincides with self-interest, and disowned when it demands sacrifice. If we must have political mandates, let us at least dispense with them in religion, which loses its vitality when it ceases to be a matter of free choice.

But "mandate" is only another example of a word that has been soiled by ignoble use. There is a type of mandate which is free from selfishness, exploitation, or paternalism. It is a call to disinterested missionary service. We should not lay down this book without looking squarely in the eyes the question: What missionary mandate has the American Christian for the Moslem as he faces the future?

THE MOSLEM FACES THE FUTURE

CHAPTER I

THE MOSLEM'S HERITAGE

The unique spread of Islam. In a number of respects Islam is unique among religions. One hundred years after the death of Confucius, the religion that goes by his name was represented by a small body of disciples in northern China whose doctrine had not yet received the support and currency given it by Mencius. One hundred years after the death of Gautama, Buddhism was the faith of a comparatively few bodies of monks in north India. It had been favored by rulers but had not yet reached its period of influence under Asoka. Neither religion had passed far from its birthplace. One hundred years after the death of Jesus, Christianity was held by little groups of believers scattered around the shores of the Mediterranean. The Emperor Trajan, replying about 112 A.D. to a letter from the Governor of Bithynia, apparently does not consider the question of its treatment a serious one for the state. All these religions had sprung up in centers of high civilization and had inherited scriptures which still rank among the most notable religious books of mankind.

Islam came out of the desert from among a people without sacred books, who worshiped crude idols. With almost no immediate religious inheritance, and with but a few ideas picked up from scattered Christians and Jews, an illiterate former camel driver forged a faith that first united the tribes of all Arabia and then sent them out

against the two most powerful empires of the time—Byzantium and Persia. No contemporary would have had the slightest suspicion of danger to either of these states from such a quarter, and yet within a dozen years from the death of Mohammed, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt were conquered from the Romans, and Mesopotamia and West Persia from the Sassanians. This was only the beginning of conquests. Before the century was out, the Moslem power had subdued all Persia, had laid siege to Constantinople, rolled across the north coast of Africa to the Atlantic, crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, established its rule in Spain, and, just one hundred years after the death of Mohammed, had penetrated as far as central France, where it was turned back only by the hard hitting of Charles Martel, the "Hammer." No other religion ever knew such a spread in so short a time.

The decline of Saracen civilization. In the centuries when Europe was emerging from the Dark Ages, the Saracenic civilization of Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, and Cordova shone by comparison. But disputes, political and theological, split the power, and the Moslem world was subject to terrible invasions from Central Asia, from which Europe was spared. First, Saljuq Turks, then Mongols, then Tatars under Timur, swept over the Near East. Such shocks might have set back European civilization for centuries. In the words of Arnold, "In the hours of its political degradation Islam has achieved some of its most brilliant spiritual conquests; on two great historical occasions infidel barbarians have set their feet on the necks of the followers of the Prophet,—the Saljuq in the eleventh and the Mongol in the thirteenth century,—and in each case the

conquerors have accepted the religion of the conquered."

Finally, the Ottoman Turks came to the top. It is a tribute to their toughness that only fifty-one years after their emperor was made captive by Timur they took Constantinople. Once settled in Europe, they made themselves feared, twice laying siege to Vienna. In the sixteenth century the most powerful world rulers were not Henry VIII or Francis I or even Charles V, but Suleiman the Magnificent, of Turkey, and Akbar, the Great Mogul of India.

Shrinkage of political power. Since that time the political power of Islam has declined. Spain was recovered by Christendom before Columbus discovered America. The independence of one after another of the non-Moslem regions of southeastern Europe was won. The Moguls in India were overthrown by the British. European protectorates were declared over various Moslem sections of North Africa. And, finally, great stretches of territory have been separated from the Turkish Empire as a result of the World War. The Sultan has been deposed and a republic declared by the Young Turks. It would be hard to find anything in the history of religion more picturesque than the rising and falling fortunes of Islam. It is the only great religion that has advanced at the expense of Christianity. In spite of political decay, it apparently retains its tenacity, and among primitive peoples it spreads today faster than Christianity.

The Secret of Its Power

To what do the great religions owe their hold? What is the secret of this astonishing career?

We can account for Confucianism by the fact that it accepted the ancient religion of a conservative people and added ethical maxims especially suited to the Chinese political and social order. It has been the state religion of a great and isolated empire but is essentially nationalistic and has never influenced other countries except as a system of ethics.

Hinduism represents the blended experiences of a deeply religious people, a mixture of subtle philosophy, ardent enthusiasm for the unseen, and coarse superstition, inherited by individuals and classes as a birthright, holding its own fast in its social scheme but making no attempts to win converts. These two religions, Hinduism and Confucianism, have made some great contributions to religious thought, but they are local and static. They spread only by emigration.

Buddhism is the first great missionary religion. It comes with high moral precepts, offering escape from this present evil world. It appeals by priesthood, art, and ritual. With immense variety of resources to attract every type, it has taken Protean shapes. It has spread peacefully at the expense of shallower religions.

Christianity needs no explanation for its successes, but rather for its comparative failures. Based on the purest religion of antiquity, supported by Greek philosophy, Roman organization, and Teutonic energy, it has been the faith of the white races and the belt of power. In view of its enormous wealth, material and spiritual, it is a searching question why such large sections of mankind have not accepted it.

Why did Islam spread? Islam had no such foundation or supports as Christianity. It came out of the Heat Belt when this belt had apparently shot its bolt and was

ceasing to be prolific in ideas. It began with the Arab race, one of the meagerly blessed of the races from a material standpoint, and it was not their native religion. It brought with it among its conquests no systematic philosophy or social organization. Teuton, Tatar, and Mongol invaders have swept forward with equal power, but have left no such permanent trace. There are explanations, social, political, and economic, which account in part for the tremendous expansive power of Islam. Its armies had able generals. Umar, the second Caliph, or successor, was an administrator of unusual ability. The entire Arab people, finding for the first time in Moslem brotherhood a national bond, rallied to the new movement with enthusiasm. The first successes and the promise of plunder stimulated a population oppressed by poverty. The Christian sects of the Levant, alienated by Byzantine intolerance, welcomed the invaders whose rule was in many ways a relief. Able Christian officials served the Caliph without abjuring their faith. Much of the civilizations of the conquered countries was absorbed.

The original dynamic intense religious conviction. None of these reasons, however, could account for what happened, had there not been back of them all the dynamic of a great faith. This faith had power because it met a religious need. It has been frequently remarked that no one can understand an intellectual or spiritual movement without taking into account the situation that makes it necessary and the conditions against which it protests. Mohammed, early left an orphan, grew up in Mecca amid crude idolatry and worldly pride. Probably through Christian hermits whose life condemned earthly vanity he learned of a God ruling with-

out rival over the whole universe, and of a judgment day in which everything opposed to God would be destroyed. The witnesses to this startling news were prophets sent from time to time to warn mankind, as recorded in sacred books. One day, while brooding alone in the desert heat over these ideas, Mohammed had a vision of one, afterward believed to be the Angel Gabriel, who ordered him to recite.

Here arose the first great problem of Mohammed's career. Was this message from God? No better evidence has been convincing to many before and since. It is a testimony to his sincerity that he went home in doubt. His wife comforted him and helped him to believe that he was the object of a divine revelation. There was nothing in the message itself that contradicted such a supposition. It rebuked unbelief and pride of wealth, and threatened these with hell-fire. It called Mohammed to warn the city of judgment to come. Would it have been better if Mohammed had been skeptical regarding these visions, rather than credulous?

Further messages brought promise of God's favor, commands to be steadfast in preaching and generous toward those in need.[2] A small group of relatives and neighbors accepted these words at their face value, gave up the worship of idols for that of Allah, the one God, and endured persecution. What greater proof had the Hebrew prophets that their witness was true?

Opposition and rejection by leading Meccans did not destroy Mohammed's confidence, and the faith of sincere men who had nothing to gain by it in this world only confirmed his conviction that he was appointed by God to warn the Arabs, who had hitherto had no prophet

[2] The first sixteen Suras in Rodwell's translation of the Koran indicate the character of the first preaching.

sent to them. Is it strange that one entrusted with such a mission and preserved from harm amid dangers came to regard his judgment as guided by God?

How Islam became a political organization. A second problem of immense significance for the future arose when Mohammed, having left Mecca and found among the people of Medina a welcome which was refused him by his own blood relations, was asked to legislate on public affairs. Here were factions, hitherto separated by tribal interests, now united in a new bond of faith, appealing to the prophet of God for just judgments. To decline would be to leave the new community without headship, to miss the opportunity to regulate political and social conditions, to cast doubt upon the adequacy of the Providence that had placed him in this situation.

Mohammed took the course that was perfectly natural under the circumstances, and yielded to the guidance of his inward impulse in passing on civil affairs. In this way Islam became a theocratic state, with its laws, as well as its beliefs, dictated by God. One result of this has been that in its social and political progress in the twentieth century the Moslem world is hampered by the letter of seventh century legislation, which claims divine inspiration.

Was Mohammed sincere? This question has been much debated. There are some people who, like Professor Margoliouth, represent Mohammed as practically laughing in his sleeve at the credulity of Abu Bekr and his other associates.[3] Such a view seems psychologically impossible. Others think that Mohammed began with absolute sincerity which he maintained while

[3] Margoliouth, D. S., *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam.* Heroes of the Nations Series.

under persecution at Mecca, but that when he attained power at Medina, he deliberately invented many of his prophetic announcements to gratify his lower impulses. Still others find the question perplexing. They accept as facts: (1) that much of Mohammed's preaching bears all the earmarks of deep and disinterested religious conviction; (2) that sayings which are not on the highest plane at least indicate candor and restraint; (3) that a number of enactments seem like sheer indulgence.

The question is, do these last imply conscious deception? Do the consciences of religious individuals always inform them to what extent they are being influenced by self-interest? Are emotional saints immediately self-convicted when they follow impulses mixed with selfishness? If a sensitive temperament once admits that strong inner urges are the voice of God, how is it to decide against later urges that at the moment seem plausible? Mohammed's sincerity can be preserved only at the expense of reflections on his character and judgment, but to modern psychology sanguine inconsistency is a much easier hypothesis than conscious imposition.

Principal Characteristics of Islam

1. *Reality and transcendence of God.* In attempting to characterize Islam as a religious and political system, we must constantly keep in mind the difference between ideal and actual Islam. The religion of Jesus and the common garden variety of Christianity are pretty far apart. Moslems themselves recognize that not all professors of their faith are worthy exponents of it. As a general characteristic of Islam, however, may be named a deep sense of the reality and transcendence

of God. This idea was a ruling passion with Mohammed. It has been all through the ages with individuals and groups of his followers. Before Allah, as before Jehovah, the nations are as a drop in the bucket and as the small dust of the balance. Anything but submission to such a Ruler is the height of folly. Mohammed lived in the fear of God. He was not systematic in his theological ideas [4] and did not attempt to reconcile transcendence with direct working, or predestination with free-will. He used many terms for God in a very poetic way. His emphasis on God as merciful is only to bring out the defenseless condition of man before Him.

For most religions the change to the Moslem idea of an elevated monotheism would be a great advance. Many of the arrangements of Moslem observances are especially well calculated to impress this conviction of the reality of God: the call from the minaret through the still air; the long rows in the great mosque, standing, kneeling, or prostrating in unison, the beggar beside the prince, unconscious of one another in the great Presence; the control of many small affairs of daily life by divine commands; the pious use in ordinary speech of the name of God; the discipline of fasting in the month of Ramadan; and the great gatherings of the Haj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. Add to these the absence of priesthood, which sets man face to face with Allah, a theology that rejects the idea of second causes and refers everything to God's direct mediation, and a naïve imagination that finds evidence of the supernatural in many trifling matters. Islam has been from the first an other-worldly religion, pessimistic as to the present age and looking forward to the day of judgment.

[4] Cf. Macdonald, D. B., *Encyclopedia of Islam.* Article "Allah."

2. *The personality of Mohammed.* A second characteristic is the impress left upon Islam by the personality of its founder. Mohammed was a great human. Like all such religious leaders, there has grown up around his life a mass of apocryphal stories and sayings which glorify his character. Modern investigation discovers beneath these an individual with strong passions and some notable frailties, but withal a remarkable personality. He apparently inspired men, not only with confidence, but with intense friendship. A fiery nature that at times blazed forth to his discredit was at other times held in wonderful restraint. Interesting comparisons might be drawn with such men as Luther and Cromwell. Those who ignore the darker traits will find much to praise in a commanding figure, a born ruler of men.

3. *The claim of absolute certitude.* A third great asset of Islam has been its confident claims. For the bulk of mankind certitude in religion is its most impressive quality. Almost anything regarding the unseen will be believed if it is only asserted with ringing conviction. Theologies which dispose of all difficulties by a few bold statements with appeals to crude imagination are likely to gain many followers, especially when they fall in behind such a sublime and compelling idea as that of monotheism. With its crisp creed, which puts no tax on any intellect, Islam is the most certain of all religions. It stands at the head in its claims for the infallibility of its scriptures.

The Koran represents the *ipsissima verba* of God dictated by the Angel Gabriel. The sayings and example of the Prophet, as handed down by the traditions, are absolutely binding. The statements of great theologians must be without question accepted. In some places the utter-

ance of a heterodox opinion may start a riot. The general characteristic of primitive religions is their uncertainty. Their myths, however picturesque, are obviously to be taken in a more or less Pickwickian sense. Through such crude beliefs Islam cuts as a knife through cheese. As Warneck says: "Islam neither proves, nor persuades, nor disputes; it simply asserts. What has heathen ignorance to oppose to such imperious certainty?" [5]

4. *The sense of superiority.* This leads to another asset—a superiority complex. The typical Moslem is not ashamed to look his fellow mortals in the eye. The final message of God to man was revealed in Arabic for his benefit in terms that cannot be compromised. The pride of the Confucian litterati or of the Brahman was as representatives of class or caste. The pride of the Moslem extends to every member of a faith that professes the right to rule the world, and which until recent times has associated with those of other religions only in the rôle of conqueror.

5. *The Day of Judgment.* A fifth characteristic which appealed more to past generations than to the present one was the sense of the Judgment and of Paradise. In days when passions were hot and restraints weak, men needed a vivid vision of a Great Assize which none could escape and in which all men should stand side by side before the bar. Men needed also a vision of a compensation from the ills and trials of this life awaiting those who were faithful unto death. Such a conception helps to create democracy in the sense that in its perspective distinctions of rank disappear.

[5] Warneck, J. L., *The Living Christ and Dying Heathenism*, p. 191.

6. *Specific religious observances.* A sixth characteristic is the provision for specific observance. Ritual has made great contributions to religious life. It may strengthen conviction and a sense of union with God, and also create social solidarity and *esprit de corps.* If it makes rigorous demands, it may cultivate hardness and willingness to sacrifice. It gives the worshiper some service that he can render to God and brings the satisfaction of having performed obligations. The Moslem prayers, demanded five times a day, have undoubtedly been to faithful observers a means of grace. The finer types have found in them spiritual nourishment; for the less sensitive the uniform worship at the mosques has been a religious drill. The requirement of alms has exalted the ideal of charity. The Ramadan fast, with its social feasting in the evenings, has promoted both abstinence and a sense of fellowship. The Haj has been called an exceedingly clever move in that it assembles from all parts of the Moslem world each year pilgrims to mingle and be impressed by the greatness and widespread sweep of their religion. All this definiteness of observance as well as of belief is a great satisfaction to the average man, especially to the dweller in the Heat Belt and the leisurely Oriental, who has no press of other duties to demand his attention.

7. *A fusing of religious and secular.* Finally, Islam is notable in being at once a religion, a social scheme, and a political order. Religions are generally conservative. Though they often protest against social or political evils, their tendency is to consecrate a modified form of the conditions under which they arose. They need constant prophetic messages to shake them out of their contentment with the status quo. Islam represents in a unique

way the fusing of the religious, social, and political. To a certain extent this has been a great asset. At a time when men needed binding rules for all of life, this union of elements made for stability. Islam holds its followers more firmly because those who leave it become political and social outcasts.

The Limitations of These Characteristics

1. *The absoluteness of God.* All these assets, of course, may turn to liabilities. The strong sense of God's reality may attach itself to too limited and specific conceptions of his nature and so prevent growth. The God of orthodox Islam is an absolute king, whose omnipotence leaves no room even for second causes. Matter has no properties to be investigated. "A man writes with a pen and a piece of paper, but God creates in his mind the will to write. At the same moment He gives him the power to write and brings about the apparent motion of the hand, of the pen, and the appearance on the paper. No one of these is the cause of the other. God has brought about by creation and annihilation of atoms the requisite combination to produce the appearance. . . . There is no nature belonging to things. Fire does not burn and a knife does not cut. God creates in a substance the being burned when the fire touches it and the being cut when the knife approaches it." [6]

This causes reaction toward mysticism. Despite the statements of systematic theologians, the common sense of mankind has always been too strong to permit an altogether consistent fatalism,[7] but Moslem exaltation

[6] Macdonald, D. B., *Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory,* pp. 204, 205; cf. also pp. 326-328.
[7] Lane, *Modern Egyptians,* p. 291. Everyman's Edition.

of the divine decrees has undoubtedly acted in a multitude of cases to paralyze effort. Acceptance of evil conditions is justified by references to kismet, fate, and to what is decreed. The idea of God's transcendence has been pressed too far, and the sense of his loving fatherhood has been lost. Allah may pardon sins, but he does not seek sinners. Sufi [8] influences have helped to supply the need for mystical contact to such an extent that Macdonald can say that Islam today is more mystical than Christianity has ever been. "From the earliest times there was an element in the Moslem church which was repelled equally by traditional teaching and by intellectual reasoning. It felt that the essence of religion lay elsewhere; that the seat and organ of religion was in the heart. In process of time all Islam became permeated with this conception in different degrees and various forms. More widely than was ever the case with Christianity, Islam became a mystical faith. All—the simple believers, the theologians of the schools, the philosophers—came in one form or another to the essential mystical position." [9]

2. *Mohammed not flawless.* So long as Mohammed is judged as a great religious reformer, he stands the test fairly well. If he had some notable faults, he also had many notable virtues. His training was limited and some of the issues he faced were peculiarly difficult. But the claims that have been made for him, founded largely on traditions that will not bear historical criticism, are bound to prove a handicap in a more skeptical age. As an infallible prophet or an impeccable saint, Mohammed

[8] The Sufis were at first ascetics who developed mystical exercises. Their influence has been especially felt in Persia.

[9] Macdonald, D. B., *Religious Attitude and Life in Islam,* p. 159.

is a failure. Continuous effort to represent him as unique is likely to cause reaction.

3. *Certitude supports superstition.* In the third place, the sense of the reality of the unseen may degenerate into superstition and hinder the practical use of reason. Like all intensely dogmatic religions, Islam has set its seal of certainty on too many things. Josh Billings has called attention to the disadvantage of knowing things that are not so. As already noted, Moslem claims of infallibility are not well prepared to resist modern scientific and historical research. Islam has canonized many ideas formulated in a pre-scientific age and seems destined to beat some very undignified retreats.

4. *Sense of superiority checks progress.* A superiority complex may be a terrible handicap if cherished without foundation. It has kept Moslem populations backward because they were too proud to learn from others. It has done most damage among the baser elements of the population, who vent their prejudices in insults, persecutions, lynchings, or massacres. Moslems consider themselves the favorites of Allah; in many countries they have been for centuries the ruling race; any turning of the tables, therefore, proves especially exasperating.

5. *The Judgment not sufficiently ethical.* The effect of a lively anticipation of the Day of Judgment depends upon the estimate of the qualities which are needed to meet it successfully. There are some fine sayings in the Koran and certain traditions which exalt sincerity, kindness, and the higher virtues. Some of the Moslem saints have shown real spiritual insight,[10] but the prevailing

[10] Cf. Zwemer, S. M. *A Moslem Seeker after God.*

persuasion is that orthodoxy of belief and correctness of observance are the main considerations. These are the things which acquit in the Judgment and open the gates of Paradise. Moreover, the language used in describing Paradise,[11] though declared by some theologians to be merely figurative of spiritual realities, will not be so regarded by the carnally minded.

6. *Observances become formal.* The limitations of very specific formal observances in all religions are that they may become meaningless habits, formulas staled by repetition. Prayers recited in Arabic by those who do not understand the language will not long remain inspiring. The performances that help to relieve the monotony of an uneventful existence, where time is of no consideration, do not fit in well with changing conditions. The greater variety of modern living makes them seem dull; the more strenuous urge of business competition makes them seem irksome; the growth of the critical spirit makes them seem flat. Routine observance is indispensable in religion, as Horace Bushnell said long ago,[12] but it should be adapted to support facts that have real significance for the present. Islam, especially in some of its sects, has gone much further than Christianity in stressing external details. Speech is loaded with blessings on the Prophet and other pious phrases.[13] A classic instance is that of Ibn Hanbal, founder of a famous school of law, who refused to eat melons because there was no tradition whether the Prophet cut the rind or broke it. Malcolm says: "What

[11] *Sura* 78, v. 33; 56, v. 22; 52, v. 20, etc., speak of damsels with swelling breasts and large, dark eyes, to whom believers will be wedded in paradise.

[12] *Sermons on Living Subjects*, XVI.

[13] Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, p. 284.

Persia needs is not so much a higher moral teaching, but a higher basis for morality. A religion that puts the commandment not to steal on the same level as the direction not to stew your dates, but to fry them, will never produce the high characters that will be found in such communities as the Parsi." [14]

7. Religious control may be a handicap. After considerable experiment, modern society has decided that separation of Church and State is the best arrangement. Religion should uplift social and political forces, but it cannot be trusted to hold them under ecclesiastical control. Different religions have recognized this fact and have abdicated more or less gracefully. Islam is now to have its turn and seems to be in for a trying experience. Cosmopolitanism is the order of the day in society and politics. In adjusting to this order, Islam will have some high hurdles to vault.

Theological Problems of Islam

Growth of tradition. Although the Koran undertook to legislate for the social needs of the community, it proved as inadequate as are codes and constitutions generally in providing for unforeseen conditions. Many questions arose which it did not answer. An effort was made to fill these gaps by quoting some saying or act of the Prophet, who might be considered a guide at all times and not only in his moments of special inspiration. Thus, the *Sunna,* or sacred custom, was affirmed, transmitted in the form of the *Hadith,* or traditions. Many of these may be accepted as genuine, but great numbers were undoubtedly invented. The Moslems

[14] Malcolm, D. B., *Five Years in a Persian Town,* p. 87.

themselves recognize this, since after a few centuries they sifted out of the huge mass a fraction of several thousands which had better claim to acceptance. The most famous of these collections is that of *Bukhari,* a knowledge of which is as important for the understanding of Islam as that of the Koran itself.

Borrowings in theology. While Mohammed was one of the great men of history, he was no systematic thinker, so that even this copious legacy of word and example was insufficient to satisfy acute and aspiring minds. Especially in Syria and Persia the Moslem soon came into contact with very different types of thought—the speculative theology of the Greek Church and later the philosophies of Aristotle, on the one hand, and of Plotinus, on the other. Rationalistic theologians arose who debated such characteristic issues as those of predestination and free-will and the attributes of God, by methods of dialectic borrowed from the Christians. As Becker says, Islam was able to borrow from Christianity because many of the original ideas of Mohammed were derived from that source.[15] Later Christian scholasticism was able to make such large use of Arab thought because the latter had been so impregnated with Christian influence. The thing to note is that all this mixture was not likely to result in a product that was very uniform, but rather in considerable diversity of belief, just as has been the case in Christianity. In the formation of the various sects of Islam, political and other factors have been at work, but different theological tendencies have also greatly contributed.

The two great sects, Sunnis and Shias. The principal division of the present is between Sunnis and

[15] *Christianity and Islam,* p. 96.

Shias. The former, who constitute a majority of the Moslem world in most countries, profess to follow the Sunna as codified by any one of the four great legal schools, all of which are orthodox. The differences are, for the most part, in the matter of minor points of ritual and law. For the last few centuries the bulk of this sect have regarded the Sultan of Turkey as their caliph, or temporal head. Shias, predominating in Persia and scattered through other countries, split originally on account of their devotion to the family of Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law. They have developed the doctrines of Imams, spiritual heads, and incarnations of God who have appeared from time to time in history. The last Imam is at present hidden, but will some day manifest himself. Shia theology has lent itself to various extravagant beliefs and has produced since its beginning numerous sects, some of them with secret doctrines. Some of these are among the curiosities of the history of religion. Between Shias and Sunnis there is much hostility, though differences of observance are not great.

Limits in theological legislation. A remarkable characteristic of Islam is the absence of an ordained priesthood. Among the Sunnis the caliph is not a pope. He is only an administrator of the sacred laws. There are no authoritative church councils to give final interpretation of dogmas. Some last court of appeal is a practical necessity. The nearest approach to this is found in the doctrine of Ijma, or agreement, according to which the consensus of opinion of the Moslem world is to be accepted as final. In theory this cannot set aside any explicit statement. It will be interesting to note whether practise goes further.

Among the Shias, pending the reappearance of

the Imam, the decision of the Mujtahids, or leading theologians, furnishes the final judgment. In theory, the Shah of Persia is no more competent to make laws than the Sultan of Turkey; both can only execute them. Legislators are under the same limitations, though statutes which do not transgress canon law are admissible.

Spiritual aspirations in Islam. From this standpoint Islam would seem to be a dry legalistic system particularly concerned about orthodoxy. One side of Islam certainly looks in this direction. But there are mitigations. On the one hand, both Koran and Sunna contain much that is fine and stimulating to the religious nature. The character of Mohammed was early idealized, and many traits worthy of imitation were attributed to him. A sincere and devout Moslem seeking for spiritual edification would find much in Islam to comfort him. On the other hand, Neo-Platonic, Christian, and Buddhist influences have turned great numbers of Moslems toward mysticism. This has taken different forms. With some, the Sufis, it has become a sort of pantheism in which the worshiper is absorbed into God or finds himself and God the same. There are spiritual stages attained by discipline, as in the case of Hindu and Christian mystics. Some claim to have risen above the restrictions of moral law; others have become ascetics with disregard of earthly things. Many dervish orders have been founded, a general feature of which are religious exercises to produce exaltation of spirit. The most common of these is the Dhikr, or remembrance, a repetition of the names of God which may result in the thrill of "getting religion" or in complete auto-hypnosis. In the latter state remarkable feats are sometimes performed. Today there are

many lay members who take part in certain kinds of Dhikrs and apparently find in them the sort of satisfaction which comes to some Christians in a prayer meeting of an emotional type.[16]

Contrasts in theology. As modern extremes in theology we have the rationalists in India and elsewhere, who deny that Mohammed sanctioned polygamy or slavery and profess to find little difference between Islam and liberal Christianity. They write, for example, "The greatest and most reprehensible mistake by Christian writers is to suppose that Mohammed adopted or legalized polygamy." [17] At the other end of the line, the Wahhabis of Central Arabia, rigid Puritans, support the most literal interpretations of the Koran and denounce all kinds of laxity.

Political Problems of Islam

Adjustment to changing conditions. On the political side Islam has been from the first a theocratic state. As Margoliouth remarks: "European jurisprudence undertakes to discuss and improve conditions; Moslem jurisprudence only to understand and administer divine commands." [18] When Mohammed acted as oracle of God in passing on civil legislation, he gave divine sanction to some wholesome reforms, but failed to provide for changing conditions. When Jesus said: "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," he left the way open for future political developments for which the world was not then ready. Here we find one of the great

[16] For interesting descriptions see Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam*, pp. 160-175, and Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, pp. 451 ff.
[17] Amir Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, third edition, p. 323.
[18] *Mohammedanism*, p. 112.

problems of Islam, as well as of all systems which oppose an ancient literalism to the spirit of the new age. Can canon law based on an infallible Koran and on the words and example of the Prophet, be made to meet twentieth century needs without such obvious misquotations as to discredit it altogether. Wonders have been performed in this line by various neo-religions, but Islam presents a much stiffer proposition than the average.

Possibilities of democracy: freedom from race prejudice. Especially interesting in this connection will be the adventures of democratic government in the Moslem world. Islam has a democracy of its own. As a whole it has been pronounced much more free from race and class prejudice than Christianity. As Macdonald says: "In the combination of the necessarily dominant European races with Christianity lies the greatest problem of the Christian missionary. In the modern world at least Christianity has never been able by its weight and breadth to obliterate the distinctions of race. To have attained this with success is the glory and danger of Islam."[19] Professor Sirajuddin quotes the inquiry of a Hindu in a Moslem mosque who asked where was the place for the Nawab (prince) at prayers. He had difficulty in making the question understood. The idea that the Nawab, on account of his rank, would have any special position assigned him seemed altogether strange.[20] One of the reasons that the darker races gravitate more naturally towards Islam than toward Christianity is the comparative absence of discrimination against them. This is not the fault of the Christian charter, which could not be more broad and universal, but of modern Nordics who are straitened in their own minds.

[19] *Aspects of Islam,* pp. 286-287.
[20] *Vital Forces of Islam,* p. 166.

Treatment of other religions. When it comes to the treatment of other religions the story is different. On the one hand, it is true that in some periods the Moslem world has compared very favorably with Christendom, as is admitted even by Dr. Zwemer.[21] The attitude of some of the early Christian sects toward the Moslem conquests has been already mentioned. Jews fled out of Europe, especially Spain, into Turkey on account of the milder treatment they received there.[22] In almost nothing has Christianity been more inconsistent than in its persecution of heretics and infidels up to modern times. Perhaps the best that can be said for either religion is that the ages were harshly intolerant in spirit, and that individuals and communities rose above the spirit of the times.

The alternatives offered by conquering Islam. It has been often pointed out that the widespread notion that the only alternative offered by Moslem armies was Islam or the sword is not correct. There were three alternatives. Those who accepted Islam became members of the conquering nation and as such were liable to conscription in the armies. Those of the book-religions, i.e., Judaism and Christianity, who submitted were permitted to retain their faith and their ecclesiastical heads who had general oversight of their civil affairs, but in return for protection and exemption from military service they were required to pay a tax. Those who continued to resist were treated with harsh rigor.

[21] *Law of Apostasy in Islam,* p. 82.

[22] Arnold, *Preaching of Islam,* p. 156. Arnold has gathered a great amount of evidence to illustrate the kindly treatment of other religions by Moslems, but makes only casual mention of persecution on the ground that this is not his subject; Zwemer, in the *Law of Apostasy in Islam,* makes a less extended statement on the other side.

This, in theory, was a fair arrangement. Arnold takes great pains in collecting evidence of its fair administration. He says that many of the conversions from Christianity to Islam that have taken place were due primarily to the isolation of Christian sects, their lack of instruction, and neglect by their spiritual shepherds.[23] His book goes far to disprove the idea that the severity of the Moslem world of certain periods and sections was universal. Apparently many Moslems must be credited with large humanity. It may even be true that up to comparatively modern times Islam has on the whole been more tolerant of other faiths than Christendom has. But even Arnold must admit that there have been massacres on altogether insufficient provocation, that reasonable taxes were often rapaciously collected, and that care of the subject peoples was often most unenviable. The fact that Christian churches still survive in the midst of the Moslem world, cut off from the main currents of Christian progress, with clergy for the most part uneducated and unspiritual, considered by Protestant missionaries who visited them to be in sad need of reviving, and yet maintaining their organization to this day, indicates that conversion to Islam has not been compelled. On the other hand, great numbers have undoubtedly gone over to Islam during the centuries in order to improve conditions that were at times very grievous.

The capitulations a practical expedient. Under the Ottoman Turks, Christians and Jews were subject to the so-called capitulations. These are traced by Sir Charles Eliot [24] to arrangements of the Byzantine Empire, according to which foreign communities were given practical autonomy. This matter of ecclesiastical or racial groups

[23] *Preaching of Islam,* pp. 104-132.
[24] *Turkey in Europe,* pp. 116-118.

within the state, which have been excluded from full political and social rights and made a realm within a realm, has caused the Moslem world some trying experiences which should warn the rest of the world against racial or religious discrimination.

Influence of observances on political cohesion. Two further comments may be made on the political aspect of Islam. It has already been noted that a number of the Moslem regulations are well calculated to promote political *esprit de corps*. The frequent gatherings at the mosque, the fasting of Ramadan, and the coming together at Mecca of pilgrims all the way from the East Indies to West Africa, have combined to help in uniting the Moslem world. The fact that these observances are not ideal should not lead us to ignore their significance from the political standpoint. Influences that break them down will have political as well as religious significance.

Islam must adjust to loss of political power. For over a century one of the most striking developments of history has been the decay of Moslem political power. This means that Islam will have to accommodate itself to other conditions than those of a political conquering faith. The old habits for the time persist, so that European authority often finds it expedient to make special concessions to Moslem prejudice, such as the closing of government offices on Fridays instead of Sundays, including the Koran in the government educational curriculum, etc. Arnold insists that Islam has always spread most rapidly when force was least in evidence,[25] and prophesies that under European control its finer qualities will be promoted and its missionary zeal increased.[26] This remains to be seen.

[25] Per contra, Zwemer, *Law of Apostasy*, p. 136.
[26] *Preaching of Islam*, pp. 476-477.

Social Problems of Islam

Social observances have religious sanctions. Islam is a system not only religious and political, but social. It has already been remarked that many observances of social life that we should consider purely secular are prescribed by religion. "'If I become a Christian, when and how am I to wash myself?' is one of the commonest questions for an inquirer to put to a missionary. Another very common inquiry is, 'How am I to dress?' The Mussulman hardly understands you if you tell him that such points are left to the individual judgment. . . . In Yezd we are continually being asked whether the commonest peculiarities of European custom, such as eating with a knife or fork, were ordained by Christ."[27] In this, of course, Islam is not unique among religions. But just as the reaction against some of the unlovely formality and cant of Puritanism and later against some of the conventionality of mid-Victorianism has swept away for certain classes many of the finer moral restraints, so the effect of freer intercourse with Europe may set up in Moslem society some devastating tendencies.

Intermarriage with other races. On the social side, Islam is remarkable for the variety of its social contacts and its absence of race discrimination. When the average person thinks of a Christian, he pictures a white man; the name Buddhist suggests an Oriental of Eastern Asia; but a Moslem may be a Malay, a Chinese, an Indian, a Persian, a Turk, an Arab, or a Negro. Moreover, from the earliest days, when captive women in Arab harems bore children to man the Moslem armies, interbreeding has been a commonplace. Racially, the Moslem is not

[27] Malcolm, *Five Years in a Persian Town,* p. 125.

exclusive. All sorts of blood flow in his veins in all sorts of mixtures. There may be in our present stages of social and international development some excellent reasons against racial intermarriage, but the religion that frowns upon it will be handicapped in the matter of world conversion. As Gairdner remarks: "This readiness on the part of the Moslem to intermarry with whatever race he conquered or dwelt among was and still is the most potent means of making that race Islamized. And *per contra,* history has shown us that where the ruling race will not intermarry with its subjects, be its prestige what it may, the fact of its being the ruler will alienate its subjects from its faith, not attract them to it. The white race, and Christianity with it, has had a fearful handicap here." [28]

The woman question. It is in connection with the position of women that Islam shows its weakest side. Some unjustified charges may be noted. Polygamy has always been restricted for economic reasons, if for no other. The Koran does not assert that women have no souls, but holds out to them the hope of Paradise. Individual women have been well educated and have attained prominence. In Moslem home life there has been much ideal affection. But, on the other hand, the example of Mohammed was, to say the least, unfortunate. Attempts to represent his numerous matrimonial unions as occasioned by a desire to provide for women without protectors are not convincing. As Macdonald says, it would have made an enormous difference in the position of woman in Islam if Mohammed had been a monogamist and had encouraged his wife to go with an unveiled face.[29] The Koran expressly permits four wives (Sura

[28] *Rebuke of Islam,* pp. 77-78.
[29] *Aspects of Islam,* p. 134.

4, v. 3), with the addition of female slaves, wife beating (Sura 4, v. 38), seclusion of women (Sura 33, v. 54), and promises to true believers large-eyed maids in Paradise (Sura 52, v. 30). Such things are not assets to a religion. The facility of divorce, however natural a corollary it may seem to strict separation of the sexes before marriage, has been in cases tremendously abused. Lane says that Egyptians sometimes married thirty or more wives in the course of ten years.[30]

Lack of wholesome home life. Such conditions will react very unfavorably on home life. Some of the most serious social problems in the West are resulting from the lowered efficiency of the home in many quarters. Sociologists warn us of the danger of further weakening. Islam faces a new world without one of the main sources of the strength of Christianity—wholesome home life.

The seclusion of women. The seclusion of women is generally held to be based on a statement of the Koran said to have been called forth by an unfortunate incident in Mohammed's life. It has been a heavy handicap to Moslem society. It varies in strictness in different countries and among different classes, being a mark of social standing. Margoliouth quotes a writer in the *Journal of Reformed Islam*,[31] who mentions seven practical evils attending the use of the veil. This has had a marked effect on the religion of the community. What an immense difference there would be in Christianity without the church attendance and practical Christian activities of its women! Women do attend mosques in certain parts of the Moslem world, but

[30] *Modern Egyptians*, Everyman's Edition, p. 188. Cf. the incidents in *Our Moslem Sisters*, p. 40.

[31] Margoliouth, *Mohammedanism*, pp. 136-137.

they are not permitted to mingle with men lest the latter should have their attention distracted by carnal thoughts. In what we call church work, women have had no practical share. Islam is a religion primarily for lay-*men*.

Further Limitations

A word in closing as to economic and intellectual limitations.

General economic backwardness. Economically, Islam arose among a people living in barren regions, to whom the material rewards of conquest were exceedingly grateful. In theory Arabs were to be soldiers supported by the people they subjected, although, as a matter of fact, many of them acquired great wealth. This arrangement, and especially the prohibition of usury, tended to throw trade and money-lending into the hands of non-Moslems. The political control of Mongols and Turks worked in the same direction.

Today countries under Moslem rule are backward economically, and in business ability the Moslems are likely to be behind the rest of the population. In a century when the power of concentrated capital is so great, Islam is not well equipped for competition.

Intellectual limitations. Intellectually, there was a time when Islam outshone Christendom in attainment. This was due, not so much to original contributions, as to earlier contact with Aristotle. The acquaintance with Arabic philosophy marked an epoch in European thought. From the time of the Renaissance, however, Europe has far outdistanced the Moslem world, which has found the supervision of the orthodox a hindrance. In art, sculpture was entirely forbidden, painting less so, while music

remained on a low plane. Poetry has been very copious in quantity, but limited in variety.[32] Prose, with few exceptions, has been unable to develop large or complex designs. Arabic on the whole is not one of the world's great literatures.

Such is a very meager sketch of a very remarkable religion looked at dispassionately as a historical phenomenon. This outline may help in studying the effect of twentieth century changes on this system, and the responsibility created for Christians by the people who constitute the Moslem world.

[32] Margoliouth, *Mohammedanism,* pp. 228 ff.

CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF ISLAM AND SOME PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS

The rapid radiating spread of Islam in its first century has already been mentioned. On the day that Mohammed died there were two great empires which commanded the thoughts of the Western world: the East Roman or Byzantine, with its capital at Constantinople, and the Persian. These two had locked horns with varying results, but considered no third opponent worthy of serious notice. Yet out of the desert there came armies of Arabs united for the first time in a single cause, which in a series of battles overwhelmed the strongest forces these great empires could send against them. The Persian monarchy altogether collapsed, and the whole country came under Moslem rule. The Byzantine Empire lost Syria, Egypt, and Tripoli, and twice within the century was besieged in its capital, but it managed to retain the bulk of Asia Minor for a few hundred years more. Never since the time of Alexander the Great had so much territory been overrun by a single power in so short a period.[1]

The Shia martyrs. The fourth caliph was Ali, son-in-law of Mohammed (657-662 A.D.). He was opposed and assassinated, and a new dynasty, the Ummayyad, set up at Damascus. He and his two sons, Hasan and Hussein, all of whom died violent deaths, are, to this day, regarded by the Shia sect as martyrs. On the tenth day of the month Muharram the deaths of Hasan

[1] See map, "Expansion of Islam," page 48.

and Hussein are celebrated with an emotion that, on the part of many participants, is evidently violent and uncontrollable. Men cut their heads and breasts until they fall unconscious from loss of blood. These ceremonies have often been described.[1]

A borrowed civilization. At Damascus Islam came into contact with Greek theology, which greatly influenced all its subsequent thinking. The Arabs had brought with them from the desert no experience for dealing either with philosophical speculation or political administration on a large scale. They therefore borrowed extensively, retaining not only much of the machinery of government but many of the former officials. The Arabic language penetrated everywhere, but the so-called Arabic civilization was taken over from conquered peoples, although original additions were made later.

From Spain to China. The Ummayyad dynasty lasted nearly a century, during which time the Moslem armies pushed along the north coast of Africa all the way to the Atlantic, crossed the Straits of Gibraltar in 711 A.D., and set up a rule in Spain which later became independent and remained for over seven hundred years. Europe owed much to this civilization. Ibn Rushd, known as Averroes, a Spanish Moslem, was the greatest medieval commentator on Aristotle, to whom the European scholastics were very deeply indebted.[2] During the Ummayyad period the boundary of Islam was also being pushed to the east. Moslem merchants and troops were settling even in China.

[1] Wilson, *Persian Life and Customs,* chap. xi; Lyell, *The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia,* chap. iii; Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam,* pp. 91 ff.

[2] Macdonald, *Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory,* p. 265.

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

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The Abbasids at Baghdad. The next dynasty of caliphs, and the best known of all, was the Abbasid, which founded Baghdad in 762 A.D. Harun ar-Rashid, the Caliph of the Arabian Nights (786-809 A.D.), represents the high-water mark of this dynasty. His capital was one of the most splendid cities of the age, noted for culture as well as for wealth. The court of his contemporary, Charlemagne, in spite of its attempts to promote learning, was crude in comparison.

Fatimids in Cairo. The Abbasid Empire was so great that it was unwieldy. Rival dynasties, tracing descent from Fatima, the daughter of Mohammed, who married Ali, arose in North Africa and in 969 A.D. obtained control of Egypt. These Fatimid dynasties were, of course, of the Shia sect. It was from these, and not long after this, that the famous Druze sect was founded, which set up its headquarters in the Lebanon.

Events of the eleventh century. The eleventh century A.D. contained some striking events in the history of the Moslem world. First there may be mentioned waves of invasion into India, which pushed steadily across the northern plains to Bengal. A second great event was the coming of the Saljuq Turks from Central Asia. Various Turkish tribes had entered into the service of the caliphs, much as the northern barbarians of Europe did into that of the Roman Emperors. Many of these were slaves, and great numbers of other slaves were imported for use as soldiers. The old story repeated itself. Those who had the power used it, and the caliph became more or less of a figurehead. Finally, in 1055, the head of the Saljuq Turks assumed the title of Sultan of Baghdad and became the real head of the empire. His successor, Alp Arslan, defeated the forces of the Eastern

Empire at Manzikert in 1071. Asia Minor was thus lost to Constantinople. This advance of the Saljuq Turks led to the third great event of the century, the beginning of the Crusades.

A fourth event of much future significance was the founding in 1077 of Timbuktu in the far-distant Sudan. This soon became a strong Moslem center. Writing in the middle of the fourteenth century, the Arab traveler Ibn Batuta says that unless one went very early to the mosque on Fridays it was almost impossible to find a place, so great were the crowds in attendance. Finally, we note the rise of one of the Shia sects, the Assassins, so called from their use of hashish, whose head, in Crusading times, was known and feared as "The Old Man of the Mountains."

The most striking Moslem political figure of the twelfth century was Saladin, who ruled in Egypt and who conquered Jerusalem. He is one of the heroes of Scott's *Talisman.*

The Mongol invasion. The thirteenth century is notable for the oncoming of the Mongols. Jenghis Khan, one of the great scourges of mankind, was born in Central Asia about 1162 A.D. In his invasions of China his armies are said to have killed eighteen million people.[3] In 1219 he conquered Turkestan, an adjoining region, with great cruelty and slaughter. Of this tragic episode it is written: "When the Mongol army had marched out of the city of Herat, a miserable remnant of forty persons crept out of their hiding places and gazed horror-stricken on the ruins of their beautiful city—all that was left out of a population of over one hundred thousand."[4] Another account makes the num-

[3] *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. IV, p. 634.
[4] Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam,* p. 218.

ber that were killed much greater. Jenghis and his successors ravaged the Moslem world from India to the Mediterranean. They were not civilized by their conquests as other barbarian invaders have been, because in so many cases they left no one alive to teach them anything. They inspired such terror that on one occasion it is said that the inhabitants of a whole village stood trembling and permitted themselves to be butchered by a single Mongol soldier.

These terrible warriors under Hulagu captured Baghdad in 1258. An eminent historian has called it "the most terrible catastrophe that ever overwhelmed a century-old and blooming civilization." [5] Eight hundred thousand inhabitants are said to have been massacred.[6] The ancient system of irrigation was completely destroyed. From this Mongol conquest Moslem culture never recovered, although the Egyptian Mameluks, by a victory in 1260, held the invaders out of Africa. This Mongol conquest is one of the factors that has been much cited in discussing the arrest of Moslem civilization.

The appearance of the Ottomans. It is hardly surprising that peoples lying in the path of the Mongol invasion should take what opportunities there were to move out. A tribe of Turks which did so is reported in the middle of the thirteenth century to have come upon a battle being fought near Angora between Mongols and Saljuq Turks.[7] The leader had no special interest in either party. "With the nomad love of a scrimmage and a warrior's sympathy for the weaker side, he led his four hundred riders pell-mell into the fray and won the day" for the Saljuqs. This act, if the story is authentic,

[5] Muller, *Der Islam,* Vol. II, p. 235.
[6] *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. III, pp. 279 and 642.
[7] Lane-Poole, *Turkey, Story of the Nations,* p. 8.

established a great empire. The timely aid was handsomely rewarded, and the newcomers settled down and carved out their fortunes. In 1299, just as the curtain was falling on this eventful century, a certain Osman, or Othman, inherited the leadership and made his energy so felt that his descendants are called to this day Osmanli, or Ottoman Turks.

Note, incidentally, that about this time Islam had spread all the way to the East Indies and had made a decided impression in Malacca.

The Ottoman shock troops. Osman's son devised a notable plan. In organizing his subjects for military service he enrolled "a thousand of the finest boys from among the families of the Christians conquered in campaigns against the Greeks."[8] In some cases this enrolment imposed great hardship; in others it seems to have been even sought. In any event, the troops so created showed no trace of their origin, for they became the fiercest fighters in the Ottoman armies and a main agency of Ottoman conquest. They were the famous Janissaries. With their aid the Turks crossed into Europe and captured Adrianople as early as 1361.

Timur's invasion and the fall of Constantinople. In the fifteenth century the Near East was subjected to another tremendous invasion. Timur the Tatar, sometimes known as Tamerlane, was born in western Turkestan and became a Moslem. His conquests extended from southeastern Russia to Delhi. He overran Persia and Syria, and in 1402 utterly defeated the Ottoman Sultan, Bayazid. It seemed as if the Turkish power had suffered a fatal collapse. But it was fortunate in having for a long period a succession of able and energetic rulers,

[8] Lane-Poole, *Turkey, Story of the Nations,* p. 26.

with a single exception, all the way from Osman to Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566). Moreover, it was a time when fighting qualities counted for much. Thus, in spite of the Tatar invasion, the Ottomans recuperated their strength. Only half a century afterward, in 1453, they took Constantinople and turned the Church of St. Sofia into a Moslem mosque, as it remains to this day.

As the century went out, Persia, which had been under various rulers, established a native dynasty, the Safawi, and, except for a few years, has maintained her independence since that time.

The limit of high water. The sixteenth century is another notable one in the history of the Moslem world. The Turkish Sultan, Selim the First (1514-1517), extended his control over Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and part of Arabia, and received the homage of Algiers. His successor, Suleiman the Magnificent, swept over Hungary and in 1529 besieged Vienna. The Ottoman Empire was in the height of its vigor and power and was justly feared by Europe.

The Great Moguls. At this time there was founded in India in 1526 the dynasty of the so-called Great Moguls. The most illustrious of these, Akbar the Great, overlapped Queen Elizabeth in his rule by two years at each end (1556-1605). He organized all of North India into an empire. His grandson built the Taj Mahal. Mogul power never controlled more than a part of South India.

Signs of decay. During the eighteenth century Moslem political power showed marked signs of weakening. After Suleiman the Magnificent, the Sultans represented a low average of ability. Pears says that some of the earlier and more able Sultans were the sons of Christian

mothers, while those of the last two centuries were usually the offspring of uneducated women, often slaves chosen for their physical beauty. The scientific laws of heredity were not known at the time, and if they had been, would have been denounced by Moslem theologians as an interference with the absolute will of God. All the same, they appear to have operated pretty consistently in the grade of ruler which they furnished to the empire. Not long after a second unsuccessful siege of Vienna, Hungary regained its independence in 1699. Turkey ceased to be a menace to Christendom.

Setbacks in India. In India a young British clerk named Clive, who had shown great military talent and received the chief command under stress of emergency, routed the army of the Moslem ruler of Bengal at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. The Mogul emperors had already been weakened by both Persian and Afghan invasions and by Marathi uprisings. From now on their decline was rapid. Though their nominal power lasted just a century longer, their practical control became only a memory.

The Wahhabi movement. During all these years Arabia had gathered pilgrims at the annual Haj, but in other ways had exerted little influence on the Moslem world. Now out of this remote center came signs of life. A certain Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab, was born near the beginning of the eighteenth century in Nejd, a large oasis of Central Arabia. He was impressed with the corruptions of Islam and undertook to restore its original literalism and simplicity. He followed Ibn Hanbal, the most conservative of the four Moslem Doctors of Law. He condemned many customs as lax innovations, and denounced other Moslems. For

him the cardinal sin was polytheism, which meant the adoration of saints with God. He founded in Nejd a strong kingdom which sent out armies to capture the Shia holy city of Kerbela in 1801, and soon afterward both Mecca and Medina, which it held for some years.

Effects of the movement. From this occupation there came momentous consequences. A pilgrim from the western Sudan, Uthman dan Fodio, happened to be in Mecca at the time and got a strong infection of Wahhabi enthusiasm. He returned to his people, the Fula, or Fulbe, headed a revival of Islam with Wahhabi doctrines, and by the time of his death had subdued the whole of Hausaland and brought one of the most vigorous races of West Africa into the fold. Other pilgrims carried the same ideas far in the opposite direction, to Sumatra, and founded another militantly aggressive movement which was put down by the Dutch only after considerable exertion. Syed Ahmad of Oudh, an ex-bandit, began preaching reform in India and was much stimulated by a pilgrimage to Mecca, in 1822, in which he felt Wahhabi influences. He proclaimed himself a prophet and headed a revolt.[9] He was defeated and killed, but the Wahhabi spirit in India has persisted to this day.

Another notable product of this Arabian fundamentalism was the great order of the Sanusiyah, founded in 1837 by Mohammed ibn Ali As-Sanusi, likewise as a result of a visit to Mecca. It spread through the oases of northern Africa, with its principal headquarters at Jaghabub (or Jarabub). Most of the order settled in *zawias,* or monasteries, where they cultivated the ground and prepared for war. It was held by many

[9] Hunter, *Our Indian Musalmans,* pp. 12 ff., 60 ff.

that if Islam could be aroused to combine in a *jihad,* the Sanusiyah would be the most formidable opponent of Christendom.

Losses in Europe. This brings us down to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which the break up of Moslem political power has gone on at an increasing rate. We have first the independence of the Balkan States. Greece, Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria have one after another secured autonomy and extended their boundaries at the expense of the Turkish Empire, until only a small territory in Europe is left, including Constantinople and the possession of the Straits.[10]

The independence of Egypt. Next, Egypt departed by a devious route. In 1808 Mohammed Ali, an illiterate Albanian of great native ability, taking advantage of the confusion resulting after Napoleon's invasion, became governor, slaughtered the Mameluks whom he found too difficult to control, and ruled with vigor. He inflicted a severe defeat on the Wahhabis and would probably have overthrown the Turkish Sultan but for the intervention of the European Powers. This was one of several occasions when the collapse of Turkey was arrested only because it seemed to the interests of Western diplomats to stave it off.

Mohammed Ali obtained recognition as a practically independent ruler. His grandson, Ismail, who received the title of Khedive played the next move in a game that has since become familiar, when he mortgaged his country to French and British creditors by great extravagance. This led to a Joint Commission on the Public Debt, with foreign control of the finances. This relation of Western

[10] See map, "Expansion and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," page 64.

capitalism to backward nations, known as economic imperialism, is especially liable to cause friction when creditors and debtors represent civilizations that are antagonistic.

An uprising in 1882 led to a virtual British protectorate, which was formally declared in 1914 at the outbreak of the World War. There is no doubt that the country has been much better governed under British "advisers." [11] Irrigation has been greatly promoted, and the lot of the fellahin, or peasants, improved. But imagination and tact as well as justice and efficiency are needed in governing other peoples.[12] Especially today, after a war that was ostensibly to vindicate the rights of small nations, and after a partition of territory that was made on the basis of self-determination, alien control is unpopular. Egypt has now been declared independent with certain reservations designed to protect the Suez Canal. This is the single example of a state which represents in recent times an accession to Moslem political rule.

European control in Africa. Outside of Egypt possessions in Africa have fallen into European hands. As far back as 1669 the Barbary Corsairs decided that they had had enough of their Turkish pasha, and shipped him back to Constantinople. They then proceeded to manage their own affairs, to the great detriment of the commerce of Christendom. In 1830 France occupied the coast of Algeria and after considerable fighting annexed the entire country with its hinterland, clear across to the Sahara. In 1881 she moved into Tunis and since 1912

[11] On the character of Turkish rule, cf. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, Everyman's Edition, pp. 130 and 315.

[12] On some practical aspects of this question, cf. Chirol, *The Egyptian Problem*, pp. 104-105, 209 ff., 303.

has had a protectorate over Morocco, with the exception of a small section assigned to Spain. Libya, commonly known as Tripoli, was attacked and conquered by Italy in 1912.

Also in the Sudan and Central Africa great stretches of country once more or less under Moslem control became colonial possessions of Europe.

The Russian advance. In another quarter Russia has advanced at Moslem expense. A few centuries ago she suffered repeated invasions from Central Asia, many of the invaders being Moslem or semi-Moslem. She thus came to have Moslem subjects in her European territory. Later, especially from 1865 on, she pushed down into Turkestan. In 1907, by a convention with England, she created what was practically a sphere of influence in North Persia, which has since been declared void.

What may be expected of the Soviet Government is not altogether clear. In 1920, with the aid of a faction which called itself the Young Bukharan Party, it expelled the Amir of Bukhara, who under the Tsar had been much in the position of the native princes of India, with a Resident from the Imperial Government at his court. Since then it is claimed that Russia has been more thoroughly in control. In the same year this government signed a treaty acknowledging the independence of Afghanistan and exchanging ministers.

Masses ruled by England and Holland. In India, while a number of the native princes are Moslem, Great Britain is still in ultimate control. There are nearly 70,000,000 Mohammedans on Indian soil.

Another vast Moslem population in territory administered by Europe is in the East Indies, the bulk of it, estimated at over 35,000,000, under the Dutch flag.

A religion which claims the right to rule has thus at first seemed to vindicate its claim in the most spectacular way, but is now left with only a remnant of its former political power. As the Moslem faces the future he may be sure that a new stage of experience is before him.

Some Present Storm Centers

Let us next note briefly some of the live situations in different parts of the Moslem world today.

Present-day Arabia. One of these is certainly in Arabia. The country seems doomed by nature to be a backward region. Economically, it is on a very low level. Today the commerce of the world steams past it on the west through the Red Sea without stopping, and another great trade channel is developing on the east through the Persian Gulf. But the caravans that cross the desert carry a total of very trifling value. The railway that was built to Medina in 1906 was for pilgrim traffic rather than commercial purposes.

Influence of the desert on theology. The natural surroundings have influenced both character and theology. On the latter point Dr. Paul Harrison, in a letter written for this book, says:

"It is no accident that this is the Arab vision of God. Long before that picture was written by Mohammed into the Koran, God himself had written it on the desert. No one will ever really understand it until he too reads it from those pages. In the sandy deserts the yellowish, cream-colored sand drifts into great dunes fifty feet high or even more. In the fresh morning they are out-

lined against a blue sky absolutely without a fleck or a cloud. There is not an artificial line in the picture. It is God's handiwork, unmarred by a single human element. In it is to be seen clean and naked and beautiful the omnipotence of God and his stern, silent beauty. What is man when one stands in the presence of the omnipotent God with the blue sky above as clear and bright and pure as his own holiness, and all around the great yellow desert as inscrutable and resistless as his own will?

"The Moslem faces God as he faces the desert. Before its omnipotence he bows in utter humility. By conformity to its laws he hopes to live, and, as a usual thing, he can. But there are times when it turns upon him in remorseless cruelty and swallows him up as a helpless insect. It is on the desert that Mohammed found his picture of God, a God as omnipotent as the desert itself, but tinged always with an unpredictable caprice and essentially heartless and cold in his utter isolation."

A Wahhabi revival. Out of this desert has come a new revival of Wahhabism. The early Wahhabis were driven out of Mecca by an expedition from Egypt in the eighteenth century and their capital in Nejd was captured. For a long time their power seemed to be on the wane, but now they have raised their heads once more. Ibn Saud, a leader of great personal force, with a few followers captured the city of Riadh in 1901 and has grown in strength. He has formed a brotherhood, the Ikhwan, Bedouin of various tribes who have been settled in colonies among the oases as cultivators ready to be used as soldiers in his war. Philby,[13] a British officer,

[13] Philby, *The Heart of Arabia,* Vol. I, pp. 79 ff.

gives a very interesting description of Ibn Saud. The latter told Philby that he had already married seventy-five times, divorcing one of his four wives whenever another woman happened to attract him. In the words of Philby: "He found the Bedouin homeless, poor, and without religion, and cursed with a tribal organization which made united action impossible and strife inevitable —in the new colonies he has settled them on land with the fear of God and the hope of paradise in their hearts, substituting the brotherhood of a common faith for that of a common ancestor, and thus uniting in common allegiance to himself as the vicegerent of God elements hitherto incapable of fusion."

Ibn Saud's capture of Mecca and the report of the bombardment of Medina have aroused indignation among orthodox Sunnis. A statement to the Moslem world in general, signed by the Mecca Young Men's Ethical Association, the Mecca National Association, and the Mecca Liberal Party, protests against the severity of the Wahhabi occupation, the punishments inflicted on those who were found smoking, and the imposition of Wahhabi doctrines.[14] Gatherings in India have denounced the desecration of sacred places by Ibn Saud. Further developments should command our close attention.

Egyptian nationalism. Another center of tension is in Egypt. The spirit of nationalism, which for several decades has been in evidence, has now become intense. The country has long been exposed to European influence, but the bulk of the great Moslem majority has been

[14] *The Near East,* Sept. 10, 1925, p. 310. On the present situation in Northeast Arabia cf. *The Arab at Home,* by Paul W. Harrison, one of the most interesting missionary books written in a long time.

conservative. Between it and the Coptic minority of less than one tenth of the population there has been friction. Traditions of disinterested public service have not been developed. Now the nationalistic spirit, however, is beginning to draw together those of different creeds. The new Egyptian constitution, published April 19, 1923, states: "All Egyptians are equal before the law . . . without any distinction of race, of language, or of religion. . . . The State protects . . . the free exercise of every religion or faith, provided it does not injure either the public order or morality. . . . Within limits of the law, everyone has a right freely to express his thoughts by word, by writing, by design, or in any other manner. . . . Islam is the religion of the State."[15] If public opinion will permit this law to be administered fairly, much will be gained.

Effects of European influences on Moslems. As to the effect of these contacts on the Egyptian, the words of Lord Cromer, often quoted, are worthy of study:

"Nominally, the Europeanized Egyptian is, in the majority of cases, a Moslem; in reality he is generally an agnostic. The gulf between him and the *Alim*[16] of the Al Azhar University is as great as between the *Alim* and a European. . . . The truth is that in passing through the European educational mill the young Egyptian Moslem loses his Islamism, or at all events he loses the best part of it. He cuts himself adrift from the sheet anchor of his creed. He no longer believes that he is always in the presence of his Creator, to whom he will some day have to render an account of his actions. He may still, however, take advantage of the least worthy por-

[15] *The Moslem World,* July, 1924, pp. 305-306.
[16] Learned (*teacher*).

tions of his nominal religion, those portions, namely, which in so far as they tolerate a lax moral code adapt themselves to his tastes and to his convenience in the affairs of this world. . . .

"The Egyptian free thinker . . . finds himself launched on a troubled sea, without rudder and without any pilot. Neither his past history nor his present associations impose any effective moral restraint upon him. . . . He rushes blindfold into the arms of European civilization, unmindful of the fact that what is visible to the eye constitutes merely the outward signs of that civilization, while the deep-seated ballast of Christian morality, which regulates the occasionally eccentric movements of the vessel, is hidden beneath the surface and is difficult of acquisition by the pseudo-European imitator of the European system.

"It is, however, to be remembered that the Oriental has a remarkable capacity for assimilating to himself the worst and rejecting the best parts of any European civilization with which he may be brought in contact. . . . His intellectual qualities have of late years certainly developed. His moral attributes have generally been little if at all improved by contact with Europe. The old orthodox Moslem is bound hand and foot by ancient custom based on his religion. The Europeanized Egyptian is often bound almost as fast by a set of rigid formulæ which he mistakes for substance, whereas they are in reality but some fortuitous incidents of European civilization." [17]

For its accessibility to new ideas and its influence on other parts of the Moslem world, Egypt must be considered a strategic center.

[17] Cromer, *Modern Egypt,* Vol. II, pp. 229 ff.

Why Islam attracts the Negro. A third situation that has aroused great interest is the spread of Islam in the Sudan and Western Africa. Much has been written of the so-called natural gravitation of the African towards Islam. Some regard this tendency as desirable and inevitable, urging that Islam is well suited to the Negro, that it raises his condition, and that in competition with it Christianity has no chance. Others believe that conversion to Islam is a great misfortune for the black man, as it makes him more opposed to Christianity, and they call on the Christian Church for efforts on a large scale to stem the tide.

It is of great interest to consider some of the facts of the case. Why has Islam spread in Africa so much more extensively than Christianity? First, because the contacts of Islam have been so much more extensive. In the last thousand years for every Christian that a Negro has met, he has met many Moslems. With the few Christians his contacts have been sporadic; with the many Moslems they have been continuous. The Negro race can never be won to Christianity by absent treatment. Christianity, like all other religions, grows by sustained impact of life on life. For many centuries Moslem traders and teachers have penetrated and settled the Sudan. These men seem to the Negro to be superior, but not too remote. Their observances, performed in public and addressed to an unseen deity who holds other gods and idols in contempt, cannot fail to attract attention and inspire with awe. Their knowledge of mysterious symbols, which when worn as charms are claimed to have magical properties, commands respect. The Moslem accommodates himself well to African superstitions. His message is positive and definite, easily understood,

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AN EMPIRE SINCE 1683

and not too high in its demands. His religion provides specific observances which bring a comfortable feeling of something achieved, and also a fellowship in their performance.

This last point is, indeed, most important. The convert worships beside his teacher, and when a Moslem community is once formed, the mosque prayers and other religious duties give a sense of social solidarity. This sense is deepened by travel. The ancestral deities of the Negro are attached to localities, outside of which they have no writ or warrant. The man who leaves home is therefore without divinities.[18] But the worship of Allah is everywhere the same, and the profession of the Moslem creed admits to a great brotherhood which extends thousands of miles across the continent and in every place regards itself as superior to other faiths. This brotherhood is not only religious, but social. The Moslem does not draw the color line. He eats and intermarries with the dark-skinned.

Indifference of professing Christians. The attitude of the white man towards all this is a weighty factor. Individuals may show an earnest Christian fellowship for the black man, though few go as far as intermarriage. Many white officials and business men, however, are less cordial. Conditions are not so bad as those recorded by Dr. Zwemer[19] as obtaining at the Cape in 1822, when slave-owners opposed the baptism of their slaves on the ground that the latter might thus acquire certain rights. Under the circumstances slaves gave as their reason for turning Moslem that a man must have some religion, and they were not allowed to become Christian. But even where there is no opposition to the conversion of Negroes

[18] *International Review of Missions,* October, 1912, p. 645.
[19] *The Moslem World,* October, 1925, p. 329.

to Christianity, there is frequently no enthusiasm for it, and where the conversion itself is approved, there is no disposition to recognize any change in social status of the convert. Canon Gairdner[20] cites the following quotations: "We disapprove because a Christian African copies our Western dress. We approve because the Moslem African copies the Eastern dress. It is like a gentleman incensed because his valet dresses like him, but quite happy if he dresses like some other gentleman." European officials approve of Islam because "it is a religion which helps the government in maintaining law and order, and does not put its members on an equality with the official himself." Government officials on a steamer just after commending Moslems who went on shore to perform their worship, ordered native Christians who were singing hymns, to stop their noise. This preference of officials for Moslem Negroes over both Christian and other than Moslem non-Christians has been emphasized by more than one writer.[21]

A social difference. The Negro who is admitted to Moslem society by recitation of the Moslem creed, finds that recitation of the Apostles' Creed works no such wonders in Christian lands except in very limited circles. In general it may be said that the black man who becomes a Moslem quotes socially at par; the black man who becomes a Christian quotes socially at a heavy discount. Is it any wonder that many Negroes conclude that Christianity is a religion of the whites, and Islam that of the blacks, and that they gravitate toward the latter?

Success of Christianity. Fortunately, there is some-

[20] *International Review of Missions,* January, 1924, pp. 15-16.
[21] *Op. cit.,* October, 1920, pp. 535 ff.

thing to be said on the other side.[22] Christian missions have had some of their most notable successes among Africans. In Uganda there is a Protestant communicant membership of 36,909 in addition to many Roman Catholics. In this case Moslems were on the ground in competition from the first. In the Cameroon 32,492 converts have been gathered by the American Presbyterian Mission into the Christian Church. These examples show that Christianity rightly presented will attract the black man. The Christian Church must operate more rapidly, on a far larger scale, and with a deeper realization of the meaning of Christian brotherhood.

The British mandate in Palestine. When General Allenby entered Jerusalem, December 11, 1917, the city had been in Moslem hands for a total of nearly twelve hundred years. Great Britain was assigned Palestine by mandate and in the Balfour declaration of November, 1917, invited colonies of Jews to return to their ancient motherland. In consequence, Jewish battalions accompanied General Allenby, with banners bearing inscriptions from the Hebrew prophets promising a return. Since an overwhelming majority of the population of Palestine was Moslem, about 590,000 out of 750,000, according to a recent census,[23] this endorsement of the Zionist movement has been bitterly resented. The High Commissioner had to exercise great tact in dealing with extremes of both parties, but in his report of the administration from 1920 to 1925 he was able to announce a financial surplus, reduced agricultural taxes, the construction of over five hundred miles of new roads, and

[22] Cf. Gairdner, *International Review of Missions*, January, 1924, pp. 3 ff.

[23] Cf. Graves, *Palestine the Land of Three Faiths*, p. 119.

a considerable extension of elementary education. In 1914, there was only a single motor car in Palestine: in 1925 there were more than a thousand. While great fear has been expressed of the results of encouragement of Jewish immigration, the Arab population increased in the period mentioned by a larger total than the Jewish.[24]

France in Syria. In Syria French interests have always been strong. After the World War, France obtained a mandate for the country, in spite of the demands of a Syrian Congress for independence. The Amir Feisal, son of the Sherif of Mecca, who helped the British against the Turks, was driven out of Damascus and French generals placed in control. The French rule has been severely criticized, and the recall of General Sarrail was apparently an admission that the Druze uprising had been badly handled. On the other hand, there has been a gain in religious freedom.

Young Turkey and its problems. The most spectacular doings, however, have been in Turkey. When the Young Turks in 1909 finally brought to an end the long and evil reign of Abdul Hamid, they inherited some difficult problems. One was the relation of non-Moslem inhabitants to the empire. For many centuries, even under the Greek emperors of Constantinople, groups of foreigners had been allowed to form communities within the city and manage their own affairs.[25] Before the capture of the city in 1453 even the Turks had a community within the walls, with a judge to administer Moslem law.

[24] *The Near East*. April 30, 1925, p. 448; July 9, 1925, pp. 31, 53.
[25] Cf. Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, pp. 116 ff.; and P. M. Brown in *Foreign Affairs*, June, 1923, p. 75.

The Turkish conquerors continued this arrangement and made the Patriarch head of the Greek nation, with authority to collect taxes. The same right was extended later to other races. This plan, natural and perhaps inevitable at the time, has made a lot of trouble. It has identified race and religion, kept races and religions apart, prevented cooperation between them and fostered prejudice, destroyed in non-Moslems the sense of patriotism, and in Moslems a regard for their fellow citizens of other faiths.

A second problem was economic: undeveloped resources and communications, huge debts incurred by wasteful sultans without public benefit, commercial enterprises mainly in the hands of subject races and foreigners, lack of capital and business experience, education backward.

A third problem arose from the conservatism of Islam, which was inclined to obstruct the adoption of Western progress.

A fourth problem was created by the need of a unifying and driving force if Islam proved inadequate.

Policy of the Young Turks. The Young Turk régime was received with enthusiasm by the subject races who hoped for better treatment. The situation involved a dilemma. The friendship of the subject races might have been purchased by increased privileges, a means which would have been used to build up the morale of their own communities by improved educational methods. This might have endangered Ottoman and Moslem supremacy. Instead, the government in control sought to keep things in Ottoman hands and to extend the use of the Turkish language. The subject races were given

very inadequate representation in the new Parliament, according to their numbers.

Some heavy initial handicaps. It is doubtful if this plan would have succeeded even under favorable auspices. But the auspices were unfavorable. The war with Italy in 1911, in which Tripoli and the Dodecanesia were lost, was followed by another with the Balkan States, who divided between them large slices of the remaining European territory in Turkey. Two years later came the World War, which Turkey entered on the side of the Central Powers. By the Treaty of Sèvres, signed August 10, 1920, Turkey lost Syria, Palestine, the Hejaz and Mesopotamia, European Turkey almost to the walls of Constantinople, and Smyrna with the hinterland.

Angora in the saddle. Turkey had never been in such a desperate condition. The new National Assembly met at Angora in April, 1920, set up a government, declared the old constitutional monarchy abolished, and invested itself with complete control. The Sultan, who submitted too tamely to the terms of peace, was deposed in November, 1922, and another appointed without political power. Mustapha Kemal, President of the Assembly, became as such the head of the new Turkish Republic. He showed himself both able and willing to fight. France was constrained to withdraw from Cilicia in return for concessions, the Greeks were routed and driven out of Smyrna, and the Treaty of Sèvres was revised at Lausanne in January, 1923.

The government was now in a position to tackle its problems. Exchange of populations with other countries having Moslem subjects has been carried out to a certain

extent. These deportations have occasioned much hardship and expulsion of some of the most able elements. Those remaining on Turkish territory are made Turkish citizens with military obligations to the State.

Islam is declared the religion of the State, but the Sheikh ul Islam has been removed from the Cabinet, the *evkaf,* or religious trust funds, have been confiscated, the dervish orders suppressed, and religious teaching in schools, even of Islam, reduced to a minimum.

Finally, as a unifying and driving force, the government is exalting the idea of Turkish nationality.

A new Arab state. Mesopotamia was conquered by Britain in the War, and the Kingdom of Iraq established under Amir Feisal. By a treaty signed October 10, 1922, Great Britain furnishes a High Commissioner for advice on financial and international questions, and promises armed assistance. Minorities are to be protected and missionaries given freedom. The constitution declares Islam to be the state religion and Arabic the official language, but permits maintenance of schools conducted in any language. The division of population has been estimated as follows: 1,500,000 Shias, 1,150,000 Sunnis, 87,000 Jews, 78,000 Christians, making a total of 2,849,000.[26] It will be noticed that Shias form the largest single block of the population. Some of their most sacred cities, Kerbela and Nejef, are in Iraq territory. Feisal, however, is a Sunni.

The British dilemma. The British mandate had originally been conferred to last for twenty years, but this was later reduced to four. On the one hand, England

[26] *Current History Magazine,* March, 1925, p. 965.

feels the responsibility for a weak country, is attracted by the prospects of oil, and is glad to control one of the great trade routes. On the other hand, the country, though easy to enter, is hard to defend, since it has no good military frontiers. At home the imperialists denounce the policy of "scuttle," while the less imaginative taxpayers fear lest continued occupation may be costly, particularly if it should involve a war with Turkey over the Mosul boundary. However, Great Britain finally decided to remain.

The bulk of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia are Arabic. Dr. Paul Harrison says [27] that the British Government is loved by the rich and disliked by the poor, while the reverse was the case with the much less efficient Turkish Government. A country undeveloped is being invaded by modern commercialism, and the contacts resulting create some perplexing problems.

Persia's new ruler. Persia, badly governed by recent shahs, proclaimed a constitution in 1906, two years ahead of Turkey. Misrule and foreign encroachments have continued. Shah Ahmad, who was only a child when he succeeded his deposed father in 1909, has shown neither ability nor inclination to govern, and has spent most of his time in Paris. Meanwhile, a soldier, Riza Khan, became first, Minister of War; then, Prime Minister; and finally, on December 12, 1925, he was declared Shah of a new dynasty. While he lives, Persia will be in strong hands. Mr. Arthur Millspaugh, an American, was, in 1922, appointed Financial Adviser for a term of five years. He has succeeded in reducing expenditures, increasing revenues, and creating a sur-

[27] Harrison, *The Arab at Home*, p. 180.

plus. He favors a foreign loan for the development of resources.[28]

A Moslem pepper-box. Afghanistan, between Persia and India, is a country about the size of Texas. It is solidly and intensely Moslem, and a large part of its inhabitants regard non-Moslems as their lawful prey. In the year 1919-1920, for instance, there were 611 raids from Afghanistan into four districts of India, resulting in the killing of 298, the wounding of 392, and the kidnapping of 463 British subjects.[29] Apart from this immediate danger, England has long been concerned about Afghanistan as a possible pathway for Russian advance. The present Amir is a vigorous and fairly progressive ruler and has signed treaties with both Great Britain and the Soviet Government, in which the independence of his country is recognized.

Moslem handicaps in India. India contains more Moslems than any other single country in the world, nearly 70,000,000. The populations of Turkey, Egypt, and Persia are insignificant in comparison, and even combined are less than half as many.

There have been three influences which have held the Moslem population of India back. The first is the memory of once having been the ruling race. When the British came into control and set up a government based on Western methods, the Mohammedans held aloof and cooperated with the new rulers as little as possible. They were therefore left far behind by

[28] *The Near East,* October 1, 1925, pp. 419 ff.
[29] *Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India for 1920,* p. 11.

the Hindus, both in government positions and literacy.

The second influence was this lack of education. In 1832 and again in 1882 the Council of Education for India commented on the backwardness of the Moslem community.[30] At the latter date Moslems constituted about twenty-five per cent of the population of the six most important provinces, including aborigines, but had only 14.5 per cent of those in school. The Commission considered that among the causes contributing to this state of affairs "the most powerful factors are to be found in pride of race, a memory of bygone superiority, religious fears, and a not unnatural attachment to the learning of Islam."

In the Eighth Quinquennial Review of Education in India, covering the years 1917-1922 (pp. 200 ff.) we find that 23.5 per cent of scholars were Moslems, while about one fourth of the total population of British India were of this faith. This report notes that the community is still behind the Hindus, due partly to the fact that the old-fashioned mullahs regard secular education as a positive hindrance to religious instruction, and that the bulk of Moslems are agriculturists. Especially in higher education Moslems have lower percentages than other communities.

The third influence is the tendency to put religion before nationality. Theoretically, this might be considered desirable, but in actual practise it has led to frequent clashes with those of other faiths. The Moslem, with numerous exceptions, is not likely to be a good co-operator.

A very interesting series of articles by Mr. Lala Lajpat Rai appeared in the Lahore *Tribune* during November

[30] Report of India Educational Commission of 1882, pp. 483 ff.

and December, 1924, written from the standpoint of an Indian Nationalist. They begin by calling attention to the fact that from 1919 to 1921 Hindus and Moslems united in their opposition to the British Government under the lead of Mr. Gandhi and Mohammed and Shaukat Ali. Since this time the two religions "have been at daggers drawn with each other to an extent never before known under British rule." The explanation of this state of affairs the writer finds in the fact that each community insists on its right to do things which are obnoxious to the other. The Moslems assert that they have an absolute right to slaughter cows. Mr. Lajpat Rai points out that no society can remain intact in which persons are not willing to surrender individual rights for the good of the whole. Especially in a country so heterogeneous racially as India it will be necessary for each community to think of its duties rather than its rights. Governments cannot guarantee to religious bodies freedom in practising any ceremonial which they claim their faiths require if these observances are in conflict with each other or opposed to the common welfare.

"It is obvious that if anyone in India is, as a right, entitled to practise in the name of religion whatever he believes to be a part of his faith, no unity is possible. . . . At the present stage of development India requires more of nationalism and toleration than orthodoxy and bigotry. . . . Never before did I see educated Hindus, Musalmans, and Sikhs attaching so great an importance to insignificant and petty things in the name of religion as they do now. . . . To be frank, we will have to follow Europe in this matter if we really desire political freedom. Religion must be divorced from politics. Social life must be broadened, and political life must be based only on

broad national policy. I do not mean to say that religion should be divorced from our lives or that our political structure be devoid of religious influence in the higher sense of the term. Healthy religious influences are undoubtedly necessary for the development of character, personal as well as national. I say nothing against religion in this sense, but I do mean that the ceremonial type of religion should be the concern only of individuals or of communities and should not be permitted to create barriers of political distinctions between the followers of different religions or between different religious communities as such. . . . I venture to say that too great an insistence on dogma has been the bane of Islam, the cause of its political downfall, and, unless it is given up, it will stand in the way of Islam's ever regaining her lost position as a world-wide political factor."

The writer rebukes both communities for tolerating within their respective folds persons who depart widely from orthodox belief and practise, while at the same time they insist against other faiths on their right to observances which render harmonious cooperation an impossibility. He urges that "their best effort should be made (a) to integrate the different religions as much as possible by emphasizing the points on which they agree, by eliminating non-essentials, and by restricting essential differences within the narrowest limitations; (b) to remove all barriers to free social intercourse between the communities which do not go to the root of anyone's faith." He considers that as far as the attempt to regard certain Hindus as untouchables is concerned, "Hindu orthodoxy is doomed." Hindus must relax their refusal to eat with Moslems, and Moslems must cease to call Hindus "Kafirs." This last-named practise is responsible,

Mr. Lajpat Rai thinks, for Moslem assaults on Hindu temples, property, and women in the case of outbreaks. "'Infidels deserve no consideration!' For God's sake, do not threaten us with Jihad," he pleads. "For the last twelve hundred years we have heard that cry every day of our national existence."

The writer reports a visit to the Levant, from which he has come back disillusioned as to Pan-Islamism. He found every country so burdened with internal problems that it had no time to think of other lands. In Turkey religious customs were not being permitted to stand in the way of progress and the interests of nationalism. He seems to consider that the measures taken were justified. He regrets that Indian Moslems have so little of this national spirit and that they send money out of the country to Moslems in other lands instead of using it for the welfare of their fellow countrymen.

He notes the Moslem fear of Hindu supremacy in a democratic form of government, based on the fact that Hindus are not only in a greater numerical majority, but that they are more advanced, both economically and educationally. Islam, having been once the religion of the ruling race, is unwilling to see its former Hindu vassals in control. Many would prefer British rule to this. They declare for Indian independence, but jealously demand a system of voting which would give them representation out of proportion to their numbers. Mr. Lajpat Rai strongly deprecates this. He calls on both communities to separate religion from politics as much as possible, as the only way in which nationality can be achieved, and cites European nations as an example of this.

"To the Hindus I will say, 'If there are any among you who still dream of a Hindu Raj in this country, who

think they can crush the Musalmans and be the supreme power in this land, tell them that they are fools, or, to be more accurate, that they are insane, and that their insanity will ruin their Hinduism along with their country.' . . . Let us live and struggle for freedom as brothers whose interests are one and indivisible."

These articles by an acute observer represent a situation in which the spirit of the Ku Klux Klan is raised to the *n*th power. They show what difficulties will be faced in the modern political world by Moslem communities which take their religion seriously as the Turks do not. It will be of intense interest in future to note the influence of the eight million Turks on the nearly seventy million Indian Moslems.

In other parts of the world there are changes and stirrings, some of which are noted in the next chapter. It should be understood that the preceding sketch makes no pretense whatever of completeness.

Estimates of total population. There have been many estimates of the Moslem population. These have been carefully summarized in Appendix B of *Christian Literature in Moslem Lands.* They range from 175,000,000 to nearly 260,000,000. Dr. Zwemer there suggests about 235,000,000 as a probable figure,[31] and calls attention to the fact that over 60,000,000 live outside of the Heat Belt. These great masses of human beings, hitherto, for the most part, isolated from the currents of modern progress, are being forced by a tremendous combination of events to turn their faces toward the oncoming of a new age.

[31] See the Statistical Survey in the Appendix, pp. 240-249, which gives the most recent estimates of the numbers of Moslems in the various countries and shows the percentage of Moslems in the total population of each.

CHAPTER III

THE OPENING OF THE SLUICES

When a great steamship approaches the locks of the Panama Canal or the Saulte Ste. Marie in order to ascend, it glides through the outer gates into water on the lower level. Behind the inner gates of the lock, however, the water is banked up high. When the steamer is inside the lock the outer gates are closed. Then comes the opening of the sluices. Through many passages a great mass of water rushes into the lock and irresistibly raises an ocean-going steamer of many thousand tons. If the vessel should try to hold itself by anchoring to the bottom the anchors would be torn loose, the cables would break, or the boat would be swamped.

The Moslem world is meeting just such circumstances. Six centuries ago it shared with Christendom in a medieval civilization. In some ways the Moslem world was the more advanced. There was mutual exchange of products and a greater borrowing of ideas on the part of Europe. Various causes lessened the intercourse. The levels of the two civilizations diverged. Islam remained medieval while Christendom became modern.

Behind the gates that separated them there has been dammed up all the effects of the Renaissance and Reformation: the development of scientific method and its application to the control of nature, the growth of democracy, the industrial revolution, the rise of nationalism. Hitherto these influences have leaked through to a certain extent, but not sufficiently to disturb the general level. Up to the present the Moslem world as a whole

has resembled Christendom of the fourteenth century more than that of the twentieth.

But at last the sluices are opening wide. Populations which had never before known any but Moslem standards and attitudes are now forced to note at close range the habits of another civilization. A large proportion of Moslems are passing rapidly within the range of modern communications, the railway, the automobile, the aeroplane. They are confronted with an altogether novel mass of information about the outside world through the printed page, the illustration, and the cinema. Their educational facilities are multiplying and are teaching new things. They are invaded by a growing army of representatives of the West, who bring with them the irrefutable demonstration of the power of applied science and the massed resources of modern capital. These bring also social and political theories which are held up as important factors in their manifest progress, and a critical attitude of mind which must be disconcerting to those still capable of new ideas. The World War was a shock that thrilled the most remote sections and the most stolid intelligences. It was followed by a combination of the influences mentioned above on a scale unapproached in pre-war days. The sluices are open and open to stay. Islam must adjust itself to an altogether different level. Will the anchors give, the cables break, or the vessel swamp?

Some persons content themselves with a very simple solution. The incubus of the Moslem world has been Islam. Islam is essentially medieval. Medievalism is being superseded by irresistible forces. Therefore Islam will disappear, the incubus will be removed, and all will be well. In the fourteenth century, however, Chris-

tianity seemed to be essentially medieval in character and many would have denied with vehemence that it could ever be anything else.

Consider, for instance, some of the more striking points of comparison between Islam and medieval Christianity.

Islam and Medieval Christianity

Church and State closely related and nationality undeveloped. In the first place, there was at that time in Christendom as well as in the Moslem world a much closer relationship between Church and State. "All western Europe formed a single religious association from which it was a crime to revolt. To refuse allegiance to the Church, or to question its authority or teachings, was reputed treason against God and was punishable with death." [1] In theory there were many points of contrast between the two worlds. The caliph was not properly a pope, but more like the medieval emperor as this ruler was conceived by the papal party, a secular head whose administration was primarily in the interest of the religious community and who was unable to set aside the canon law. The bulk of Christendom would have regarded the present separation of Church and State to be as undesirable and even unthinkable as would any orthodox Moslem. In the second place, the sense of nationality was then practically undeveloped in Christendom. Men thought of a single head of temporal power who had inherited his claim from the Roman emperor, to be looked up to by all those of the Christian faith. This was in spite of the fact that the rule of the emperor

[1] Robinson, *History of Western Europe*, p. 201.

was never universal, any more than that of the caliph. The most common tie was that of religion, and next that of race and of allegiance to a personal ruler. The sense of nationality based on residence within a well-defined territory was very weak. This was equally true of Islam.

Economic development primitive. On the economic side both worlds were in a pre-industrial state. There were manufactures, and products were exchanged; but the gigantic developments of modern commerce and industry and of the transportation systems that make them possible, would have made the Arabian Nights seem insipid by comparison. The bulk of production was consumed before it had traveled far. The ecclesiastical law, both Christian and Moslem, forbade the taking of interest, and thereby drove money-lending largely into the hands of other faiths, Jewish and Eastern Christian, respectively.

Social development backward. The social relationships of the medieval world, Moslem and Christian, cannot be adequately estimated in brief compass. The highest social teachings of the respective religions found response from individuals and groups. On the other hand, the most express commandments were violated on both sides, not only by the irreligious, but by those who maintained a reputation for orthodoxy. In refinement of manners Saracens compared favorably with Europeans. In the position of women, in spite of records of happy Moslem homes and pious and learned Moslem women,[2] and education occasionally even of slave girls,[3] Christendom undoubtedly stood higher. Even though

[2] Cf. Von Kremer, *Culturgeschichte des Orients,* Vol. II, pp. 120-122.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 133.

polygamy among Moslems was comparatively restricted on account of poverty, the harems of the rulers and wealthy classes were a terrible handicap, politically and socially. Neither picture, however, taken as a whole, approaches the idyllic. Special pleaders can make out clever cases for the superiority of one age or civilization in particular respects, but it is safe to say that the modern woman would find it hard to change places with her medieval sister.

Scientific thinking crude. On the intellectual side medievalism exalted ideal thought handed down by tradition and distrusted both observation and judgment. The testimony of the senses was counted untrustworthy as compared with unseen realities. Scholastic philosophy had reached a high stage of development based on assumptions which were generally admitted. Men criticized each other's arguments, but had not gone beneath these to the evidence on which they rested. Traditions were accepted naïvely. In Christianity there was the same disregard of second causes as in Islam, since God wrought all things. For this reason theology was often absolutely hostile to science. Speculation was the servant of theology and came under suspicion when it ventured into other fields. Superstition and credulity were general. The most learned men held beliefs that would arouse the ridicule of school children today. Among the common people religion was often no more than protective magic. A cross was an amulet to ward off sickness, like a passage of the Koran worn by Moslems. Saint worship was general, and angels and other spirits were live articles of belief.

Religion generally intolerant. Medieval thought was intolerant. In this respect Christians were on the whole

more severe than Moslems, though there was harsh fanaticism on both sides. Orthodox Christianity in general exhibited a positive hatred for unbelief. There was no obligation to keep faith with an infidel. The Albigenses were exterminated in a crusade. Christians had toward Jews and Moslems the same superiority complex which we consider characteristic of Islam.

Education controlled by theology. On both sides of the Mediterranean education was generally controlled by theology. In Christendom there were gild schools, to some of which women were admitted, but in the main elementary education was dispensed in connection with cathedral and chantry foundations. The fact that a man could sign his name secured for him the benefit of clergy; i.e., trial by an ecclesiastical court. Higher education led to theology and canon law. Illiteracy was widespread. The language of the Church was the language of learning. In the Moslem world elementary education was confined to study of the Koran and learning to write Arabic. The *madrasas,* or higher schools, turned out lawyers and theologians. The spread of Arabic as a language was greater than that of Latin.

Religion other-worldly. Both religions were other-worldly. The idea of the transitoriness of this world was prominent in medieval theology, Moslem or Christian. The thought of the Judgment, of heaven and hell, had a great place in men's minds. While in both religions there were many who were concerned mainly with dogma and ritual, observances and pilgrimages, on the other hand, there was on both sides a strong mystical and emotional element. Great saints, Moslem and Christian, were mystics. The influence of the Christian orders,

especially the Franciscan, in promoting these types of religion is paralleled by that of the dervishes.

General conclusion. These comparisons might be pursued further and made more striking. On the other hand, there is, of course, much that might be said by way of qualification and contrast of the two civilizations. The evidence, however, seems to warrant the following statements:

1. In medieval times the Moslem and Christian worlds had developed civilizations with striking points of similarity and with advantages not unevenly distributed. From the modern standpoint their handicaps were not in appearance very different.

2. Since then the Moslem world has remained practically static, while Christendom has changed very rapidly in many ways.

Arrested Development of Islam

Possible reasons for Moslem arrest. Many different reasons are offered to account for this arrest of development on the part of Islam:

1. Christianity has had nineteen centuries of development, while Islam has had only thirteen. In six centuries more Islam may easily be where Christianity is now. To this it may be objected that at its best period Islam seemed much ahead of Christianity from the standpoint of civilization, and that some special explanation is needed to account for arrest after such striking progress.

2. Islam suffered devastating invasions, especially those of the Mongol and Tatar, which destroyed the seats of culture and set back progress for centuries, like the

barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire. But Egypt, which was spared these inroads, suffered the same arrest.

3. The Turk who took over control from the Arab is essentially unprogressive. There has been much incompetency in Turkish administration, but several flourishing states in India and Persia have shown even less recuperative power than Turkey.

4. Islam is unfortunate in inheriting a climate and lack of material resources which render progress difficult. The stimulating climate of the temperate zone and the possession of coal and iron do seem to be great assets in modern prosperity. A large section of the Moslem world, however, lives outside the Heat Belt, as Dr. Zwemer has shown, and the progress as well as the arrest of Islam occurred in the same territory.

5. Some find the causes of decay in remediable customs, such as polygamy, overobservance of traditions, etc., which they claim are not essential to Islam. We certainly have before us a striking spectacle of the way in which some parts of the Moslem world are trying to lighten ship and get rid of burdens of the past. What will be the effect of all this on Islam we can at present only conjecture.

6. Some hold that there are defects in Islam, not incidental, but essential, cardinal points in the conception of God which have produced early arrest. Some of these must be taken up later in considering the presentation of the Christian message.

Progress of Christendom

Reasons for the progress of Christendom. An equal variety of reasons is given for the rapid progress of

Europe since medieval times; the mingling of nations which stimulated competition; the abilities of the Nordic races; the climate of the north temperate zone; the intellectual renaissance leading to the discovery of scientific method and its application in the development of natural resources; the growth of nationality and democracy; the outworking of Christianity.

The isolation breaking down. Today the sluices are opened and the Moslem world is in for an inundation of Western ideas of all sorts. A world with a great past, whose pride has been stiffened by the consciousness of a special and direct revelation from God, the only faith that has spread at the expense of Christianity, is now called upon to assimilate in a few decades all that Christendom has evolved since the fourteenth century, to pack into a generation the experiences of over half a millennium. It is a remarkable spectacle, but it is far more than this. These peoples who are feeling their foundations tremble and swerve in the flood are our brothers and sisters in God. When our own young people go away to college, we take the keenest interest in the reaction to the intellectual currents to which they are exposed. Let us with the deepest sympathy note the effect on the Moslem world of twentieth century influences.

Conflicting Influences in the Moslem World

In theory the Moslem world was a single theocratic state, the head of which administered but was unable to modify canon law. This last based its authority on the Koran, which was supposed to regulate all sides of life. As a matter of fact, the Koran was comparatively scanty

in its enactments, and, moreover, it was the product of an unsystematic mind. It was therefore capable of a wide variety of interpretation. Here is the first possibility of change, more liberal interpretation of the Koran. To meet needs that kept arising, acts and sayings of Mohammed were at first quoted and later invented in large quantity, as has been recognized even by Moslems. Systems of canon law were worked out by the four great Sunni doctors and are followed in different regions. The Sheikh ul Islam and the muftis act as interpreters of these, while the caliph is executive. Islam has never provided great church councils to pass on issues of importance, neither has it convened parliaments to make new laws. The power of the sultan and of recent legislators has been confined to statutes which do not transgress the sacred law.

A question of great importance in Moslem law is the right of Ijtihad, or independent interpretation of the Koran. According to the Sunnis, this right ceased with the four great doctors, while the Shias concede it to their mujtahids, or highest theologians. A further loophole is left by the Sunnis in the celebrated doctrine of Ijma, or agreement, which rests on a saying ascribed to Mohammed, "My community will never agree in an error." According to this, when the theologians of a period come to a general agreement as to any matter, their position may be assumed to be correct. In theory this gives no right to play fast and loose with the Koran and traditions, but practically it may work wonders. It has been said of many of the issues of Christian theology, such as the predestination controversy, for instance, that they have never been settled, but only outgrown.

When the demands of a new age press in full force

on the regulations of Moslem law, different groups will take different attitudes. Some will refuse to compromise with modernism and will hug their medieval cloak tight around them. Some will modify their position just as far as liberal interpretation of the letter of the law allows. Some will seek to set aside inconvenient enactments of the canon law by Ijma, or agreement. Some, like the Angora leaders, will simply push the sacred law off great areas of the map.

The result will probably be a further break-up of Islam into a number of new schools of varying degrees of liberalism and the breaking away of many adherents from everything but the name. Much that has been written on this subject has apparently assumed that if circumstances compelled Islam to modify any of its enactments, it would immediately collapse or blow up with a loud noise. No such thing will take place. Great institutions have a remarkable way of surviving inconsistencies. That Islam will suffer considerable disintegration is probable. That it will altogether disappear is absurd. We still have medieval Christianity with us and are not likely soon to see the last of orthodox Islam.

The following sections present evidence as to what is going on in the Moslem world today in five great fields, political, economic, social, intellectual, and religious.

Effect of Twentieth Century Political Contacts

Under each head the situation in leading Moslem countries is treated, beginning with Arabia and passing first to Africa before dealing with Asiatic countries. Certain countries are omitted under some heads.

This presentation has some advantages and some dis-

tinct disadvantages. It is systematically arranged so that information is easily found, as the countries follow each other in the same order. It was thought that the power of the different influences would be more clearly realized if the working of each were traced in succession throughout the whole Moslem world. The chapter should make a useful basis for further study and interpretation of items in newspapers or articles in magazines.

As to disadvantages, grouping material under current tendencies makes it necessary to separate information regarding single countries. The paragraph headings, however, will enable one to collect material bearing on any one country with comparative ease. A more serious fault is the scantiness of information on some fields. This is inevitable in view of the space limitations of the book. The references in the footnotes and bibliography will serve to supplement our meager treatment. Finally, information that goes to press early in 1926 will not long remain up to date. No mere arrangement could obviate this difficulty. It is hoped that the facts that have been selected and the form in which they are presented will encourage leaders to become life-long students of the impact of twentieth century influences on Moslem peoples from Morocco to the East Indies.

Arabia. Arabia today would seem to be one of the places least affected by political changes of the outside world. The recent expulsion of the Turks by Hussein and of Hussein in turn by the Wahhabis are events of considerable magnitude. Dr. Harrison says that the main result of the World War, however, has been to demonstrate to the Arab his military and cultural inferiority, and to provoke in consequence a demand

for recognition and a beginning of the sense of nationality.[4] This does not prevent Arabia from being Arab against Arab at present. Later it may help to unite the nation against the Turk.

Egypt. In Egypt the nationalistic spirit has become intense. The mortgaging of the country to European creditors by Ismail Khedive and the subsequent British control, have already been mentioned (pages 56-57). Even though debts are just from the standpoint of modern economic morality, they are none the less irksome to those who have been saddled with them by extravagant rulers, and the resentment is likely to concentrate on those who do the collecting. Moreover, a foreign rule, in spite of its superiority, will be criticized severely, not only for its inevitable mistakes, but especially for the personal brusqueness of its officials. It is unfortunate for the peace that Zaghloul, the man who has caught the public imagination of Egypt and who has gone farthest in appealing to nationalistic sentiment, has been deported twice by the British. When he was elected president of the Egyptian Parliament which opened March 23, 1925, the Parliament was dissolved and new elections ordered. Meanwhile, a new electoral law was framed, greatly restricting the franchise in order to reduce Zaghloul's support. A further law directed against political associations has caused deep resentment.

Syria. In Syria the situation appears to be much more confused. Here an Arabic-speaking population with many antagonistic sects has been until recently under Turkish rule. This discouraged the more progressive

[4] Harrison, *The Arab at Home,* p. 268.

elements and stimulated emigration. With the World War and especially with the announcement of the Fourteen Points, there arose a desire for independence. France, however, wished control of the country for political and commercial reasons and was assigned a mandate without consulting the inhabitants. This has been unpopular and has stimulated nationalistic feeling. Naturally in so mixed a population there has been a great variety of opinions and attitudes.

A correspondent writes from one of the most backward and purely Islamic cities of Syria: "There is now a great conflict going on amongst Moslems to determine the relations of State and religion. The question facing every Moslem is: Are we primarily Moslems or primarily Arabs? The nationalistic wing say: First we are Syrians, then Arabs, then Moslems. The conservative wing reply: No, we are Moslems primarily, brothers with the Moslems in India, Arabia, and North Africa, and only secondarily owe allegiance to Syria politically. The most extreme of the first class would divide Church and State entirely by making an independent empire in the Near East, many of them preferring a monarchical democracy similar to that of England, including people of all religions on an equal footing. The conservative wing would say: This is not the country of Syrians, but the home of Moslems, where we must return to the old Koranic ways, with the followers of other religions having no active part in government, but either bowing in submission by paying tribute money, or being driven from the country. The largest number of thinking Moslems would take a middle position, desiring to be independently organized, much as Turkey was before the War, except with national leaders instead of Turks, and having two

sets of courts, one religious and the other for secular and business matters."

Another, who is in close touch with Moslems, writes from Damascus, the center of Syrian nationalism: "The things mentioned have awakened the democratic spirit in the Moslems of Syria. It has created in them patriotism, national feeling, self-respect, and a self-consciousness which leads them to demand their national rights. The result of the late War is hatred on their part of foreigners. They think that foreigners are greedy people, their aim being to rule Moslems, rob them of their rights, exploit them, and do away with their religious and personal freedom. They had thought previously of founding an Islamic unity, then they thought of founding an Arab republic, but now they are thinking of founding only Syrian independence."

A missionary writes from Aleppo: "We are told that there is greater personal liberty than there was when Turkey was over Syria and the Caliph the religious head. Then the people were forced to do what the Sheikh said, and they respected him. Now they do not respect the Sheikh and do not obey him as they did. . . . Even though many talk against the government in charge and would criticize any government in a similar position, many of them would admit that they have a greater feeling of security than they had while the Turks were over Syria."

An American long a resident in the Near East writes: "Recent history has immensely augmented among Moslems the democratic idea as well as practise, of which they love to boast. Self-determination is now the ambition of all Moslem people who are not already autonomous. This impulse, so thoroughly aroused by the

idealism of the late President Wilson, is constantly gathering momentum, and its champion was and is idealized by intelligent Islam. . . . The fact that the leading Allies threw into the junk heap the promise to give self-determination to the subject races of the Ottoman Empire has all but wrecked the confidence of Islamic people in the integrity of Western Christendom, and has imposed a new and tremendous barrier in the path of Moslem evangelization.

"The practical working of the current mandatory system has two contradictory effects. When it is applied fairly, it unites the mutually antagonistic elements in the country, since all desire deliverance from foreign supervision and hope by means of union to shake off external domination. But when the administration is beguiled into favoritism and partiality, this arouses and augments the ancient animosities. . . . It should be borne in mind that politics, which are in the West a side issue as far as the mass of people are concerned, are the pivot of the whole life of the mass of people in the Near East."

Turkey. In dealing with political changes, the country that comes most prominently to mind is Turkey. Here the shift that has taken place is epoch-making. For centuries the Sultan of Turkey has been the most powerful ruler in the Moslem world, in real or nominal control of all North Africa and the Near East. Especially since 1774 he has stood forth before Europe as a special protector of Moslems. His title of "Caliph," as to the significance of which there has been much discussion and difference of opinion among Moslem legists, has emphasized this function. He was not a Moslem pope, since he did not pass on matters of doctrine, but he repre-

sented to the outside world the head of the bulk of the Sunni community. As already noted, the system of breeding and training Sultans was vicious and the results were about what might have been expected. Not many sultans of recent times have been men of character or ability. Abdul Hamid disgraced his office and was deposed, to be succeeded by amiable recluses with neither capacity nor opportunity to govern. The acceptance of the Treaty of Sèvres by Mohammed VI aroused the indignation of the Angora nationalists and led to his removal. His successor lacked the power which gave his title real significance. The final suppression of the title itself was a political move.

We have said that the caliph was no pope, but his deposition has for Moslems in general something like the effect that would have been caused to the medieval world by the suppression of the papacy. The points of dissimilarity are many and obvious, but the shock for many would be of like quality. A great symbol is gone, a great bond of Moslem unity has been relaxed. More significant, though less spectacular, is the absolute power invested in the National Assembly, which is no council of theologians. These gentlemen evidently do not propose to be held up in their decisions by interpretations of the sacred law.

They are playing particular hob with institutions believed by many to have Koranic authority, with vested rights of religious bodies, and with customs and prejudices sanctified by pious use, which are so often dearer to the heart of mankind than morality and religion itself. They have abolished polygamy and compulsory religious instruction in schools; they have confiscated the *evkaf*, or endowments of mosques and other religious foundations;

they have removed the Sheikh ul Islam from the Cabinet, a much more drastic procedure than the unseating of bishops from the House of Lords; they have suppressed the dervish orders and closed all *tekkes,* or monasteries, and prohibited the wearing of religious dress by those not properly doctors of religion; they have declared the rule for officials to be bare-headed indoors and to remove the hat in salutation out of doors, thus putting the fez and turban out of commission; they have taken down in tram-cars and steamers the curtains which separated men and women; they have erected in Constantinople a statue of the President, breaking the rule of centuries; they have adopted the Christian calendar and the Swiss civil code.

Articles 39 and 40 of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 read as follows:

Article 39. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion shall be equal before the law.

Article 40. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. . . .

The Angora leaders are doing all these things on the ground that they propose to conform to the customs of civilized countries. Imagine the vials of wrath they are storing up for themselves in the bosoms of the strictly orthodox. The secularizing legislation of the French Revolution went further in some respects, but it probably outraged fewer sentiments. Turkey is trying the experiment for which no country in Christendom was prepared in the fourteenth century of the Christian era. It remains to be seen whether reaction will accumulate strong enough to check the present tendencies. Is the spirit of nation-

ality in Turkey strong enough to put through such a program, a spirit which has been confined to only a section of the population?

Iraq. In Iraq, in spite of the divisions between Shia and Sunni, and between the townspeople with more or less education and the tribal Arabs,[5] there are also stirrings of nationalistic feeling. The townspeople have most of this and are inclined to resent British control, while the tribal sheikhs are well disposed towards anyone who will help them to maintain their power. Dr. Harrison says of the rule of the British that it is "benevolent in purpose and efficient in administration, but the personal attitude of the ruling class is haughty and aloof. A distinct class division is established and insisted upon, with the ruler above and the ruled below. However much it may reflect on the Arab's intellect, it remains true that he prefers a ruler as inefficient and corrupt as the Turk, who treats him essentially as an equal, to an efficient, honest, and progressive ruler like the Briton, who treats him as an inferior."[6] British support of the claims of Iraq in the Mosul boundary case has created a more cordial feeling toward the English.

Persia. Some of the recent political events in Persia have been mentioned (p. 72). This country has had a constitution since 1906, but very heavy handicaps in developing modern democratic government. There has been a tradition of autocracy which was unwillingly surrendered by the Shah to the Nationalists. The young Shah has been in France for some years and has finally been deposed. Riza Khan, the prime minister, has succeeded him.

[5] *The Near East,* August 6, 1925, pp. 166 ff.
[6] Harrison, *The Arab at Home,* pp. 180 ff.

A missionary writes: "The villager, toughened by winter exposure due to lack of clothes, and hard boiled by his day's work done under a summer sun, is forced to forego some of the necessities of life in order that he may pay his share toward supporting the king, who is busy with his many marriages and frequent trips to France, meanwhile drawing the meager sum of five times that which wealthy America considers the equivalent for the services of our President."

The same missionary says, referring to the rural citizen: "Politically, he is an ass to be ridden and prodded. His main concern is to get his crops sold. He has no care who sits on the throne or what principle of government may obtain, only as long as they do not take too much of his crops in taxes. During the propaganda for a republican form of government in 1924, the villagers in one village near Tabriz got the idea that this 'republic' was a great general who was coming from the capital. Under the present constitutional form of government the peasant has a vote, but should one be so foolish as to inquire for whom he cast his vote, he could not tell. He only knows that someone from the city, with a 'sign' on his hat, came around with an officially sealed box. He went when he was called, gave his name, the official marked the ballot and dropped it in the box. His duty as a citizen was thereby discharged."

This is a commentary on the state of literacy, economic development, public spirit, and public opinion. On the other hand, among more cultured circles the nationalistic feeling is growing. Whatever may be the affiliations of an emancipated Moslem with modern democracy, the fact remains that the bulk of Islam is not yet emancipated, and that in Persia political progress encounters

consistent opposition on the part of mujtahids and mullahs. Formerly their power was so strong that in 1891, in order to circumvent a monopoly of tobacco granted by the Shah to a British corporation, they declared tobacco *"haram"* (forbidden). This prohibition was so generally obeyed by the people that the use of tobacco practically ceased and the concession was rescinded on payment of an indemnity.[7] Now the political power of these ecclesiastics is greatly reduced. At the same time many of the leaders feel that Islam is the national religion and that to repudiate it would involve disloyalty to Persia. The conservative associate democracy with Bahaism, probably because the Bahais are politically and materially the most progressive sect.

India. In India the action of the Allies in cutting down the territory of the Sultan of Turkey was greatly resented, since it was alleged that control of Arabia and Mesopotamia was essential to the dignity of the temporal head of Islam. A coalition was formed between the heads of the Moslem community, Mohammed and Shaukat Ali, and Mr. Gandhi. The latter expressed great sympathy for the Moslem community in this violation of its sacred rights. For a time Moslem and Hindu fraternized, and they had never done so before. Later the Angora Government did a thing which threw the iniquity of the Allies into the shade, when they first deprived the Sultan of temporal power and then, in spite of a protest from the leading Indian Moslems, abolished the office altogether. With the departure of a common antagonist, the two communities have reverted to their former friction as described in the articles by Mr. Lajpat Rai, quoted on pages 74-77.

[7] Cf. Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia,* chap. xvii.

East Indies. In the East Indies there have also been stirrings within the past two decades, a great desire for education and civilization being accompanied by an increasing spirit of nationality.[8] Influential societies have been organized to promote general welfare and national feeling. In the effort to develop cooperation on a large scale, it is natural that every existing bond should be utilized, and of these Islam stands first, being, as it is, the religion of the great majority. The primary effect of the new ideals will therefore probably be to stimulate the religious activities of Moslems.

Economic Changes

Next we may consider the effect on the Moslem world of economic changes.

Economically, the Moslem world was at one time more wealthy than Christendom. The court of Harun ar Rashid was more splendid than that of Charlemagne or of contemporary Byzantium; the Alhambra preceded the Cathedral of Seville by over a century; the cultivation of the Saracens amazed the Crusaders and greatly stimulated the desire of Europe for luxuries. Even as late as the eighteenth century the riches of the Great Moguls were a proverb. The Moslems conquered some of the most prosperous and productive portions of the earth. Today these lands are desired by European powers, not for what Moslems have made them, but for what they have been unable to develop.

Some of the influences which have hindered economic development in the Moslem world are similar to those

[8] *International Review of Missions,* January, 1917, pp. 113 ff.; January, 1925, pp. 40 ff.; *The Moslem World,* July, 1924, pp. 274 ff.

which obtained in Medieval Europe. In the first place, the Moslem ruling class was composed, in theory at least, of fighters rather than producers, as was the case in the Middle Ages when the rulers owed protection to their clients. Especially among the Turks this tradition has persisted. In different countries many forms of occupation have been turned over partly or wholly to Christians. Lack of security and of communications is a second important factor. Third is the prohibition of usury which threw money-lending into the hands of Christians, while in Medieval Christendom this same regulation operated mainly in behalf of the Jews. The other-worldly influences of religion withdrew many individuals of the greatest ability from the producing class. The lack of exact knowledge of the properties of matter and of machinery driven by steam and electricity was characteristic of both the civilizations compared. Among the more peculiar hindrances of Islam has been the fact that a much larger proportion of population live in the Heat Belt, where labor was avoided by the privileged class. Likewise, it has been overrun by several devastating invasions from which Christendom was spared. Moslem theology has ruled out second causes and made every occurrence depend immediately on a fiat of God. Malcolm gives a striking instance of the application of this philosophy of life:[9]

"An English lady was one day standing by an open tank in a Persian compound into which one of the children had fallen that morning, and she remarked on its extreme danger. 'Yes,' said the mother, 'I have lost three children in that tank.' To build a small wall around such a tank would be in Persia exceedingly easy.

[9] Malcolm, *Five Years in a Persian Town*, pp. 154-155.

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Perhaps the little power of initiative that is left in them by their predestinarianism is destroyed by the insecurity of the country. It will get in the way of making as few improvements as possible, and of never exposing their capital more than they can help."

Harrison says[10] that the Arab mind is essentially an investigative and truth-loving mind; but later,[11] that in the past two thousand years the Arabs have gained no new appreciation of truth or beauty. "Probably no race in the world has remained more completely stagnant during this time than they." This stagnation he traces to Islam. Religious pride has hindered Moslems in borrowing the results of European progress, so that today Moslem countries stand low in the economic scale, absolutely dependent on Western capital and initiative for improvement.

Meanwhile, Christendom, with the aid of applied science, has rapidly manifolded the machinery of production, has amassed capital in overwhelming bulk and perfected methods for its increased extension. The most casual acquaintance with conditions makes evident, even to Moslem prejudice, its extreme economic backwardness today. The multiplying contacts, as communications continue to penetrate into the most remote regions, demonstrate this ever more clearly. The Moslem is moved by new material ambitions. He desires products of a superior efficiency and convenience, and a share in creating the prosperity of the world. After having for centuries regarded the rest of the world with the easy-going disdain of a Dives, it is humiliating to find himself sitting in the place of Lazarus. He wishes to borrow,

[10] Harrison, *The Arab at Home*, p. 266.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

but perceives the danger of doing so. He needs capital, but fears exploitation. He wants to develop his own natural resources for his own profit, yet lacks funds and expert advice in order to get started. He is repelled by the impersonal attitude of modern business, which makes the best bargain it can, and looks out mainly for the interests of the creditor. He feels that the latest comers in modern industry are likely to get the back seats.

Arabia. Economically, Arabia is among the most backward nations of the earth. The bulk of the country is well towards the zero mark in productiveness due to deficient rainfall and very scanty irrigation. There is nothing to attract outside capital, even if the attitude of the people should welcome it. As Dr. Harrison says,[12] Islam has not stimulated the development of natural resources, but has, instead, created a positive prejudice against modern progress. In the oases and the coastal regions desire for material prosperity is more felt.

Egypt. Egypt has been for some time under the financial control of foreigners who have wished to enable it to pay its debts. Consequently, there has been a systematic encouragement of production and amelioration of the condition of the agricultural class. Schools of various grades in industry, commerce, and agriculture have been provided; but these have appealed less strongly to the native Egyptian than those which led to government positions or to the professions. The constant contact with Europeans in the country and the frequent travel to Europe have led to considerable imitation of Western economic standards of life.

[12] Harrison, *The Arab at Home,* pp. 251 ff.

North Africa. The material improvements in North Africa are also creating new desires. We hear from Morocco, the latest country open to Western influences, that old conservative ways are fast disappearing, and that many of the people, especially the younger ones, are rather ashamed of their ignorance and primitive habits.[13] Abdul Krim reported to Vincent Sheean [14] that he hoped that American capital would help him to develop the mineral wealth of the Riff. Communications are developing, not only with Europe, as is natural in view of recent events, but with the interior. There is a motor route across the Sahara all the way to Timbuktu, and a railroad is planned in the near future. These material contacts are bound to work changes.

Syria. Syria has shared in the economic status of the Turkish Empire, but now she is under the mandate of an enterprising European power. Many medieval and modern methods of doing business come into collision. A correspondent writes: ". . . (Moslems) will not unite in any cooperative move. Hence, Western capitalists could and will control their economic life. For instance, there are hundreds of men in Hamath making a living by buying and selling wool and hides with a very small marginal border. But now Western capitalists are coming and they will quickly eliminate these middle men. An Armenian buying for a large New York firm controls the price of hides in Hamath district and had nearly a monopoly on wool. Yet he refused to deal with any of the small wool and hide merchants, but dealt on a large scale with the producers.

"Moslems have much to learn economically in the way

[13] *The Moslem World,* April, 1924, p. 134.
[14] *Asia,* October, 1925, p. 856.

of cooperation. There are hundreds of shops in Hamath selling exactly the same thing, and all their goods are arranged in the most heterogeneous style. In production their methods are the same as those which were used many centuries ago. . . . If orthodox Moslems wish to make a contract for organizing a company on the basis of the Koran, they find it almost impossible, since the Koran does not provide for modern economic conditions. There are many interpretations given to almost every passage, and many passages have contradictory illustrations on the same subject. Hence, if the Moslems really wish to find a firm economic basis on which the country may progress, they must entirely discredit the Koran as an economic guide except in so far as it teaches general principles, such as honesty, faithfulness, etc.

"The economic barrier is the lack of confidence of all classes of people in each other. The autocratic landowners were often very dishonest, since they had absolute control, even to life and death. . . . But the dishonesty was not always one-sided, for while it is acknowledged that landowners rob the people, it is also well known that shepherds and peasants often gave dishonest returns.

"With the coming of modern influences to the Moslem cities there arise many problems of reinterpretation; for example, the taking and giving of interest on money. According to the Koran, this is explicitly prohibited for Moslems, but there is now a way to buy and sell a trifling object, such as a pencil, for the sum involved in the amount of interest to be paid, thus making the giving of interest a permitted commercial transaction. According to the Koran, a man may will his property to his heirs as *wakf,* in which case it cannot be sold. It has been

estimated that at least fifty per cent of the property in Hamath is now *wakf*. Under modern conditions it is becoming necessary to buy and sell such land, so two methods have been provided: either by buying another property of the same value with the price of the sale, or by a *wakf* tax. The second method has become merely a joke, since some of these taxes on quite valuable land transactions is a *barghot* (5 cents) per year."

The Damascus correspondent goes on to say: "Moslem conditions in Syria have greatly improved. There has been created a desire for wealth, material products, and Western civilization. The result is that the people's mode of living and business and commercial activities are quite different from those of the last century. But this development is confined to the civilized circles. The rest of the population are still under the influence of the old régime because they think that such customs and traditions suit them better."

Another correspondent writes: "Communications have worked a wonderful change. There has been a movement from place to place of the common people which was never possible before. This has broadened their interests and the scope of their conversation, and this in turn will surely affect their religion. The War taught the people how things were done efficiently; especially was this true among the Arab soldiers cooperating with the British, who were greatly impressed with Western efficiency and organization. Capitalism has not become a question with them."

From a Metawali (Shia) village we hear: "The easy communication has had a tendency to speed up life in all its aspects. There is less time given to reading, meditation, and prayer. A year ago one could almost never

walk down into the market in the early part of the day without hearing in two or three or more of the shops the shopkeepers reading from the Koran. Now one rarely hears it at all. . . . It is the common practise now to combine prayers and dispense with certain of the five daily prayers. . . . Modern efficiency ideas have not made any perceptible impression. There is a feeling, occasionally expressed in words, more often in attitudes, that to make a sudden change in the use of tools, institutions, or methods would be a confession of weakness. However, as new tastes and new demands develop, modern ideas of efficiency are being introduced. . . .

"Material ambition is no recent innovation. The West has nothing of material ambition to contribute to the Shia or Huli Arab. . . . We have usually found it the case that where religious demands and material gain are in conflict, the latter takes precedence. One example among many is: A man who opposes our being in the town and is afraid we are contaminating the youth and leading some astray is at the same time trying to rent us his house because we pay higher rent than anyone else. We have been asked many times by apparently serious inquirers, how much our Society would pay a man to become a Protestant."

Turkey. Turkey, although settled in Europe, did not share in the industrial development of Christendom in the last hundred and fifty years. The sultans spent money copiously on extravagances, but did little for public improvement. Abdul Hamid was very suspicious of certain modern devices, such as telephones.

Turkey, like all the rest of the Moslem world, has been backward in communications. "On January 1, 1913, the

railways of the Ottoman Empire totaled 1,046 miles in Europe, and 2,836 miles in Asia, a total of 3,882 miles or less than half of Belgium's."[15] This amount was greatly reduced by the loss of territory due to wars since that date. In Asia Minor poverty and scanty population hinders development of transportation, and this in turn impedes economic progress.[16]

Agricultural improvement has been blocked by the inefficient methods of conservatism, and discouraged by the rapacity of tax collectors.[17] Arnold, in defending the Moslem from the charge of religious intolerance, repeatedly points out that the Turkish peasant was quite as much oppressed as his Christian fellow-subject.

The European nations, with massed capital and well-organized credit system, discovered that "here was a country of vast potential resources, with a strategic location and a government too ignorant, irresponsible, and corrupt to protect its interests. It was an ideal field for political intrigue, and it would not long remain uncultivated."[18] Tremendous loans were contracted by extravagant sultans, and further ones arranged to pay the interest on the former. As a result, there was created in 1881 the Ottoman Public Debt to represent foreign creditors, which has recently apportioned shares to countries now severed from the Turkish Empire. Turkey today stands in a difficult position. She still pays interest on loans which were expended so as to leave no permanent benefit. Her resources are largely undeveloped. She desires further capital for constructive work, but is exceedingly jealous of foreign exploitation and is therefore unwilling to offer terms that bankers will accept.

[15] Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 222.
[16] *Ibid.*, chap. ix.
[17] *Ibid.*, chap. xii.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 389.

In February, 1923, an economic congress met at Smyrna and announced an economic pact, sections of which are as follows:

"The Turkish people, having obtained their national superiority at the price of their blood, will no longer suffer the least sacrifice in this respect. . . . From the point of view of natural resources and wealth, the Turkish people are conscious that they possess golden treasures. . . . Theft, lying, hypocrisy, laziness—these are our deadly enemies. A solid faith, free from all fanaticism, is the fundamental principle of our life. We shall adhere always to useful inventions. The Turk is the hearty friend of enlightenment and the sciences. The Turk is always the friend of people who are not against his religion, his life, and his institutions. He is not the adversary of foreign capital, but in his country he entertains no relations with organizations incompatible with his laws and language. He draws from springs of science and the arts everywhere. He repudiates every intermediary in his relations. The Turkish woman and the Turkish schoolmaster mold the children in accordance with the precepts of the Moslem vow."

The determination of Turkish leaders is evidently formed, but they have some difficult problems. In the interest of a unified national feeling they have expelled numbers of the minority races and have lost some of their most capable citizens economically. Exchange of populations has also of itself dislocated industry and agriculture for the time being. The government is seeking by a high tariff to keep certain lines of trade in Turkish hands. A law has been enacted that all employees of companies in Turkey must be Turkish citizens. A summary of news published in Constantinople Feb-

ruary 4, 1926, notes with satisfaction that this law is being enforced. It states that the request of certain companies that their new hands be employed for a time as apprentices has been refused, and that the Greek citizens serving in minor occupations will be prosecuted. The government is planning agricultural schools and has distributed seed and advanced loans to cultivators. It has opened dispensaries and is planning sanitary measures.[19]

Iraq. Iraq, which was never completely linked up with the rest of the world by the Baghdad Railway and was, therefore, connected only by steamers of the Persian Gulf and by caravans, has now a motor transportation service to the Mediterranean, and in addition it is often visited by aviators. From the economic standpoint advance has been hard. The strategic boundaries of the country make defense relatively expensive. Commerce has been slow in developing.

Here, as in other countries, the entrance of modern industrial standards is unpopular with many because they treat the propertied classes with largest consideration.

The government has granted a concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company, the interests represented being British, American, French, and Dutch, to exploit petroleum in the Baghdad and Mosul vilayets for a period of seventy-five years.[20]

Persia. Persia is one of the most backward countries from the standpoint of communications. This, combined with its comparative inaccessibility, keeps away many influences that touch other lands. In many sections the long-suffering peasant lives pretty much as in the past.

[19] *The Near East,* August 6, 1925, pp. 177 ff., 181.
[20] *Ibid.,* March 19, 1925, p. 307.

A missionary writes: "Economically, he earns his salt—and earns sugar for the fellow up above him. His frugality, patience, and lack of vision and faith are the most notable qualities. The landlord bleeds him, the government oppresses him, and the bandit robs him."

But for the centers trade and outside contacts are increasing, which affects the standards of living of the upper classes. The entrance of European concession hunters has stimulated imports. It is charged that England and Russia have discouraged Persian economic development in order to keep the market more thoroughly to themselves. The American Financial Adviser has, on the whole, been successful, and he has been authorized to engage twelve more Americans as assistants. He reports an increase of revenues and a decrease of expenditures.

Afghanistan. Even Afghanistan is concerned with the development of home industries. It is reported from more than one quarter that the Amir has not only sought to find markets for Afghan products, but that he encourages his officials to buy home-made cloth by personally clipping with a sharp penknife pieces out of garments made of imported materials.

Social Changes

A religion like Islam, that has undertaken to legislate in detail regarding social observances, will experience a greater shock when brought into inescapable contact with a different social system that invites imitation. When the only Christians they knew were of subject races or isolated representatives of foreign nations, there was no

temptation to Moslems to copy their ways. But now the social life of the West is penetrating more intensively. It is accepted on a far larger scale than ever before as the convention of progressive and powerful races who follow it with a superior air that is disconcerting to those with other standards. It is a part of a rich civilization from which the Moslem world has no choice but to borrow. By its wholesome liberty and high ideals it appeals to the more serious among the open minded, and by its unwholesome license attracts the pleasure seeker. There are three possible attitudes towards it: some will stand by the letter of Islam and resist all compromise with changing ways of living; some will try to hold fast to what they consider the real spirit of religion and admit changes that seem desirable; some will adopt anything that seems agreeable, without regard to the taboos of religion. Of these courses of action, the middle one involves most scope and raises perplexing questions. How far are certain social usages essential to the spirit of Islam? Even if they are theoretically permissible, are they immediately practicable? Meanwhile, the stand-patters and the drifters are pulling in opposite directions and not making solutions easier.

The storm center of the social problem will inevitably be the position of women. Mohammed's personal example and precepts recorded in the Koran constitute a terrible handicap. The seclusion of women has hindered their participation in political, economic, social, intellectual, and religious life. Even in Christendom they have suffered along some of these lines until recent times. With all our preparation for it, the removal of restrictions on the activities of women has been in many cases not too soon, but too sudden. We have rejected mid-

Victorian prudery more rapidly than we have built up wholesome standards for a new régime. If the post-war conditions have caught us with our lamps short of oil, what shall we say to the problem of the Moslem world in adjusting itself to such a situation, with religion operating as a clog instead of an aid.

Egypt. We find in Egypt the feminist movement proceeding in a hopeful way. In the elections in the early part of 1919 veiled women went about in carriages to encourage the voters. They now are appearing in public much more fully and are issuing helpful magazines.[21] The Ulama of Al Azhar have found it necessary to condemn "the short dresses and bright colors in which Moslem women are now seen walking in the streets," and to declare that it is contrary to the law of Islam for women to go on the stage.[22] It is reported that the Egyptian Women's Union has secured the passage of a law forbidding marriage for boys under eighteen and for girls under sixteen.[23]

North Africa. A notable event in North Africa has been the action of the Algerian courts all the way to the top in confirming the right of a Kabyle girl to damages and divorce for brutal treatment by her husband. The highest court, in sustaining the opinions of the lower ones, declares that a more humane conception of women's rights now deserves legal recognition.[24]

Syria. From the Syrian city of Hamath we have the following impression of the status of Moslem women:

[21] *The Moslem World,* January, 1922, pp. 86 ff., 90 ff.
[22] *The Near East,* July 20, 1925, p. 94.
[23] *Current History Magazine,* January, 1924, p. 1100.
[24] *The Moslem World,* April, 1924, p. 129.

"One from the West cannot realize the ignorance and superstitions of the average Moslem woman, nor can he appreciate her abject condition. Moslem women in the past, and even today in such a predominantly Moslem city as Hamath, have been regarded merely as pieces of household furniture, to be used or removed at the will of the men. The average Moslem woman received only scant attention or consideration. Whatever her state of health, she must rise at once to perform her husband's demands. It is still a very common thing for a Moslem man to allow his wife to die rather than to permit her to visit a man doctor. In Hamath it is still only a negligible number of adult women who can read.

"The women have almost no part in religion. Some of the older women pray in their homes, and in some of the better families a sheikh will come once a week to instruct the women in the Koran. In all the sixty mosques of Hamath, only one provides a place for women to worship, and this is but a dingy, dark room where just a very few of the women go to listen to the sermon on Friday. For the average woman religion means nothing more than visiting the tombs on Friday, praying at the graves of saints, fasting in Ramadan, and providing for herself and her children charms made efficacious by the recitation over them of the Koran by a blind sheikh, to ward off the evil effects of hostile and malignant spirits.

"Nothing gave me more of a shock when we reached Hamath than the miserable position of the women. Even the Christian women are all veiled and hard to distinguish from the Moslems, with the exception of a few elderly Armenian women. . . . In the happiest of the homes I have entered I found one daughter was married at ten, another at twelve, and a young girl who would just be

enjoying college life at home, told me sadly that she has had seven children and they had all died. . . . There are some signs of improvement. There are two schools for Moslem girls, but what is that among such a population? The school I saw—it was the larger and better one—seemed utterly lacking in any real education and character training or training in self-control."

An Arabic editor states: "Veiling is a matter of morality and politeness. One must hold fast to it and be strict with it. As women neglect this and become indifferent and begin to associate with men, they lose their respect and ranking in the hearts of men. Corruption and wickedness would prevail. The mingling of the two sexes is exactly like the mingling of fire and gunpowder."

A Protestant Syrian minister says: "Women imitate the fashions adopted by Christians. The veil used to be made of thick, dark-colored cloth, which was put on the face double. But now it has come to be considered an up-to-date fashion to throw over the face a very thin veil of silk. Also in meetings and receptions Moslem women throw off the veil and enjoy the light. There is the beginning of an anti-veiling movement among the Moslems themselves. The movement began in Egypt, where it succeeded, and is now working in Syria, especially in the big cities of Damascus and Beirût. I heard lately a Moslem lady delivering a speech in the American University with the subject, 'Give Them Light.' The speaker supported her arguments by stating historical and Koranic proofs which show that Islam does not require veiling on the part of the women. She finished by saying that veiling was pre-Islamic and still to be found practised by some heathen tribes."

These reforms take a long while to spread. A Damascus missionary says: "The emancipation of women is as yet very little felt in Damascus. Last August many articles were written in the newspapers by Moslems, including women, about throwing away the veil. Most of the writers said that the time had not yet come, although it might or would come. Some writers held that the veil should never be thrown away because it was a religious duty. The Mufti himself gave a *fatwa* for this last view, but several were against him. The common, ignorant men would certainly still think and feel as the Mufti does."

A young Moslem woman who was interviewed, reported a conversation. One speaker said: "We sit here, each one like a bird in a cage, and cannot stir unless our husbands give us permission." The other speaker replied: "We cannot help it. God willed it to be so." The first speaker continued: "God never willed that any human being should so be kept in bondage." The other said: "It is the fault of our Prophet. He had no mercy on us." The first answered: "What would you expect of a man who had thirteen wives?" And to this there was no reply.

From the Metawali village we hear: "It has only been during the past decade that the women have adopted the veil. It being a new custom locally probably accounts for the fact that they are veiled more closely than in the larger cities. Veiling is one of the earmarks of a large town as contrasted with a village."

Along with this reaching out after our wholesome Western liberty, there is also a reaction against the unhealthy license of Christendom. Every age has had its social vices and excesses. In no previous age have

certain excesses been placed within the reach of so large a proportion of our population. In the cosmopolitan atmospheres of our great cities the restraints of village public opinion are no longer felt, and individuals are not content with the monotonous lives of their parents. The frailties of the pampered and undisciplined rich are imitated on a less expensive scale by the masses. One day when we shall see these things in truer perspective, we shall wonder that we accepted with so little protest the semi-barbaric features of our present social life. People fiercely defend their right to drink as they please, to dress as they please, to enjoy what coarse and inane and extravagant amusements they please, without regard to the effect of these things on individual character or the higher aspects of social welfare. We are cultivating an appetite which in the nature of things is insatiable—the desire for thrills. In all this we comfort ourselves with the assurance that we are essentially sound at bottom and can stand a few flings.

But to the Moslems these things look different. In the first place, the more serious among them, having never had their perceptions blunted by Western conventions, see certain vices in their native ugliness. A young *bey* in a Metawali village was playing backgammon in a shop when the head sheikh entered. The young man blushed violently and pretended that he was only watching the game. Imagine the impressions of such a person if he could see the gambling of Christendom, from the bridge playing in private homes to the casinos of Deauville and Monte Carlo. An intelligent Moslem woman from under her veil, would feel a moral superiority to Westerners in some of the extreme styles. In the second place, social customs that might find ample justification in the case

of the pure minded and well trained, may be inadvisable for people without high principles and experience of social freedom.

A Syrian correspondent writes: "Western morals have had both good and evil effects on Islam. However, the evil effects at present seem to outnumber the good. The worst effect of Western standards of morals is that they put the stamp of good form upon things which are explicitly stated to be wrong, both in Christianity and Islam. For instance, before the War both gambling and drinking were prevalent in Syria, but both were done in secret. They were not sanctioned by good society. Now, however, Moslems of the better class serve intoxicating drinks to visitors with a sort of pride, as much as to say: 'You see, we are quite European.' Also gambling was practised among Moslems before the coming of Western morals, but it was a petty sort of gambling, such as playing backgammon to see who would treat to coffee. But now even in Hamath, the most conservative city of Syria, poker playing for money is getting to be the thing to do among those who are trying to be thought up to date."

Another says: "There is no new opposition to the Christian and Christianity; probably much less than ten years ago; but a growing disgust at European morality, the increase of drinking, the freedom of the sexes, etc. . . .

"The tenacious exaltation of decorum on the part of Moslems stands them in good stead in partially arresting the growing inroads of the attractive vices from Western lands. Their phraseology is most significant as stereotyping the historic facts of the origin of their plagues in the domain of morals. Their term for dead drunk is 'Eng-

lish drunk,' so unfamiliar was such a condition. And their name for venereal disease is 'European pox.' Their religious instincts qualify them to look upon the excesses in ways of Western society with disgust and contempt, but this gives them at the same time a sense of moral superiority that blocks the way to Christian evangelism."

Turkey. In Turkey there is much discussion on the crucial social question of the position of women. For some time customs have been relaxing. In Constantinople the veil has been laid aside by many, and women serve in shops, business houses, telephone exchanges, and hospitals. They accompany their husbands to public entertainments and receive men in their homes. A congress of women met in Constantinople in January, 1917, and criticized early marriages, polygamy, and easy divorce. The curtain that separates men from women in tramcars and steamers has been removed. Miss Emerson writes that she was in Smyrna when this law went into effect.[25] It was received as the abolition of Jim Crow regulations would have been received in parts of this country. The more conservative indicated their displeasure by veiling closely and sitting as much apart as possible. Others accepted the change with dignity.

Finally, polygamy has been abolished and women have been given all the rights of inheritance that men have.[26] A leading newspaper has advocated abrogation of the rule demanding the adoption of Islam by those who marry Turkish women, on the ground that the rule excites unfavorable criticism and that intermarriage with Europeans would be desirable.[27]

[25] *The Moslem World,* January, 1925, pp. 369 ff.
[26] *The Near East,* July 9, 1925, p. 37.
[27] *The Near East and India,* November 19, 1925, p. 613.

A more superficial change that has been played up in the newspapers, but which may yet stir the nerves of deep-seated prejudice, is decreed by the new regulations as to head covering. The Angora authorities, on the ground that they wish to conform to the customs of civilized nations, have declared that for officials the rule shall be to stay bareheaded inside of institutional buildings, and to greet with a nod. Out of doors the official greeting is to take off the hat. These rules have been made increasingly strict, and they seem bound to arouse resentment among the old-fashioned, who will dislike to see long-established customs of Islam discarded for those of Christendom. A man in Sivas who conducted a propaganda against hat-wearing was condemned to death.[28] In Constantinople the change seems to have commended itself to the majority. Fezzes have disappeared, and those who have made a business of blocking them see their occupation gone. There is a great rush for hats, so that the factories are working overtime to fill orders. Angora thus takes another opportunity to show its contempt for orthodox Moslem customs.

Persia. From Hamadan in Persia we hear: "The chief points to note here, I would say, are the growing freedom of women, the gradual disappearance of the idea that a foreigner is unclean, permitting greater access to Persian homes, and the growth of the idea of the superiority of monogamy as a form of family life. Of course, the progress is comparatively small as yet."

In Resht "the military commander of the district recently delivered an address, telling the women that they

[28] Summary of "Turkish News," Dec. 3-10, 1925, from Weekly *Servet-i-Firoon,* Constantinople.

could lay aside their veils. He warned them to walk modestly, mind their own business, and call upon the police to protect them if anyone was rude to them. Women in increasing numbers would like to remove the veil, but fear the men."

A lady missionary in Tehran writes: "With the adoption of constitutional government in 1906, women began to talk of leaving off the veil, and now they are talking more than ever about it. There have been many spasmodic bursts of enthusiasm for such action, but never any steady, consistent effort. The unveiling of Moslem women in Constantinople has had an effect on the women of Persia. Many women who earnestly wish the abolishment of the veil feel that the time for it is not yet come and that unveiled women would not know how to behave. I have recently heard of people of good families who are having mixed companies in their own homes, where men and women are meeting socially. . . . A few years ago women were derided and even cursed on the street for wearing imported boots or going without the enormously full bloomers customarily worn under the chuddar. Not only have the bloomers been superseded under the long skirt, but women wear any shoes that they wish. A few years ago women did not use the telephone, fearing to let their voices be heard. Now women use the phone. . . .

"In Meshed, the most holy city in Persia, social evils are not only winked at, but condoned by religious heads. Women are constantly ready to serve as temporary wives of men pilgrims, the ceremony being performed according to religious law, and the limit of contract being set at the time of marriage, whether in terms of hours, days, or weeks."

India. In India, as might be expected with such a vast population of every degree of education and culture, there is the greatest variety of reactions to new social influences. The most orthodox sheikhs still threaten with hell-fire those who depart from the prescribed methods of dress or wearing the hair. At the other end of the line are earnest and progressive Moslems like Professor A. M. Maulvie, of Dharwar College, who holds that the practise and beliefs of Islam are retarding the country, and that fanatical priests have done more harm than good. He interprets the Koran as teaching high social principles. He denounces *purdah* and asserts that its present use sets at naught the teachings of Islam. Social laws should be adjusted to the needs of modern progress.

The Moslem women have organizations to discuss social questions. An interesting account of the Fifth Annual Conference of Indian Mohammedan Ladies is given in *The Moslem World* of April, 1919.[30] About four hundred attended and polygamy was denounced with great applause, but the President held that the duty of women was to obey the Koran, which held that a man might have four wives. The demoralizing influences of modern education; namely, distaste for household work, extravagance, desire to marry for love, money, or good looks, were cited, and approval expressed for a type of education which should fit primarily for domesticity. The *Muslim Herald* of Madras, of October 25, 1924,[31] refers to a more recent Provincial Ladies Conference as holding much the same position. Improvement within *purdah* restrictions rather than imitation of the freedom of Western women was considered desirable for the present.

[30] Pp. 169 ff.
[31] Quoted by Murray T. Titus in *The Moslem World of Today.*

Intellectual Changes

The intellectual problems of Islam during the coming years are of supreme interest. On the one hand, the great masses are either absolutely or for practical purposes illiterate, since ability to pronounce passages from the Koran does not make one a reader. In general this illiteracy involves desperate hostility to all progress. If the entire Moslem world thirsted for modern education and unlimited funds were at our disposal, it would still be a terrific task to instruct the people on account of their widespread distribution and isolation. Without large financial resources or eager response, the difficulty is tremendously increased.

On the other hand, the canons of the past will not apply to the future. In the first place, the machinery for intellectual stimulus available today—printed matter, the spoken word, pictures and cinemas, manufactured articles, significant action, opportunities for travel, and enlarged contacts—in their quantity and quality have multiplied our effectiveness manyfold. Education which was once a practical necessity only for a few specialists has now become the most obvious means of individual or national welfare. It is no longer an elegant accomplishment, but an indispensable tool. Its value is more immediately demonstrable than ever before, and its results can be convincingly verified. The disadvantage of ignorance to individuals or communities is steadily more apparent. No community can afford to let such a weapon be monopolized by its opponents.

The development of the Roman Catholic Church since the Renaissance may be suggestive. Without the strong Protestant motive for teaching everyone to read the

Bible for himself, education as promoted by the Jesuits and other orders became a leading agency of the Counter Reformation Since that time learning which has supported the Church or that which has been capable of being reconciled with its teachings has been cultivated, although many Roman Catholic countries have been backward in literacy. On speculative matters the great majority have been willing to accept the authority of the Church, and for the present the criticism of modernists has been repudiated. Of course, many intellectuals find themselves unable to sympathize with the official dogmas, but a considerable proportion nevertheless maintain their connection with the Church as a social institution. So in Islam we may expect to find in certain sections a cordial welcome for modern learning, with, on the one hand, attempts to harmonize it with Moslem theology, and, on the other hand, loyalty to Islam as a social and political scheme by many who find intellectual adjustment impossible.

Egypt. In Egypt, as we might expect, modern intellectual influences are comparatively active. "A new book is being published in Cairo in Arabic every day of the year. Of these a large proportion are either translations or interpretations, and especially of French scientific and political thought." [32]

During the last twenty-five years there has been marked progress in education. The government has encouraged the little *kuttabs,* or elementary schools, which, previously, did little but teach memorizing of the Koran, to enlarge their scope and efficiency, and thus, gradually, the effective literacy of the country has been increased. The press of Egypt is active and influential.

[32] *The Moslem World,* July, 1924, p. 229.

North Africa. In Algeria the French had at first to employ pressure to induce parents to send their children to school. The great financial success of those who learned the French language was such that "now it is a sight to see the government schoolmasters besieged at the beginning of the October term by far more boys than they can take. And the parents are there, trying bribes or tears, whichever seems to have most chance."[33] The same desire to learn European languages is evident in Morocco. "Young men and lads are eager to come to evening classes for this purpose."[34] Mothers wish to have even their daughters taught.

Syria. "In almost every city of Syria there are still a few of the old type of schools, conducted by a sheikh, who is often blind, dozens of boys crowded into a room with no attempt at order, and everyone droning the Koran as he rocks backwards and forwards. But such schools will soon be a thing of the past if modern education continues to spread and national schools are founded, with teachers who have done graduate study in the American University at Beirût or in European universities. . . .

"The War impressed the people as being a war of brains, and helped them to understand what is going on in Europe intellectually. There has been a real growth in the desire for education. Even the simple farmers in the Anti-Lebanon wish to have their children educated. . . . They say strongly: 'We must be free to accept anything in Western civilization consistent with our inheritance.' They talk about adopting much from the West. There is a marked increase in the number of girls' schools

[33] *The Moslem World,* April, 1924, p. 127.
[34] *Ibid.,* p. 135.

conducted by Moslems, and many Christian women are teaching in them."

A missionary says: "A young Moslem friend of mine in Aleppo was severely criticized by a very orthodox Moslem because he had been reading some books in preparation to become a druggist. Such books are *haram* (forbidden). In spite of the efforts of some to stop it, there is a growing number of those who are thirsting for knowledge and want to know the truth."

Turkey. As noted above, Turkey has only recently come to real consciousness of nationality. With extensive territory poorly provided with communications, a large amount of illiteracy and poverty, several different races among its Moslem population, and several more of other faiths, separated politically into compartments sufficiently water-tight to destroy the sense of cooperation and patriotism, controlled by a government that permitted no public representation and aroused no enthusiasm, Turkey needed some steam to get her wheels moving. To utilize religion would involve being hampered by a partnership of conservative theologians who consider themselves authorized to pass on civil matters. Therefore, nationalism has been chosen by the present government as the driving power. This is to be generated by the aid of education.

A representative of the Ministry of Education wrote in the *Tanin* of March 30, 1923: "We are in the stage of nationalism. . . . Our educational aims will be humanitarian, but at the same time very nationalistic. In place of an artificial education, a civilized and liberal education; in place of old cosmopolitan elements, a modernized gentleman Turk. . . . We can summarize our educational

system in two words, national culture and modernized teaching. . . . In this path of national culture and national education we shall take into consideration all the emotional, religious, and educational elements of our social consciousness. By national culture we aim to fuse all these elements into one. We cannot remain attached to traditions and conservatism. They do not enter into our modernized program. We have selected carefully all the points which we can accept reasonably."

Ismet Pasha recently addressed the teachers' conference as follows: "The national educational system which you are following today has no relation to anti-religious tendencies. Ten years hence you shall see in Turkey the purest type of Islam flourishing. We had been entangled in such a complexity of ideas that we were in need of getting rid of them. . . . I do not believe our system is antagonistic to religious education. We shall follow this ideal of national education at any cost. In the sphere of science and civilization the Turkish nation must have an existence. I am expecting social duties also from our teachers. Our social life is lacking in many things. It is dirty, really dirty, and you will cleanse it."

The editor of the paper comments on this as follows: "The feeling and idea of nationality is a very new thing in Turkey. It has been born during the Great War. It is this nationalism that has led us from those calamities to these victories. It is this national feeling that has saved Turkey from slavery and given her independence. It is nationalism that has saved us from death and brought us to life. Therefore, Ismet Pasha is quite right in emphasizing the national education. We are obliged to be extremely nationalistic in order to make up for our lack

of it in the past. It is the duty of the teachers to bring up the coming generation as extreme nationalists."

In the Turkish Republic, as already mentioned, the schools have been secularized. Conflicting reports have been circulated, but it seems clear that compulsory religious instruction will not be permitted or encouragement of students to attend exercises of any religion other than their own. This raises an important issue for missionary boards, which will be presented later.

Iraq. From Iraq we hear: "Among young men there has sprung up a thirst for education, especially Western education. Old and young want to learn English. Boys and young men carry English primers in their pockets, and whenever they find a friendly foreigner, they ply him with questions as to the pronunciation and meaning of words in their books." A high official promised missionaries that if they would open a school, he would send sixty girls from his family as pupils. King Feisal stated that the greatest help America could render would be to duplicate at Baghdad the American (Beirût) University.[35] He has since sent a son to the preparatory department of this institution. A year later a writer reports: "For a long time, until the close of the Great War, Baghdad was an isolated city. Now she lies on the crossroads of the world; and the thought currents and the transforming ideas that move the Western world find lodgment here in the hearts and minds of men. Such a mingling of the scientific thought of the West is found nowhere else. Beirût is tame to Baghdad in this respect. In the latter city scientific clubs are formed. Men and even women go to night schools in order to learn.[36]

[35] *The Moslem World*, October, 1924, pp. 399 ff.
[36] *Ibid.*, October, 1925, p. 364.

Persia. "In 1900 there were less than half a dozen Persian schools in Tehran on modern lines. With the establishment of the constitution in 1907, education became most popular. It was looked upon as a cure for all their ills, economic and moral. At one time there were from seventy to eighty schools for boys and an even greater number for girls. Many of these were of mushroom growth and soon passed out of existence, but a goodly number have continued and are giving a constantly improving grade of education. At present there are over five thousand girls and twelve thousand boys enrolled in schools. Although this is a great advance, it is a very small percentage for a city whose population is variously estimated at from three to four hundred thousand."

From Hamadan: "We hear there have been tremendous strides in Persian education in recent years. The influence of the schools is inestimable. They develop a critical spirit and a spirit of investigation. They give a spirit of independence and self-reliance so that one does not feel the necessity to go to a *mullah* to ask the meaning of a passage of the Koran, for example. They break down superstition, they develop open-mindedness, they help to postpone early marriages, besides many other obvious results."

Afghanistan. It is reported that the Amir of Afghanistan is sending Afghan students to France and Germany for study, and importing French professors, German engineers, and Italian doctors. There is a French high school for girls in Kabul.[37]

[37] *The Moslem World,* October, 1924, p. 406; *Moral and Material Progress of India for the Year 1923-1924,* p. 26.

India. The educational backwardness of the Moslem community in India has already been referred to (pp. 73 ff.). In spite of the pride of a superiority now long past, and the idea of conservative theologians that there is nothing outside of Moslem learning worth knowing, it has dawned on certain sections that they themselves are the principal losers if they continue to hold aloof from Western education. The result is a wide variety of Moslem literature. Important European books on science and philosophy have been translated into Urdu. Papers have been started to promote social reform. The Moslem press is well developed, but very partisan in tone. World happenings are interpreted from the Moslem point of view. There is a great mass of popular literature which appeals to the superstition of the credulous.[38]

The leading Moslem university is at Aligarh, which takes the position of progressives in Turkey and Egypt. Another more purely Moslem university is the one recently established in Hyderabad, where all the work is in Urdu. English is taught only as a second language. Besides these, there are institutions representing the views of different reform movements and sects, and some of the old type orthodoxy.

East Indies. The development of nationalistic feeling in Java, already noted, has naturally been accompanied by a greater desire for education.[39] Those who attend schools are likely to aspire to white-collar jobs and are among the most active in adopting Western ways and advancing education.[40] Moslem schools are trying to improve their methods, and those of the old type are at a discount.

[38] From an article by Murray Titus.
[39] *International Review of Missions,* January, 1917, pp. 113 ff.
[40] *The Moslem World,* July, 1924, pp. 273 ff.

Religious Changes

Religious changes that are taking place today in Islam present problems of the greatest perplexity and interest. The way in which the social, political, and religious have been mingled is not very unlike medieval Christendom, but it is one thing to build up these elements from within through several centuries until they are able to maintain their independence in relationship, and another thing entirely to unscramble them in the course of a few decades. Unless their spheres of authority are properly delimited, none of them can find its best development.

There are three great alternatives that face Moslems. The first is the abandonment of all religion. There will be many who find it impossible to retain the externals of Islam, and for whom the bands of religion will snap clean off. Some will remain nominally Moslem while at heart they are materialists and skeptics. The quotation given from Lord Cromer (pp. 62-63) presents in a striking way the problems of this type. Few will probably for the present abjure all connection with Islam.

The second alternative is the reconstruction of Islam to meet the new situation. It seems not unlikely that each of the four pillars of Moslem theology will have supporters. Some will declare for a religion based on the Koran. The vagueness and unsystematic character of this document will afford considerable scope for interpretation, especially when the theologians make the discovery of the Westminster divines that one part of Scripture must be interpreted by another. They have many tough nuts to crack and will probably repeat the legerdemain of some Protestant theologians. Some will rest on the Hadith, which, properly selected, may serve to

relax or to make more strict the ordinances. Some will employ mainly analogy, which, according to a tradition, was endorsed by the Prophet, and construct by this means a Neo-Islam. Some will transform the doctrine of Ijma, or agreement, into a democratic type of discussion which would make it practically possible for the community to revise its own constitution. These theological alternatives, though bristling with difficulties, are in many respects not more formidable than those which faced medieval theologians. The most striking difference is that these things have to be settled soon. There also are many simple-minded souls who derive their chief satisfaction from mystical exercises or esoteric doctrines. These will ally themselves to one of the preceding divisions or form new sects.

The third alternative for Islam is a change of faith. It is for us who are Christians to consider how we would present Christ to the Moslem world so that we may have a right to expect that He will attract these people whose assumptions and prejudices are so different from ours.

Following medieval Christianity we had a renaissance and an enlightenment in which many abandoned religion altogether, many reconstructed their ideas of orthodoxy, and many left the Church of their fathers for another. History has a way of repeating itself, but it rests on present and future generations to decide whether it shall repeat itself for the worse or the better.

Arabia. In Arabia the Wahhabi movement has some of the strength and more of the weakness of Puritanism. On one hand is the intense certainty, the protest against worldliness, the sense of being God's favorites compared

with whom all others are heretics; on the other, the crude dogmatism, the legalism, the intolerance. Dr. Dame[41] tells of a man he met on a tour to Nejd, who "most strenuously objected to being told to love God with all his heart and his neighbor as himself. He said he loved God only and hated and would like to kill anyone whose belief was different from his own." Many stories are told[42] of the naïve disregard of cause and effect, resigning everything to the will of God in an attitude of fatalism. But the demonstrations of modern efficiency in manufacture and transportation are appealing to self-indulgence and calculating materialism. Arabic theology will probably be modified in the next few decades.

Egypt. A remarkable case has been that of Sheikh Ali Abdul Razek, who, after fifteen years of study at Al Azhar, went to Oxford and has recently published a book, *Islam and the Basis of Government,* which declares that Moslem laws are only for individual observance and not binding on the civil code. He criticizes polygamy severely and he also writes of the caliphate as follows:

"For the actual fact, confirmed both by reason and by history, is that the rites of Allah and the outward manifestations of his religion are not dependent upon a particular kind of government called the caliphate, nor yet upon the caliphs, nor does the temporal welfare of the Moslem depend upon it. We have no need of it in religion nor in civil life. We might, if we wished, say more than that. For the caliphate has been and continues to be a misfortune to Islam and the Moslems, and a source of evil and corruption. . . .

[41] *The Moslem World,* October, 1924, pp. 358 ff.
[42] See Harrison, *The Arab at Home,* p. 206.

"The evident sense of the Koran confirms the view that the apostleship had nothing to do with political sovereignty, and that his heaven-appointed work did not go beyond the proclaiming of his message, entirely apart from any thought of rulership. . . . Many Koran verses are given. This is an example: 'He who obeys the apostle, obeys Allah, but if any refuse, then we have not sent you as a guardian over him.' . . . It is clear that the Koran forbids him to be a guardian or an agent over them, or a compeller or a forcible ruler, and that he should have the right to compel men to believe. . . .

"It is a reasonable idea that the whole world should embrace one religion and that all mankind should be organized as a religious unity; but as for the whole world being included under one Government and being united in one common political unity, that is something that comes near to being beyond the bounds of human possibility, and something not lying within the will of Allah. Government, moreover, is one of the worldly designs which Allah has left to our own intelligences and which he has left people to arrange as their education, attainments, and desires may direct. . . .

"The fact is, Islam is innocent of this kind of caliphate. Let the State manage its own affairs. There is nothing in Islam to prevent the Moslem nations from rivalling others in social and political honors, and from tearing down that ancient order under which they have been humiliated, and building up their government according to the best and most recent scientific principles."

For this utterance the Sheikh was excommunicated by the Al Azhar Ulama, a judgment which once would have involved his execution. The press generally supported him, and the demand of the Ulama that he be deprived

of his government position as Kadi was resented by the Minister of Justice on the ground that Al Azhar had no business to meddle with politics. The Minister was dismissed from the Cabinet, whereupon three other Ministers resigned. It is thus that candles are lighted which will never be put out.[43]

Syria. As to Syria, the missionary in Hamath says: "Among Mohammedans at present there are three general classes. The highest is still largely fixed in its beliefs and not much troubled over religious problems. Opposed to these are the highly educated ones who have rationalized Islam and all other faiths to the point of becoming almost non-sectarian Unitarians. Islam is not in any way large enough to hold their beliefs and is too dogmatic for their rationalistic and agnostic tendencies. Yet they are not Christians, for they are not any nearer to accepting the dogmas of the Christian faith than those of Islam. They think that all religions have good in them and there is nothing to choose between them, since nothing in regard to religion can be proved, so they do not take any active part in the promotion of any one of them. The tendency, however, of most thinking Mohammedans is to rationalize orthodox Islam and reinterpret it to meet modern demands. They reject all religious authority except the Koran. Some of them call themselves the Protestants of Islam and claim that the Unitarians among Christians and the Ahmadiya Mohammedans of England and America are one with them. These very advanced Mohammedans would accept all findings of modern science, reject all the foolish tradi-

[43] *The Near East*, August 6, 1925, p. 162; August 27, p. 244; September 17, p. 332.

tions of Islam, exclude all superstitions, even changing some of the things which have been considered the very fundamentals of Islam."

Speaking of a particular Mohammedan, the same missionary says: "He knows and is loved by many Christians, and is familiar with many Christian beliefs. We feel very sure that if he were a young man and had his present essential attitude and a chance to know more of Christianity, he would become a Christian. Already he has so many Christian principles that his is an Islam far in advance of the Prophet himself. He is very much opposed to many of the evil practises in Islam and does not hesitate to say so, even in his sermons in the mosque. He claims that he has many enemies among the Mohammedans, but so far I have not found a single enemy to him among the Christians. In fact, his life, given absolutely to service, would put to shame ninety-nine per cent of the Christians of Hamath. There are more like him in Hamath. They form a small group who call themselves the Protestants of Islam. I have met five of the group and find them all very fine men. He and I find very much in common, both in our theology and ethics. The divinity of Christ has been the focus of our differences, but I often find it difficult to hold him back in his enthusiastic statements that Islam and Protestantism are one. When his son and I began to study English together he said, 'My son, you must learn English in order to read the religious books of the Protestants, for Islam and Protestantism are one and must each find what the other believes, and cease fighting each other.'"

A Syrian pastor from Damascus says: "Criticism, democracy, and materialistic views have none of them

shaken belief in religion. The inclination towards the mechanistic and materialistic views or towards atheism or irreligion has not appeared in Islam. But we find a small group endeavoring to reconcile between science and religion, though they themselves are firm in their beliefs, conservatives as to rites and traditions."

A Protestant Syrian missionary says: "The outlook of the educated class on religion has changed immensely. They have found many things in Islam that their minds cannot accept. This is why they have neglected the requirements of Islam; namely, the five prayers, fasting, the pilgrimage, etc. Many of them are Mohammedans in name only. Many have begun to criticize Islam sharply. Some of them have begun to interpret it in a different way. They have gone so far that they do not care what their religious teachers and interpreters of the Koran say. They have even neglected to take into consideration the traditions which are valued by Mohammed himself."

Turkey. An event which might seem to be of great significance is that of the suppression of the dervish orders and their *tekkes,* or monasteries, where their exercises are performed. These orders represent in Islam not only ignorance and superstition, but also a reaching out after something which will guarantee the reality of the unseen, which will kindle emotions that proceed from no earthly source. Many whose more refined spiritual perceptions are undeveloped demand either some external ritual or a mysterious experience of autohypnosis to create a thrill of certitude that they are in contact with the divine.

A very large proportion of the population have been

attached to these dervish orders as lay members. Yet the suppression seems to have excited surprisingly little protest. It has been suggested, to account for this, first, that the Turk is less religious than most other Moslem races, that the dervish orders have declined in the popular estimation, and that the nationalistic spirit is running strong. The confiscation of monasteries by Henry VIII has been cited in comparison. Of this act Pollard says: "The real cause was that monastic life had lost its savor." [44]

Iraq. Iraq contains the Shia holy cities of Kerbela and Nejef which are centers of bitter fanaticism. It is here that the death of Hussein is celebrated with the most intense emotion. The mujtahids, who control Shia theology and who once succeeded in securing the effective prohibition of the use of tobacco in all Persia by their *fatwa,* obtain their exalted and not unprofitable positions only after long study and severe examinations. On the other hand, the ignorance of some of the common people is profound. Lyell [45] states that he had met Nejefis who thought that Ali and Hussein were the names of one person. An English woman who visited a government dispensary in Kerbela reports that patients experiment with their rosaries before presenting their cases to the doctor. If the rosary beads indicate delay, they postpone consultation. If the results are disastrous, it is kismet.[46] Here again the weakness of a crude orthodoxy is manifest. While it may be sufficient to exercise a wholesome restraint in the absence of competition, when

[44] *Factors in Modern History,* p. 98.
[45] *The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia,* p. 110.
[46] *The Near East,* July 23, 1925, p. 104.

new ideas undermine its power of conviction and nothing more rational takes its place, there is likely to be a moral collapse.[47]

Persia. The testimony from Hamadan is: "I should say that two great trends here were the increase of religiouslessness, if I may use that term for one who has no religion, and an endeavor to adjust Islam to meet modern demands. While most persons profess to be Mohammedans, hundreds have become either weary of its burdens or dissatisfied with its teaching and are really without faith. Those who cling to the faith in many instances realize they must reinterpret it to agree with modern views. More than once I have heard the younger generation maintain that the verse about the veiling of women does not mean the veiling of the face. And again I have heard arguments that the Koranic permission of four wives, provided the husband treats them alike, means single wife, for no one could treat two wives alike."

In Resht: "We hear that Bolshevism has sapped the religious belief of the younger men and women. It offers freedom from so much that has bound them before. On the other hand, it seems to be not so much religious freedom which appeals to them, as social and political freedom."

From Tehran: "The power of the Mohammedan clergy is steadily waning. The most potent factor in the decrease of influence of the clergy is the spread of education. When the mullah was the only man who could read, he commanded more respect and had more power over the ignorant. Today even in many villages the mullahs cannot hold their own. . . .

[47] *The Moslem World,* October, 1924, p. 402; October, 1925, pp. 365 ff.

"Two recent events reveal the attitude of the mullahs toward the mind and aspirations of Young Persia and help one to understand the desire of the latter to 'kill off the mullahs.' There is no youth movement in Persia as we have them in Europe. The youth movement could never have the force in Islam that it could acquire in Christian countries, partly because Islam is built on precedent and partly because Christianity is essentially revolutionary, as Islam is essentially static. The first of the events referred to has to do with music.

"A young colonel of the Persian Army, progressive, musical, gifted, went to Europe to study music for five years. He returned to establish a music school. A part of his work consisted in conducting a weekly concert of really fine music. The sympathies of the young, educated, progressive Persians were with him. The Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet put the seal of their approval on him by attending the concerts. But the young colonel met opposition from the mullahs. Why? The Koran forbids music.

"The second event has to do with clothes; namely, the hat. The Persian head-gear is shaped like the Turkish fez, but is black in color and stiff in its form. It has no brim. It is never removed in polite society, for to do so would be as great a sign of disrespect as for an Occidental not to remove his hat indoors. A Persian gentleman would no more think of removing his hat in public than an American gentleman would remove his collar and shirt. It is brimless so that it may not interfere with that part of Islamic prayers when the forehead must be touched to the ground. It affords no protection, however, from the glaring heat and light of Persia's powerful sun. A year or so ago the army

adopted a new form of military head-gear, a hat having a diminutive vizor to protect the eyes, but the vizor could be folded up. There was some opposition from the clergy at this innovation, but not much. This year a number of young men appeared on the street with a new style of hat shaped like the military hat, with a small vizor, its one avowed purpose being to protect the eyes from the sun.

"This new hat was greeted with violent disapproval by the mullahs and with equally violent joy by the younger men of Persia. The result was some miniature pitched battles in the streets, for certain descendants of the Prophet took the law into their own hands and attempted to do away with the new style. Some heads were broken and some arrests made, but finally a truce was declared when the young men promised not to wear the new hat until after the sacred month of fasting was over. The following editorial appeared in a sympathetic newspaper:

" 'The only point that is raised against the new hat by the ignorant people is the statement that the new hat resembles the hats used by foreigners, and it is stated (in the Koran) that "he who makes himself look like nationals of other countries belongs to such countries." This argument is to a certain extent worthy of consideration, but it is not by any means practical, for if one were to act according to the literal meaning of this statement he would be compelled to keep himself entirely bare and like the savages of Africa, wear no clothes at all, because all the clothing now used by Persian ladies and men are very similar to the dress and clothes of one or another of the foreign nations. There is, therefore, no sound reason that an exception should be made in regard

to hats, and that the attempt now made to improve hats and make them more sanitary should be opposed. It is stated in the Koran that "the clothes of purity are the best," but I have never found a statement in the Koran whereby one is obliged to wear certain definite clothes in exclusion of others.' "

A missionary writes from Meshed: "References are constantly made in conversation with Mohammedans that disclose the fact that there is a real and growing rebellion against the dominance of the priesthood. This, however, may or may not carry with it a rebellion against the restrictions of their own religion. There are many Mohammedans who are quite disgusted with their priests, but who profess to remain true to the teachings of Mohammed. At the same time this growing aversion to the dominance of the priests is often accompanied by desire to be free also from the restrictions of Islam. This cutting loose from Islam may result in atheism."

India. The great variety of Moslem types in India has been already noted. Those of Bengal where most Moslems are found, are divided by a missionary into four classes: "(a) The minority, read in Western thought, who live on the borderland of orthodoxy and heterodoxy; (b) the orthodox, steeped in the Koran and traditional ideas; (c) the illiterate masses who in addition to accepting orthodox views, feed on distorted and unauthenticated traditions and superstitions often of Hindu origin; (d) the heterodox who follow the teachings of *pirs* and faqirs and who create a form of Sufism." [48] The bulk of these 25,000,000 belong to one of five dervish orders. Being illiterate, they feel the need of a spiritual

[48] *The Moslem World,* January, 1914, p. 16.

guide and attach themselves to *pirs,* who in some cases are worshiped.[49] In India Moslems, being in a minority, are likely to use their religion as a political rallying cry and be more concerned than in most other Moslem countries to criticize Christianity which represents foreign rule. This does not prevent them from a considerable amount of internal theological controversy. A movement that has attracted great attention is that of the Ahmadiyas,[50] so called from their leader, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who began to preach in 1879 and declared himself to be both the Christian Messiah and the Moslem Mahdi, the Guided One. The sect has been opposed by orthodox Moslems, on the one hand, and is very active in attacking Christianity, on the other. It conducts propaganda in England and the United States, quotations from which are given on pages 159-165 of this book. Since the death of its founder it has split into two parties. The growth of this sect is only one more of a series of indications that Islam is not unchanging and that it is prepared to modify its beliefs and to follow new voices.

In this varying testimony we see reflected the influences of a new age upon the people of Islam. Such evidence should prepare for a sympathetic discussion of the probable future and the challenge which it brings to us, and also for an interested study of further developments. Can anyone consider thoughtfully these facts without feeling a desire to keep up to date on the subject, the contact of twentieth century influences on the Moslem world?

[49] *Ibid.,* April, 1922, p. 130.
[50] Cf. Walter, *The Ahmadiya Movement;* Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India,* pp. 137-148; *The Moslem World,* October, 1912, and January, 1925.

CHAPTER IV

MOSLEM RESPONSE TO THE NEW AGE

If you were a Moslem, how would you feel toward your own religion and toward Christianity? The answer to this question must take many forms according to the different types of Moslems and the influences by which they have been surrounded. If all Moslems were equally enlightened and unprejudiced and if Christianity had been presented to all fully and attractively, we might expect to find an approximate consensus of opinion among them. But Moslems on the whole are not noted either for their broad outlook or for their open-mindedness, and in their experience Christians have represented beaten enemies, subject races, contemptuous conquerors, or hostile critics. There have also been some favorable aspects, but as a whole the contacts would hardly prepare them for any just appreciation of the Christian religion.

Some Moslems have found real spiritual consolation in their own religion; some of coarser grain have at least felt the comfort of regarding themselves the favorites of God; and others have been sustained by the sense of a great social and political fellowship. Some have real grievances against Christendom, and others have been taught to put the worst possible construction on all that Christians do. Out of all this we obtain a great variety of reactions.

A missionary in Egypt[1] makes a very interesting analysis of the different modern types of Moslem thought.

[1] Morrison in the *Moslem World,* October, 1925, pp. 374 ff.

He mentions seven classes: (1) Those strictly orthodox in faith and practise, who are almost without exception hostile to everything modern, foreign, or Western; (2) those who admit that progress is inevitable or desirable, but who maintain their confidence in the Koran by interpreting it to harmonize with modern ideals; (3) those who not only interpret the Koran to bring it up to date ethically, but who find spiritual and mystical points of view in Moslem religious literature; (4) those who are willing to recognize in the Koran elements that have been outgrown which they are ready to discard, but who hold fast to a modernized Islam and sometimes attack Christianity very bitterly; (5) those who discriminate in the same way between the temporary and permanent teachings of Islam, but who are appreciative of Christian thought and ideals; (6) those who are essentially Christian in belief, but fear to make an open profession; (7) those who have lost faith in the Koran, but who stand by Islam as a social and political system and are opposed to Christianity as a foreign religion.

This is a very interesting and suggestive analysis. It makes no claim to be exhaustive. As a matter of fact, we find individuals who in many respects resemble one of these types, and in others, another. The following quotations will therefore not attempt to follow this classification, though a number of them would illustrate it very well.

Statement of Orthodox Moslems

We first have the views of the Grand Mufti, or religious head, of a thoroughly Moslem community which has been considered very backward. He recently an-

swered in his own handwriting in Arabic a set of questions put to him by a missionary. A certain allowance must be made for constraint due to courtesy and for a desire to put the attitude of Islam in as favorable a light as possible. But the replies are very interesting as coming from such a person. Slight verbal changes have been made in his answers to bring out the evident sense.

He was asked, "What has been the effect of the development of communication on Islam?"

He replied, "The easy means of communication between East and West has had great influence on the Moslem mind in that it prepared the way for a laying aside of many beliefs which were added to Islam by originators" (i.e., later traditionalists).

To the question, "What is the effect of democracy, nationalism, and the right to choose one's destiny?" his answer was:

"The new democratic ideas are welcome. Islam has opened its heart for these teachings because we find in the Koran many references to democracy. The Koran has praised also the Ansar (helpers of Mohammed) because their organization was democratic. Nationalism and the right to choose one's own destiny have restored to Islam hope, because then the religious cause would be founded on the Koran's saying: 'No compulsion in religion.' In other words, the basis of religious faith would be proof and the choice of the best, and not compulsion and force."

On the increased freedom of women his comment was:

"Freeing women from the bonds of ignorance and tradition has a very good effect on Islam. Women are becoming educated. But freeing them from other things,

such as veiling, and giving them liberty, will have a very bad effect on Islam."

As to the effect of European customs he said:

"Some of the European customs are noble, which are also in Islam, or at least Islam has referred to them. Some European customs are disliked even by Europeans themselves. Many of the good ones have been adopted by Moslems, especially in the higher classes. But the bad ones have crept into the irreligious communities simply by coming into contact with Europeans. Those who adopt them are Moslem in name only."

Of the effects of education and learning he stated:

"The study of natural sciences has had a bad effect in that it has made the new generation indifferent as to religion because they learn these things as being often contradictory to the Koran. That is how they interpret them at least. But some Moslem teachers have attempted to reconcile religion and science, and the result has been very satisfactory. Education and learning are the best means of progress for raising Islam to higher levels and for giving Moslems happiness."

As to religious superstitions he remarked:

"Superstitions have no basis. Religion has no place for them. Law forbids to believe in them. All that Islam requires from its followers could be summed up as follows, believe in God and angels, in books and the prophets, in the last day and fatalism. Islam is simply to believe in this statement, 'No God but Allah and Mohammed his prophet,' and to pray, give alms, fast in Ramadan, and make a pilgrimage if you can afford it. Islam tells us also to do humane deeds and to have a strong character."

On taking interest his position is characteristic:

"Interest and all purchases and sellings that involve interest are unlawful. The only justification is necessity. Islamic law does not require a man to do more than he is able to do. The Koran said, 'God does not demand from a soul more than it can do.' Therefore it is permissible (for a man) to commit such a sin if he is forced by necessity."

He was asked what Christianity might do for Islam. He replied:

"The noblest thing that Christianity could restore to Islam is the spirit of cooperation, help in the matter of education, and sincerity in work. Also it could help in organizing business enterprises, and in founding educational institutions built on the essentials of religion (which is the noble Koran), so that Christians and Moslems can come into agreement in beliefs and actions."

His testimony on the effect of Christianity on Islam in Syria is interesting. "The noblest thing that Islam learned from Christianity in Syria is the spirit to work and to progress socially. The spirit of missionaries in their midst has created in them a new spirit to attempt to spread the Islamic cause. We were awakened spiritually, but not as much as we ought to be."

As to the effect of Islam on Christianity in recent times, he could only say:

"I do not happen to think of any influence that Islam had on Christians during recent times."

The critical attitude of the Grand Mufti toward some of the traditions and his appreciation of Christianity might lead us to class him in some respects with type five.

Another sheikh of the same community, presumably

also an orthodox Moslem, shows some of the characteristics of type seven. His comment on the growth of communications was:

"The intellectual Moslems desire to establish still stronger bonds between themselves and other countries, but they fear one thing and that is colonization (i.e., exploitation). They fear those who rob them of their privileges and exploit their lands, taking ninety per cent and leaving the remainder for the wage earners who collect the wealth for them. A sample of that is the Suez Canal, which did not do any good to the Moslem world but instead was the door for the Europeans to step in and rob them of their own freedom and privileges."

On the influence of the World War he says:

"The worst effect of the War on Islam was the occupation of their mother countries by European nations and the fact that these did not keep their promises. The occupation has changed the outlook on Western civilization. Moslems now hate everything which is Western. Those who were sincerely willing to adopt Western customs find it very difficult to discriminate in choosing between the good and the bad."

On the freedom of women he remarks:

"As the morality of both men and women is not strong and fine character is rare, it appears that the least freedom that might be given to women would have a very bad sudden effect. If such a thing were to take place, it should be done gradually, carefully, and intelligently. It needs thinking and studying. One of the factors that stands in the way is women's ignorance. The new Syrian movement among Moslem women is very weak and shaky."

On the effects of European customs his statement is:

"Almost all Moslem men resent the idea of adopting European customs which do not suit the nature of their country and which in many respects contradict the requirements of their religion. Many young men like and adopt these customs, but this is because we are quick to imitate."

On the effects of education he says:

"Eagerness for education has become universal in Islam except in a few cases where narrow-minded sheikhs still have control over the simple-minded population, where because of the defects found in the curricula of many schools, the people doubt whether primary and secondary education are meeting the demands of the country. . . . Moslems like to reconcile the theories of European education with those of their religion without seriously injuring the essence."

On criticism of officials and of superstitions he remarks:

"Criticizing here is still in its first stage. It has very little in it of modern criticism. It is mostly against the different departments of the government or the missionary enterprise. The former is more or less a personal criticism. The latter, against missionaries, is because these people are working to prepare the way for colonization (i.e., exploitation). It has been observed that these enterprises work for their own interests primarily, disregarding the needs of the country. Criticism against superstition is to be found, but conditions do not allow the intellectualists to carry a campaign against it at present because the sheikhs still have a great influence on the minds of men. Anyway, most of these superstitions will disappear by and by."

Statement of Indian Liberals

It is not always easy to draw the line between the second and fourth types mentioned by Mr. Morrison. There are many who seem distinctly modernist in attitude and who are not in good repute with the strictly orthodox, but who still defend the Koran strongly against attacks. How much they would concede apart from controversy does not appear. Some are content with advocating progress without mentioning other religions.

Among those who attack Christianity there are some who do so mainly for defensive purposes, repelling charges that Mohammed was insincere or inconsistent, or that Islam is false and perverted in its morals. Just resentment at extreme statements made by Christian apologists has led them to call attention to weaknesses of historic Christianity, and to catch eagerly at praise of Islam and criticism of Christianity by Western writers. Some of these Moslems apparently have no enmity toward Christianity as a religion, but only to its claims of exclusiveness. They would tolerate it or even welcome it as a sister faith if Christians would reciprocate. Some profess to find no difference between Christianity and Islam if the former could be amended by dropping certain doctrines which are special stumbling-blocks.

Others are much more aggressive in attacking Christianity and, through ignorance or conscious malice, do not hesitate to caricature Christian beliefs. It is unfortunate that a partial excuse for such tactics has been afforded by the extreme and one-sided statements of some Christian writers regarding Mohammed and Islam.

One of the earliest leaders of the rationalist type was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, born in 1817, through whose in-

fluence the Anglo-Mohammedan College was founded at Aligarh in North India in 1878.[2] Syed Ahmad was willing to reject much of the Hadith. In this connection he says, "All his (Mohammed's) sayings and practises concerning worldly matters are, with the exception only of those which he himself said were of divine origin, looked upon by us in precisely the same light as those of any other virtuous and pious individual." He held that the night journey of Mohammed was only a vision in which he saw himself transported to Jerusalem, and in which he received revelations.

Syed Ahmad was ignorant of English, but, with the aid of friends, he published in that language a series of essays on Mohammed in which he undertook to combat the aspersions of European writers on Islam. He was a vigorous debater, but gives the impression of being candid, though he makes some remarkable statements, such as that Luther was indebted to the Koran for inspiration in his attack on the Pope. He declares that Moslem scholars are mistaken when they hold that the Christian Scriptures have been falsified, but proceeds to find numerous prophecies relating to Mohammed in the Bible, including the promise of the Comforter, John XIV:26; XVI:7, in which he declares that the original text, instead of the word translated "Comforter," contained one of similar sound which is the equivalent of the Arabic Ahmad and which refers to Mohammed. (This is a common claim among Moslems.) In general Syed Ahmad was far ahead of his time and was opposed by conservative Moslems.

A more sophisticated type of apologist is Syed Ameer Ali. His principal book is *The Spirit of Islam.* He

[2] Cf. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India,* pp. 91-97.

speaks of Jesus in the highest terms as "the messenger of universal brotherhood and love," but denies that his immediate disciples ever regarded Him as more than a man.[3] While professing admiration for the original ideals of Christianity, he emphasizes its perversions and failures. Historical Christianity he views through blue-colored spectacles, but Islam through very rosy ones. The most favorable construction is put on everything in Mohammed's life. For instance, he says: "Truer knowledge of history and a more honest appreciation of facts, instead of proving him a self-indulgent libertine, would conclusively establish that the man, poor and without resources himself, when he undertook the burden of supporting the old women whom he married in strict accordance with the old patriarchal institution, was undergoing a sacrifice of no light character."[4] Ameer Ali takes high ground for himself on the subject of polygamy and slavery, but it is difficult to feel that he believes all he says regarding early Islam. Some of his statements are wholesome correctives of too extreme attacks, but his panegyric is overdone.

A much more attractive example of this type is S. Khuda Bukhsh, one who shows some of the characteristics of type five. We quote the following from his *Essays Indian and Islamic.*

Speaking of Mohammed, he says: "His knowledge of the Jewish and Christian books, at times faulty and defective to a degree, was derived almost exclusively from oral communication." (Pages 11-12.)

"Nothing was more distant from the Prophet's thought than to fetter the mind or to lay down fixed, immutable,

[3] Third edition, p. 20.
[4] *The Spirit of Islam,* p. 331.

unchanging laws for his followers. The Koran is a book of guidance to the faithful and not, to be sure, an obstacle in the path of their social, moral, legal, and intellectual progress. The requirements of Islam are at once easy and simple, and leave scope to Moslems to take part in their duties as subjects or citizens, to attend to their religious obligations without sacrificing their worldly prosperity, and to adopt whatever is good in any community or civilization without any interference on the part of their religion." (Page 20.)

"It is only the clouded vision which sees difference between one religion and the other; to one who has the eyes to see and the heart to feel, all religions appear as but the reflection of one and the same light." (Page 22.)

"Modern Islam, with its hierarchy of priesthood, gross fanaticism, appalling ignorance, and superstitious practises, is indeed a discredit to the Islam of the Prophet Mohammed. Instead of unity, we have Islam torn into factions; instead of culture, we have indifference to learning; instead of liberal-minded toleration, we have gross bigotry. . . . Whatever may be the defects in the Koran, even non-Moslems must concede that it is a noble testimony to the unity of God, and whatever may be the blemishes in the life of the Prophet, none but a perverse mind will regard him as anything but sincere in his conviction, honest in his purpose, and unshaken in his resolve." (Page 24.)

In these essays the writer gives a fine tribute to his father, a man versed in both Oriental and Western culture, combining devoutness and spirituality with tolerance and breadth of mind. "For the Prophet and his family he entertained the most devout reverence, and to

the last he never missed the five daily prayers. After the morning prayer he would regularly read the Koran for half an hour." (Page 158.)

"He found fault with my views as being somewhat unorthodox, but he never lost his temper or showed the least sign of displeasure. On the contrary, he purchased for me Sir William Muir's *Life of Mohammed,* Koelle's *Life of Mohammed,* and Dodd's *Buddha, Christ and Mohammed,* books by no means favorable to the Prophet; but at the same time he asked me to study the other side of the question as well before making up my mind one way or the other." (Page 160.)

"Resignation to the will of God was his watchword." (Page 161.)

"He never suffered religion to be a barrier to a genuine friendship or intimate social intercourse." (Page 163.)

"While religion is no more than a social function in the West, in the East it is the very essence of life. . . . Let us, to begin with, make an attempt to heal the breach in our own camp; to unite in loving brotherhood the two sects—the Shias and Sunnis—divided as they now are by envy, malice, hatred, and all uncharitableness. We talk of unity, but we have the barrenness of death and division at home." (Page 215.)

"A great deal of our social evils is due to the condition of our womankind, and so long as we keep them in ignorance, we cannot hope to impart to our children those elevated virtues which adorn a civilized and free people." (Page 217.)

"Let us, then, first and foremost, purify and sanctify our home and hearth. We cannot lay the foundation of a healthy community on a foundation of sand. We can-

not have very high regard for womenkind with a system that sanctions four wives. Polygamy is destructive alike to domestic peace and social purity." (Page 231.)

"We have adopted European customs, European ways of living, even the European vices of drinking and gambling, but none of their virtues. . . . We have developed expensive habits; we are imitating luxurious modes of living; but we have not succeeded in learning that supremest of practical lessons; viz., the lesson of making money." (Pages 239-240.)

In this volume, *Essays Indian and Islamic,* the author cannot altogether accept the doctrine that Islam does not sanction polygamy, but he believes that it should be abolished in any event (page 256). He is alive to the inconsistencies of many who profess to be orthodox Moslems (pages 263 ff.). He considers that much of the time spent on the study of the Koran by customary methods is in vain (page 280). Finally, he declares that the four great sources of law—Koran, traditions, agreement, and analogy—are inadequate; Islam should borrow law from European systems." (Pages 290-291.)

Another interesting writer who discusses the present situation mainly from the standpoint of scope for reform afforded by Moslem law, is Sir Mohammed Iqbal. He has recently written a paper on the idea of *Ijtihad,* or the exercise of independent thought in Moslem law. He says:

"We heartily welcome the liberal movement in Islam, but it must be admitted also that the appearance of liberal ideas constitutes the most critical moment in the history of Islam. Liberalism has a tendency to act as a force of disintegration, and the poison of territorial nationalism which we are gradually imbibing from

Europe might accentuate racial distinctions in Islam and ultimately kill the broad human element in the outlook of the Moslem world. Further, in their zeal for liberalism, and in the absence of a check on their youthful fervor, our religious and political reformers may overstep the proper bounds of reform. We are today passing through a period similar to that of the Protestant revolution in Europe, and the lesson which the rise and outcome of the Reformation in Europe teaches should not be lost on us. We stand today in need of far-seeing leaders who possess the greatest power of self-control combined with a clear insight into the foundations of Islam."

As to the four legal schools he says:

"With all their comprehensiveness, these systems, after all, are individual interpretations and as such cannot claim finality. I know the Ulama of Islam claim finality for the four public schools of Moslem law, but they have never found it possible to deny the theoretical possibility of a complete *Ijtihad* (independent judgment). . . . The claim of the present generation of Moslem liberals to reinterpret the foundation of legal principles in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life is, in my opinion, perfectly justified."

On the social question he remarks:

"In India a Moslem woman who wishes to get rid of an undesirable husband cannot do so without becoming an apostate. Nothing could be more distant from the aims of a missionary religion."

Referring to the question of *Ijtihad,* or right of independent judgment and legislation, he says:

"The transfer of this power from individual representatives of schools to an assembly—now almost a neces-

sity in view of the growth of opposing sects and one-sided education of our doctors of law—will secure contributions to legal discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs. . . . The modern Moslem legislative assembly, when it undertakes to frame an enactment on a question relating to Moslem law, is bound by the Koran alone and possesses unlimited power of interpretation. . . . The *Ulama* should be a vital part of the Moslem legislative assembly, helping and guiding free discussion on questions relating to law. . . . Within the limits of the revealed texts, *Ijtihad* (independent judgment) is absolutely free."

As to Europe, he is skeptical.

"Modern Europe has no doubt built idealistic systems on these lines, but experience shows that the truth of a philosophical nature revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that power of conviction which *personal* revelation alone can bring. This is the reason that pure thought has so little influenced men, while religion has always elevated individuals and transformed whole states. The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life; and the result is a perverted ego, seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich. Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical achievement. . . . For us Moslems, on the other hand, the spiritual basis of life is a matter of conviction for which even the least enlightened man among us can easily lay down his life; and in view of the idea of Islam that there can be no further revelation binding on man, we are spiritually one of the most emancipated peoples on earth."

Statement of Ahmadiya Controversialists

Finally, we come to the eager controversialists who glorify their interpretation of Islam as far superior to Christianity and attack the latter with more zeal than scholarship. An abridged translation of a pamphlet written by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the messiah of the Ahmadiya movement, contains the following statement:

"A learned Jew has shown that the New Testament is nothing but a collection of teachings borrowed from different books. The Sermon on the Mount, of which Christians are so proud, has been traced back verbatim to the Talmud. . . . Recently I came across a Hindu paper, the writer of which has been at great pains to show the New Testament to be nothing but a copy of the moral teachings of Buddha. . . . Again it is a proved fact that Jesus Christ visited India, and we have shown by strong and incontrovertible arguments that his tomb is still to be seen in Srinagar at Khanhyer Street. The evidence in support of the above statements is so varied and so convincing that there is no room for any doubt or suspicion. . . . The holy Koran is a miracle because all of its stories are revelations and prophecies for all times, which will continue to be fulfilled in all ages to the last day of the world, and because it is written in a language the rhetorical fluency and flow of which are unique, unparalleled, and inimitable. . . . Every word of the holy Koran is a revelation so complete and mighty that in spite of its repeated challenges no one has had the courage to take up the gauntlet thus thrown down and produce a parallel to it." [5]

Mohammed Din, who is a Moslem Missionary of the

[5] *Moslem World,* January, 1920, pp. 76 ff.

Ahmadiya movement, writes on the subject of Christ's death by crucifixion, which is so widely denied by Moslems. He remarks first that according to the Old Testament a prophet that dies an unnatural death—is killed, hanged, or crucified—must be regarded as a false prophet, and refers to Ezekiel, Jeremiah, and Zechariah, though mentioning no specific passages. He gives thirteen reasons for believing that Jesus did not die on the cross, but only swooned and was alive when he was taken down. He says there is evidence to prove that he migrated into Eastern countries in search of the lost sheep of Israel. "It is a long subject and I am afraid space would forbid my dealing with it at length. Suffice it to say, that it is a well-established fact that he crossed over into the East and, passing through Persia and Afghanistan, he went into Kashmir, where he lived and preached among his own people and died at the age of one hundred and twenty." [6]

The same writer eulogizes Islam as the religion of peace. He says among other things:

"Even in this respect Islam claims a superiority over sister faiths that it is free from human interpolation, and this is what adds to its divine character. . . . Unity in the Godhead implies the brotherhood of man . . . (which) is the practical side of the unity of God. . . . The holy Prophet categorically denied that any one man had superiority over his fellows. In his last message he said that he trod under foot all distinctions of race, color, or blood, all being equal in the sight of God. . . .

"Among other things fasting reminds a man of the serious plight the poor and needy are in. We cannot form an adequate idea of the misery that is all about us

[6] *Moslem World,* January, 1924, pp. 23 ff.

until we put ourselves in their condition. . . . Legal alms have been made obligatory, for it is thus alone that by the distribution of wealth the peace of the world can be maintained. Under Islam there can never arise such a question as conflict between labor and capital, for Islam has taken steps to see that neither goes to extremes. . . . There are very few good natures that do good for the sake of good, but many are held away from evil deeds on account of the dread of the consequences. Other faiths also teach the same thing, but the prominence that Islam has given to this side of the question is out of all proportion to what the founders of other religions have said on this score, and herein lies the eminence of Islam. . . .

"Some critics of Islam would maintain that Islam used force in its propagation. But this is not only misreading history, but also misjudging Islam. . . . Moslems are proud of the fact that theirs is the only religion which categorically and in unmistakable terms bans this forcible conversion. . . . It is clear that even when Islam permits war, it is always in the interest of peace." [7]

A very interesting point of view is quoted from the *Islamic World,* published in Lahore, by a writer who is engaged in missionary work in England. He warns Moslem missionaries of the importance of understanding the English temperament. He says:

"We cannot win over the English to Islam through terrorism. The doctrines of hell and heaven which are so popular in the East cannot appeal to the prosaic and matter-of-fact mind of the West. We cannot successfully take up the same line of preaching in England or in other Western countries as in the imaginative East. . . .

[7] *Moslem World,* October, 1924, pp. 363 ff.

The East is emotional and hence her people are very profuse in the display of sentiment, both of love and hatred, but that is *the* thing which is despised by the English. They want calm and dispassionate arguments, without any intentions of directly or indirectly hitting the cherished ideas of anybody. They welcome honest difference of opinion, but at the same time expect that their susceptibilities will be respected. . . . There are hundreds and thousands of people in England who do not believe in dogmatic Christianity. They unconsciously follow Islam. . . . Christianity is only a jumble of rituals and ceremonials which cannot satisfy the heart-craving of man for his Maker, nor can they be of any good to our daily life.

"The following are points which deserve special attention: (1) Avoid invidious distinction between prophets, especially between the holy prophet Mohammed and Jesus (peace be upon them). . . . (4) Always derive your arguments against Christianity from the New Testament. . . . (7) Show that the prophecy about the advent of a Comforter has been fulfilled in the person of the holy Prophet. . . . (9) Explain that the remedy for the social evils under which the West is laboring is to be found in Islam."

A newspaper reporter told this writer that England would never approve of polygamy as it is against the law. "We will change the law," said he, "by changing the public opinion. Sentiment must subside to reason. Monogamy is simply based upon sentiment. England has just emerged out of a great war which has largely reduced her male population. Should the surplus women remain without husbands? If so, it will reduce the population of the country."

"Well," asked the reporter, "why should not a woman have more than one husband?"

"Because," answered the writer, "nature has placed limitations upon woman." [8]

Some recent issues of another journal indicate the lengths to which the Moslem controversial writers will go. There is a constant assumption that the flood of critical inquiry which is sweeping against old-fashioned views of Christian orthodoxy and effectively undermining the faith of some has destroyed the whole intellectual foundations of Christianity. It is at the same time complacently assumed that this flood of historical and scientific criticism will beat against the rock basis of Islam in vain.

For example, the *Islamic Review,* published at Woking, England, in the January number of 1925, contains the following quotation referring to Christians:

"The life has gone out of their faith because when found inconsistent and often hideously at variance with the actual truths of nature as revealed continually by scientific research, that faith has lost its savor—is dying—nay, is, in the eyes of all reasonable men and women, dead. Men are seeking a living faith—a faith that men can live; in Islam, steadfast and unchanging, standing high above the welter of sectarian controversy and the sudden, disconcerting blasts of scientific discovery, they may, if they will, find it."

In the same issue a writer discusses the charges that the Koran contains historical errors. As is well known, there are in the Koran numerous stories about Abraham, Moses, Solomon, Jesus, and others which include incidents not mentioned in the Bible. A notable instance is

[8] *Moslem World,* July, 1925, pp. 289 ff.

in Sura 28, verse 38, where Pharaoh orders his Prime Minister, Haman, to build him a tower of clay in order that he may mount up to the God of Moses. The most plausible explanation of this combination of features is that Mohammed either gained his knowledge from persons whose acquaintance with the Bible was very defective, or that he himself combined fragments from different stories of Moses, Esther, and the Tower of Babel in a single narrative. Of course such explanation is not consistent with the theory that the Koran was dictated verbally by the Angel Gabriel. The writer in the *Islamic Review* says:

"Nobody so far has ever proved to our satisfaction that the Koran has made any serious error in coherently relating any story of the prophets, or that any so-called charge of anachronism holds good."

Concerning Haman, he takes the bull by the horns and intimates, first, that the story of Esther in the Bible has none too strong a historical foundation and therefore cannot be used as the basis of criticizing the Koran. Next, he asserts that on the basis of recent discoveries Haman was the high priest of Ammon. Ingenuity like this may succeed in keeping the higher critics at bay for some time.

In the July number of the same year we find the statement:

"Islam . . . repels every kind of compulsion. It is therefore inconceivable that it should countenance, let alone encourage, the punishment of those who have strayed from its fold."

It is true that Sura 2, verse 257, reads: "Let there be no compulsion in religion." There are other passages to the same effect. Christ also told his disciples to love

their enemies and to be as harmless as doves. As a matter of fact, both Christianity and Islam have failed to exhibit always this spirit of tolerance, and there is nothing to be gained by blinking the fact on either side. The Moslem editor is probably well posted regarding the Inquisition. He might be reminded that it was only after the most strenuous opposition from religious leaders that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe succeeded in 1844 in inducing the Sultan even to announce that the death penalty would not be imposed on apostates from Islam.[9] Lane-Poole says that this concession "was the more noteworthy since it repealed what was believed to be a part of the sacred law of the Koran."

In the September number the trial at Dayton, Tennessee, received some caustic comments, and the affair is taken to prove the inadequacy of the Bible. In this article there is the assertion:

"Mohammed all by himself combines in his person and in a much higher degree the collective virtues of all the Israelitish prophets from Moses to Jesus." [10]

Statement of Turkish Liberals and Critics

In Turkey criticisms of Islam are more free. There are many, however, who, while they are willing to discard any Moslem traditions or practises that seem to stand in the way of modern progress, nevertheless profess to believe in a reformed Islam. An interesting example is found in an editorial in the *Tanin,* an influential Turkish paper, for January 11, 1924:

"As I think of the most important causes which have

[9] Lane-Poole, *Story of Turkey,* p. 353; *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. II, p. 275; Pears, *Turkey and Its People,* p. 361.
[10] *Islamic Review,* September, 1925, p. 342.

kept the East from making progress, I consider of first importance the fact that women in the East have been deprived of any position in social or civil life. Women have not been given any share in our social and political life, but have been kept secluded in their own homes. To mix the women with our social life shall be the first step for our true regeneration. Civilization is not the external pomp that attracts one's eyes in Europe. True civilization is culture of spirit, fineness of thought, and purity of character. In place of a woman who is some kind of a slave, standing as a lifeless decoration in the house, we ought to see a woman who is the mistress of her own civil and human rights, enlightened, diligent, and a companion to her husband in soul and spirit. It is this that will help the East to shake off its old laziness, and bring about a new social organization."

Other expressions of opinion in the same paper are:

"We must admit that we Turks take marriage as a toy tied with cotton thread. On one side there is the poor Turkish woman whose family life is like an empty piece of shell tumbling before the wind of the new life; on the other side there is the Turkish man who considers divorce as a thing as easy as changing one's chair." [11]

A third writer says:

"The following are the chief points to be changed in our law of marriage: to prohibit and remove polygamy altogether; to cancel absolutely such harmful and worn-out old customs (three divorces and mock-marriage) which can never agree with the principles of modern civilization; to make allowance for divorce, but with the condition that it should be brought before the court for decision, both parties having equal legal rights; at

[11] *Tanin*, January 19, 1924.

the time of marriage to demand that both parties, husband and wife, should be present personally before the judge, and give their own consent, and express their own conditions. . . . The Turkish womanhood of the twentieth century ought to persist in demanding these things, never wavering before any obstacle or force, and insist as a united body to recover her lawful rights, as the women of other countries have done." [12]

Other writers represent a liberalized Islam without reflecting on Christianity. A Turkish teacher and journalist writes:

"Materialism has not had a great effect upon most of the people in this country. It cannot be said that it has settled into their minds as a reasoned belief. Only as in other countries, so in ours also, there are many people indifferent to religious belief. Democracy has imparted to the Turks the idea of the necessity of work and progress, and has put an end to many old customs and traditions. Although there are people who are tied to traditions and religion, these are not strong enough to force their ideas upon the newly established government. The new generation is growing up as a lover of progress and liberalism. Therefore, there is no necessity for rationalizing the Mohammedan beliefs. Already fundamentally the Koran teaches the principles of democracy."

Some attack the orthodox freely. The following article appeared in one of the best of the Constantinople Turkish daily papers, the *Vakit,* on October 18, 1925.

MOHAMMEDANISM IS NOT A NATIONAL RELIGION

It is a light sent to all men. It has no national costume.

There were some people who thought that the great steps of progress which Turkey has recently taken, such as the suppression

[12] *Ibid.,* January 21, 1924.

of the Caliphate, the closing of the religious schools and *tekkes*, the separation of religion from government, and putting on civilized headgear, would make a bad impression on the feelings of all the other Moslems in the world and consequently would strengthen the power of reaction. But both from the writing and from personal acquaintance with the world of Islam it is understood that the Moslem world has taken two positions in relation to our reforms. On one side there are the reactionaries, the poor people who bend the neck to ignorance and silly tales, the superstitious, who remain ignorant of truth, and they do not hesitate to stick the stamp of heresy and blasphemy to the forehead of our reforms. A set of people calling themselves "learned in religion" are the leaders. This party, fearing the opening of prisons of ignorance and breaking the chains of fanaticism on their poor slaves, with much weeping over the ruin and the disappearance of religion, think to continue their rule, for their own personal advantage, over the consciences of men.

On the other side, there is a group, enlightened and free, who are equipped with the knowledge of this time, who appreciate the greatness and importance of the Turkish revolution. They believe, and do not conceal their belief, with devotion and passion that the way of the revolution is the way to progress and civilization. Between these who see the truth with such enlightenment and the owls who sing of destruction all around there is a very stern battle going on.

A prominent editor has translated Cætani's great work, *Annali dell' Islam*.[13] In his preface he says:

"It is really a sad thing to be obliged to translate even the history of Islam from European languages. I hope that this sad experience will drive us, the Moslems, to work hard. I have hesitated very much to translate this book, as the ideas of such a treatise would naturally differ from our historical and traditional viewpoint. But the great scientific worth of the book itself, on the one hand, and the absence of a history of Islam in our own

[13] A very extended and critical study of the early history of Islam. Cf. *Moslem World*, April, 1912, p. 190.

language, on the other hand, have overcome my hesitation. This book is the best in the European languages in its impartiality and good-will. Yet the author has the outlook of a European scientist; therefore, it contains such points as may hurt our feelings and convictions. However, if we overlook those points, we can surely be much benefited by this book in regard to our privilege of the history of Islam. I have had this thought of benefit before my eyes. I should have liked to add some notes and to criticize and refute the statements which are antagonistic to our beliefs and traditions; but feeling my inability to do so, I have left that duty to our theologians. I do feel that I have been of great service to our theologians by translating such a book, literally and exactly without changing any point, because in this way they will have the opportunity to understand and criticize the ideas which are contrary to our own beliefs. I pray that the readers will cherish a spirit of toleration in reading this book."

The same writer would seem to represent type five, those who appreciate Christianity, in that he has translated also a paragraph from Leon Marillier's *Liberty of Conscience* as follows:

"The greatest characteristic of Christianity is not its morals or dogmas. It is the teaching of Jesus in regard to the relationship between God and man. The old ethnic religions have been broken down, and a new religion has been born. Here man and his heavenly Father stand alone. The Christian is obliged to be meek and compassionate for the sake of his Father and for the love of God. He will devote himself to the service of his brethren, and will not judge them, because they are all children of God like him. He ought to love all men, Jews

or Gentiles. A Christian loves his brethren in Jesus. Formal religion has been set aside. The soul of the faithful has become the sanctuary. Think of the words of Jesus in the Gospel of John: 'Woman, believe me, the hour cometh when neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem shall you worship the Father. The true worshipers shall worship the Father in Spirit and in Truth.'"

It is a matter of great interest that Moslems themselves are willing to make such statements accessible to their fellow countrymen.

We find a number of writers even attacking Islam as an Arab religion. Abdullah Jevdet, who edits a liberal journal, wrote in his periodical of August 1, 1924:

"The disintegration of Turkish people in the past has been due chiefly to three causes, the first of which is religious. A cloak cut out and modeled for Arabia (i.e., Islam) has been forcefully put round our necks which has kept us tied to our bedsteads and so prevented the free development of our normal and national abilities. God says in the Koran: 'Verily we have sent down the Koran in the Arabic language, so that you may understand it.' From these words it is evident that the Koran has been addressed to the Arabs, and the Turks can have no share of it. In the early ages of superstition it was only natural that each people should have a god of its own creation, and consequently it was very natural that the revengeful Arab should have a mighty, revengeful god. . . . The Arabs have ruined us (the Turks) by forcing upon us a god of their own creation. This god does not lack some good and noble qualities, but he has such attributes as have paralyzed our national and normal growth. Our minds have remained puzzled in the midst

of contradictions. The cause of the Persian disintegration is also the same thing."

The same writer, in his paper, *The Ijtihad* of February 1, 1926, replies to a letter of inquiry. It appears that he had quoted a statement of President Coolidge to the effect that the moral discipline and order of humanity which cannot be secured by law can be secured only by religion, but for the word "religion" he had substituted "moral training." He was asked why he had made this substitution. To this he replied:

"Words change their value and content from century to century, from age to age, from people to people, from race to race. The value and meaning of the word 'religion' in America is certainly not the meaning of that word in France, in Italy, in Turkey, in Arabia. Peoples who are trained in Latin culture surely look upon this word 'religion' as a little out of place in the mouth of the President of the vast United States of North America, for they do not know the scope and value of the conception of religion according to the Americans. If the conception of religion among us were the same as that in America, I would not have hesitated to retain the translation of the word 'religion' spoken by the President of the American Republic. . . .

"Especially in the East, religion today is a science of the hereafter, and as regards its present influence on us, religion ruins this present world. . . . Let the high moral principles of religion exist in its source books as much as you please . . . still cleanliness will continue to be found, not in Moslem but in non-Moslem wards of the city, attention to science will be observed among non-Moslems more than among Moslems, care for the acquiring of wealth and comfort, and for the removal of

poverty will be noticed more among non-Moslems than among Moslems. A people's religion is made up of convictions which are active and dominant in their practises and deeds. It is obvious to what depths and to what conceptions the Moslem beliefs which rule in our spirits and consciences have lowered us. . . . There is no religion among us which is worthy of serious attention and support. We face the high duty of making our people religious in this worthy sense by means of well ordered moral training. . . . In America religion is put forward and exalted from the point of view of its usefulness with regard to building up and restoring the world and making man happy. . . . The Moslems of Persia and India, of Khiva, of Bukhara, and even of Turkestan still continue to say: 'Religion and the world are mutually contradictory; wherever there is religion, no importance is given to the present life.'

"We are not unaware of the fact that other factors also were present in the fall and ruin of the Moslem East, but no one of these factors with its baneful thought possesses degenerative and destructive power to the degree of the religious. Until the conception of religion acquires a character and a power elevating instead of degenerating, constructive instead of destructive, and until it changes its flavor, to mention its name—in the East—will continue to be fatal. Therefore, Turkish leaders are called upon to create for the Turk a new lordship of conscience, free from silly tales."

A recent editor condemns all religion as a hindrance to civilization.

"In the discussion of religion, the progress of humanity has been very slow and very trivial. The humanity of today has not progressed a hand's breadth beyond what

was known in Hindustan ten thousand years ago regarding the beginning and the end. Today we are simply repeating the ideas thought ten thousand years ago on the top of the Himalaya Mountains by the Indian. Civilization, the product of the work and life of human beings, is an entirely different thing. In view of its course in history it can very clearly be seen that it is completely irreligious and perhaps an entirely human thing.

"Possibly those may be found who would call social events which are necessitated by religion the outcome of civilization. These also can only be considered so in a roundabout manner. Aside from this, no religion has ever taken any people by the hand and helped them up the ladder of civilization, nor has helping them up ever been possible to religion, nor is it now possible. It is now necessary to know that religion and civilization are two entirely different things. All through the period in which Christianity was master of the situation, it has hindered the development of civilization, that is, the enlightenment of minds and spirits. Therefore, the term 'Christian civilization' is nonsense.

"At the same time, the term 'Moslem civilization' is also nonsense. All that Islam did in the way of civilization was to build upon and carry forward the Greek civilization. In the same way, the present world civilization also is nothing but the continuation and improvement of the Greek and Roman civilizations. Even religions have been helped and improved by this current of civilization. However, they themselves have not been able to forward the cause of humanity in the least. By means of their inherent conservatism, they have done their best to hinder the progress of humanity and they

have actually tried to push humanity backward; but a single step forward — never!" [14]

A Warning against Christian Methods

Finally, an anonymous communication warns against the work of the Young Men's Christian Association:

"We have from the very first been suspicious of this benevolent, religious, charitable, rich Christian Association, that with such boldness stretches out its hands to the Turks. And we are very much afraid that while they may give us one, they will take five from us. It is in fact more than sixty years since this Society has been establishing in Constantinople, in Roumeli Hissar, and Arnaoutkeuy, and in some of the Anatolian vilayets, branches, each under the name of a school. But since the time and circumstances were not very favorable to a propaganda, their energies, especially among Moslem Turks, were very limited. But now, taking advantage of the great opportunity given by the freedom resulting from the separation of religion and government, these zealous Protestants, like marauders who make away with goods under cover of a tumult, have got the better of us, and are clinging on like crabs.

"Only they make a mistake in not realizing that the Turkish Republic, while it does not trouble itself about the individual belief or faith of anybody, does not allow either Christian or Moslem propaganda on its soil. Yet we know for certain that the Young Men's Christian Association, under whatever name it may be, is, like the Baktashis, a sort of enlightened dervish order. First they get people to love them, and then they make them

[14] Editorial from the *Jumhuriet*, a Constantinople daily paper in Turkish, July 7, 1925.

novices in their order. Their schools are each a *tekke;* there the great deeds of Jesus are sung. The persuasive abilities of the members of this Association, both men and women, are so great that, like ants caught in a spider web, people cannot again be rescued from their hands. The greatest secret of their success is love.

"It is true that this ability is seen also in the *Sœurs.* They too, before spoiling the faith of the children, gain their good-will. In the heart of each girl, a very early attachment is formed toward the white-capped, sad-looking women in long, blue dresses, called *Sœurs.* These sisters become a uniting bond between our innocent children and Jesus. They constitute to a certain extent a visible danger. Their object is clear. Their methods are well known. The mothers and fathers who send their children to those institutions to learn French, say: 'What can we do? Let them learn the language a little, and let them become whatever they become.' It is the principle of these *Sœurs* to proceed from rules to examples, from the abstract to the concrete. They give them the theoretical basis of the Catholic religion and then illustrate it by living examples.

"The others, that is, the Protestant young Christians, are exactly the opposite. They begin with example and lead up to rule; they go from the concrete to the abstract; and this sort of propaganda is much more fatal. They do not proclaim the principles of Protestantism, nay, they do not even talk about religion, but by their attitude, their actions, their manners, by their compassion to animals, by the help they give to the poor, by loving what is good, by mercy to the unfortunate, they try to show the loftiness of their religion.

"We see that the number of innocent Turkish children

captured by these charms is constantly increasing, and that these children are weaned from their individuality and are becoming each an American Protestant, nay, more, not only a Protestant, but a missionary.

"Only a short time ago, in Smyrna, a young Hafiz (one who knows the entire Koran by heart) was, as they themselves call it, brought under divine influence, and the poor thing suffered for it. Are such divinely influenced ones rare in Robert College, or the Girls' College? Only a few months ago again was not a young Persian lad in the Robert College *tekke* thus converted?

"We must awake from our sleep, and we must tell these self-invited guests of ours to desist from this ill-considered ambition of theirs. We are much impressed by the news that they are going to open libraries in Anatolia and start clubs; and it is reported that they are going to send to their own institutions in America ten young Turks. We are afraid they are thus going to hit us with our own weapons. A little sagacity! A little caution!" [15]

Such are the reactions of Moslems of various types regarding the religious situation today.

[15] An unsigned communication in the Turkish daily *Jumhuriet*, September 24, 1925.

CHAPTER V

OUR SHARE IN THE MOSLEM'S FUTURE

Determining Our Purpose and Aim

What can we learn from past contacts of Christianity with Islam? In order to pursue with profit this inquiry, we must first decide what is our purpose in learning about the past contacts of Christianity with Islam. What use do we propose to make of our knowledge when we get it? We need a general aim to help us determine what material is pertinent. What does Christianity hope to accomplish in its future contacts with Islam?

Some wish to "expose" Islam. There are some whose program for dealing with Islam is dominated by the idea that Islam is a *false* religion founded on the claims of an impostor. Their principal aim is, therefore, the *exposure* of Islam and its Prophet. They dwell on the crudeness of Mohammed, intellectually and morally, on the opposition of the teachings of Islam to those of Christianity, on the unwarranted assumptions of its theologians. This group will stress argument and debate. They will study all the historical inaccuracies and logical inconsistencies of the Moslem defense and emphasize the contrast with Christian doctrines. Practically, their aim is to confute and silence Moslems, to undermine their belief in their own religion, and to convince them of the theoretical superiority of Christianity. There are some who would consider this aim as one-sided and extreme, but who would yet maintain that exposure of the falsity of Islam has an important place among Christian methods.

Some wish to supersede Islam as a social and political system. Another group think not so much of the false claims of Islam as of its evil consequences as a social and political system. They point to the effects of Mohammed's example and legislation on the position of women, to the oppressive and inefficient character of Moslem rule, to the backwardness of the Moslem world today, its ignorance and superstition. They feel that such a religion cannot be adequately reformed, and that therefore it must be superseded and outgrown. They stress the importance of social service. All would probably admit that Islam stands in great need of social reform. Some would affirm and others deny that it would cease to be Islam after it had passed through this process.

Some concentrate on individual evangelism. The next group are not so concerned about attacking Islam as about securing converts to Christianity. They avoid argument as much as possible and concentrate on direct evangelism, dealing with individuals through conversation, distribution of literature, and friendly offices. These people are surely on the right track. The only question is whether they have gone far enough. In other fields of missionary work we have advanced long ago beyond the stage of gathering individual converts and are considering problems of the church and Christian community. Because in most Moslem lands we are still confined to comparatively pioneer methods is no reason why we should restrict the statement of our ultimate aim.

Some aim at an independent Christian Church. Some would be satisfied with the establishment in various sections of the Moslem world of a Christian Church, self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating. This classic definition of the aim of the missionary enterprise

has been a wonderful guide and inspiration for the last three quarters of a century. It will never be superseded, but more recent discussion seems to indicate that it may be supplemented. To the minds of certain persons it confines the objectives of missionary work too exclusively to ecclesiastical aims and therefore considers possibilities of service closed with the establishment of an independent native church.

Some desire cooperative development of a better type of Christianity. There are those who like to think of our relationship with other countries and religions as not terminating in the transmission of our own faith, but only entering a new stage of cooperation in the evolution of a type of Christianity better than the poor scrubby varieties that have yet been produced, and enriched by the contributions of men of good-will of every nation and kingdom and tribe and tongue. Anyone who can regard with complacency the religion of Christendom must have a pretty low ideal of the possibilities of Christianity. Anyone who can offer to other civilizations the social order of the West without apologies for its imperfect Christianization must be suffering from moral myopia. It is one thing to rejoice that we have in Christ the promise and potency of all spiritual good; it is another to believe that this may be transferred adequately to other lands through the medium of a single institution, or that nations are to be able to work out in the future their best development in isolation.

In considering these different methods of work we must ask ourselves some questions regarding each:

1. Does this method adequately represent the spirit of Christ?

2. What has been the extent and character of its success?

3. What have been its limitations and disadvantages?

4. What is its appropriateness at the present stage of development, which, of course, may differ in different countries?

5. What is its justification in view of our ultimate aim?

I. The Exposure of Islam

1. *Does this method represent the spirit of Christ?* On the one hand, it is urged that Christ is the way, the truth, the life, and that there is salvation in none other. Mohammed has claimed to supersede Him and bring the final revelation to mankind. Multitudes have accepted this last assertion at its face value. How may we hope to get anywhere unless we remove and destroy these false ideas?

On the other hand, we have the statement that Christianity is not a logical argument from which there is no escape. Raymond Lull, the heroic medieval missionary to Moslems, thought he had constructed an argument which left unbelievers no standing-ground, but no one would attempt to use it today. We accept Christianity for moral and spiritual rather than for logical reasons. Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil. The spirit of His missionaries should be constructive. The most Christian presentation is that which undertakes, not to confute and silence, but to help to believe.

2. *What is the extent and character of the success resulting from this method?* This is extremely difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy. From earliest times polemical argument has been used and converts

have apparently been won by it. Individuals have testified that without the doubts created in their minds by attacks on Islam, they might never have been led to gravitate towards Christianity. On the other hand, argument sometimes receives credit which it does not deserve. A Moslem convert in North India, who had confessed Christ after some pretty hot controversy in the bazaar, was asked which of the missionary's arguments had pierced the joints of his armor and brought him conviction. He replied that none of them had. In the mere matter of persuasiveness of debate he considered that he had the best of it. The thing that bowled him over was the spirit shown by the missionary. He himself had become very heated and bitter, but the missionary somehow managed to keep sweet and courteous. The Moslem decided that a religion which could help a man to behave like that was worth having even if its arguments seemed a little defective.

Bishop Lefroy says: "I suspect that in conversions resulting from bazaar preaching and discussion with Mohammedans it would be found that in a majority of cases what had first commended the truth to the conscience of the individual had been, not the intellectual ability or force with which it had been presented, but the good temper and kindliness of the preacher in the face of bitter opposition and insult. . . . Much of our preaching seems to me rather as if we were hoping to convert men by throwing brickbats at them in the form of truth." [1] It seems probable that the converts made by Raymond Lull in Tunis were not won so much by his irrefutable demonstration of Christianity as the only true religion, as by the spirit that animated him. It would hardly be too much

[1] *Methods of Mission Work among Moslems*, pp. 219-220, 225.

to say that some missionaries have succeeded in spite of their arguments rather than because of them.

3. *What have been the limitations and disadvantages of the controversial method?* In estimating the value of any method its net results must be taken into account. No one doubts, for instance, that the Holy Coat at Lourdes or the methods of Christian Science actually work cures. But before relying on either of these agencies for physical rehabilitation we ought to know something also about their failures, about which so little is commonly said. An evangelist holds a series of meetings in which ten persons profess conversion. We cannot altogether gauge the real value of his work until we know, first, what becomes of his converts, what is the quality of their subsequent Christian life; second, what was the result among those who made no profession, whether they have been led nearer or made harder to reach; and third, what is the influence on the whole community. There seems to be a growing agreement among missionaries that the controversial method has grave disadvantages and should be employed, if at all, only with great care.[2]

An especially valuable series of papers, originally published in the *International Review of Missions,* has been gathered into a book with the title, *The Vital Forces of Christianity and Islam.* Writers were selected from different parts of the Moslem world, and from among those who seemed best qualified to discuss this great theme. It is interesting to note their comments on the limitations of controversy.

Canon Gairdner, of Cairo, writes: "There can be no

[2] Cf. Herrick, *Christian and Mohammedan,* chap. xi, for a summary of opinions of missionaries on this subject.

doubt that on the wise principle of advancing along the line of least resistance, these beliefs (which are common to Christianity and Islam) should be emphasized in all Christian preaching." (Pages 29-30.)

Dr. W. A. Shedd, of Urumia, remarks: "Knowledge (should be) imparted in as non-controversial a way as possible. . . . A Mohammedan receives Christian truth into a mind filled with a large amount of unbelief. These previous beliefs can by no possibility be all expelled even if such were desirable. And any attempt to dispossess a man of all his religious convictions in order that he may have a totally new supply is absurd." (Pages 65-67.)

Pastor Gottfried Simon, formerly of Sumatra, says: "I need hardly say that it is unnecessary to expose in a controversial way the moral weakness of Mohammed's life or the contradictions of the Koran." (Page 106.)

Professor Stewart Crawford, of the American University of Beirût, writes: "From the beginning frankly tell him (the Moslem) that he may or may not accept the doctrine in your terms, but that you and he together must gain new views of the fullness of the divine nature. You have then done much to disarm him of the spirit of antagonism." (Page 144.)

Professor Sirajuddin, of Forman Christian College, Lahore, himself formerly an earnest Moslem, suggests that it "is for us to believe and to demonstrate that Christ Jesus came not to destroy but to fulfil the best and highest aspirations of every religion, to present Christianity more as fulfilment and less as destruction, to apply the golden rule of sympathy in studying the deepest religious experience of the most earnest-minded Mohammedans." (Page 180.)

Canon Godfrey Dale, of Zanzibar, holds that "there is a place for controversy, no doubt, . . . but it serves its purpose best if it confines itself to removing misconceptions from the mind of the Moslem and giving a clear and courteous statement of the evidence on which Christian beliefs rest. . . . It is probably preferable that listeners should discover for themselves the difference in many points, dogmatic and practical, between the two religions." (Pages 205-206.)

Dr. D. B. Macdonald, of Hartford, one of the leading Islamic scholars of the world, advises: "As much as is in any way possible, avoid controversy, however friendly. Turn it with an answer which will show that Christianity has beneath it a reasoned metaphysical system." (Page 238.)

The quality of those converts won by controversy is likely to lack something. A missionary from Peshawar,[3] noting that in general converts from Islam were "colder Christians and lacking both in spirituality and in devotion to Christ," as compared with converts from Hinduism, concludes that this was due neither to the characters of the individuals in question nor to their respective religions, but mainly to the fact that the Mohammedans had been won largely by argument.

If this point is open to debate, there is certainly no room for doubt that the effect of controversy has been unfortunate on those who have *not* been won. They have been embittered and provoked to counter attacks. Note instances quoted in the previous chapter, which indicate an exasperated and impervious mental attitude. Childish as many of these reactions are, those who aroused them will have much to answer for. Apparently

[3] *Moslem World,* July, 1911, pp. 283 ff.

with no other religion are the relations of Christianity so unhappy as with Islam, and it would seem that a distinct share of the blame must rest on those who thought they were doing God a service by abusing Mohammed and his religion.

4. *What is its present appropriateness?* As to the appropriateness of this method at the present stage of development, it may be remarked that to the eye of the hostile critic Christianity never before lived in such a glass house. Those of us who view the church from within can find many signs of new life to give us encouragement.[4] Even the present unrest, emphasizing itself in the older generation in the form of theological controversy and in the younger in the form of sharp criticism of things as they are, we may be able to interpret hopefully as indicating clearer thinking and higher ideals.

But consider the position of the young Moslem, eager to snatch at anything soothing to his inferiority complex, to discover flaws in this Western civilization which regards his backwardness with such contempt. Remember that, as Lord Cromer says, "the deep-seated ballast of Christian morality which regulates the occasional eccentric movements of the vessel is hidden beneath the surface," as far as the Moslem critic is concerned. What does he find? He finds that missionaries, who may have been almost the only Westerners he knew, are by no means representative of Christendom as a whole, but are considered by many as distinctly peculiar, both in their manners and beliefs. He discovers an entirely different type of Westerner, who seems to pride himself on being quite normal, whose major interests appear to be sport,

[4] Cf. William Adams Brown, *The Church in America.*

drinking, gambling, and rather free relations with the opposite sex, and whose womenkind behave in public as no Moslem harlot would venture to do. He discovers also that there is a mass of Western literature very different from that which the missionary offers for sale. It includes novels which represent Western society as altogether pagan in its ideals and as exulting in the fact; books and magazine articles which deride Christianity as an outworn superstition and which support their arguments by appeals to science; newspapers which give the impression that Western cities are a riot of vice and crime. He need not go far to read and hear wholesale denunciations of the present state of Western morals quite as severe as those made by missionaries of the Moslem world. He is told by many that the principal doctrines advocated by missionaries are generally considered obsolete, that modern criticism has altogether undermined their main positions. Finally, the World War and subsequent diplomacy impress him as indicating a civilization that is savage and rotten at heart. Is theological polemic likely to make much headway with such a person?

The Christian writers quoted above, although comparatively recent, would have found in the developments of the last decade reasons for warning more strongly than they do against theological controversy. Friendly discussion of theological difficulties is another thing. What is most needed at present is personal witness to the faith and power of Christ that our civilization so greatly misrepresents.

5. *What is its ultimate justification?* As to the justification of this method, we should remember that our aim is to win, whereas controversy usually only antago-

nizes. The old fable of the efforts of the wind and the sun to rid the traveler of his cloak is to the point here. A final consideration is the effect of the convert on his own community. One who is a product of controversy, who has abjured as false the faith of his fellow citizens, would find it especially hard to live in the Moslem world and influence it. There have been exceptions to this rule, such as Makhail Mansur, in Egypt.[5]

II. Superseding Islam as a Social and Political System

1. *Does this method represent the spirit of Christ?* The second method of dealing with Moslems mentioned above stressed attack upon it as a social and political system. Some would emphasize destruction of social features which seem to be inextricably bound up with religion; and others merely the removal of burdens by whatever method is necessary. As to the former, many of the things said about theological controversy would also be pertinent here. Christ denounced the life of the Pharisees, but on the ground of inconsistency with their own professions. For the rest, his social influence was by principle and example. Many feel that under modern conditions he would have gone much farther.

As to the need for constructive social effort with Moslems, there can be no difference of opinion. As to methods of attack, several debatable points may emerge. Shall we attack Islam as a system which is socially hopeless and needs to be destroyed? Shall we attack the theological positions of Islam as the fundamental cause of arbitrary social arrangements? Shall we at-

[5] *Moslem World,* January, 1919, pp. 19-24.

tack the social regulations only, with the hope that their improvement will react upon and mitigate the theology? Shall we abandon the attack altogether and employ only constructive methods?

2. *What has been the extent and character of its success?* As to the success of social methods, the testimony of writers in *The Vital Forces of Christianity and Islam* is interesting. Canon Gairdner says: "The life of the Christian family when they see it,—Christian womanhood, calm, capable, womanly, gracious, self-controlled,—these all fill them with wonder. They know Islam has never produced such women; they know it is not producing them today; they strive to ascribe the overwhelming difference to custom, race, education—any reason that can be found." (Page 37.)

Dr. W. A. Shedd says: "Probably the greatest work Christian missions have done in Mohammedan lands is to present in life and deed the fruits of Christianity. Hospitals, schools, relief of poverty, and integrity and honor in daily life have presented a new idea of service, religion, and manhood. This ideal differs from that of the saints of Islam. The position of woman in the Christian home and society has an attraction, especially for women (page 64). The social and political results of Christianity are far less effective than its manifestation in personal character. For one thing, the Oriental has not learned to judge religion by such standards, and besides, the faults and shortcomings of Western civilization are obtruded on his view." (Page 65.)

Professor Crawford writes: "It is becoming a commonplace of Moslem writers to speak of the vast influence of women for good or evil and to advocate the

training of girls for noble womanhood. This is not infrequently coupled with the demand that the modesty and retirement of the veil be maintained as against the painted and objectionable immodesty of European civilization." (Page 151.)

Professor Sirajuddin writes: "The greatest dissatisfaction is beginning to be felt all over the Mohammedan world in connection with the unprogressive tendencies of Islam in matters political and social, and this dissatisfaction is bound to grow in intensity as well as extent with the progress of education and enlightenment." (Page 171.) "There can be no two opinions as to the great influence of Christian institutions for relief and remedy of suffering, ignorance, and shortcomings—in the form of hospitals, schools, homes for widows, orphanages, and leper asylums." (Page 177.) He goes on to urge that the Christian influences of these institutions be exalted.

Canon Godfrey Dale reports the admission by Moslems with whom he has talked, of the evil of slavery and polygamy, and that "Islam in this part of the world has failed to produce the type of womanhood that could be safely allowed the freedom of the Christian woman." (Pages 199-200.) There can be no doubt that the deepest results are produced by the good fruits of the spirit of Christ. Truth and gentleness, patience, forbearance and courtesy, self-sacrifice, spirituality in all its forms; the work in hospitals, the better treatment of prisoners, the freedom of the courts of justice from corruption, Christian domestic life at its best, the pains freely bestowed on the education of the young, the real interest taken by those who are in authority in the general welfare of those

whom they govern—all these are signs of practical Christianity and are having their effect in a quiet way." (Page 205.)

It is probable that the social manifestations of Christianity have been the main influence in changing the attitudes of Moslems toward their own social institutions. Quotations in previous chapters have furnished examples of the different positions taken by Moslems today on social questions. Besides those who profess to be satisfied with things as they are, we find some who advocate Mohammed's legislation only in theory and for exceptional cases, some who explain it away by denying that he ever intended to endorse polygamy, and some who admit that the Koran permits polygamy, but who denounce it nevertheless.

3. *What have been its limitations and disadvantages?* It would seem that a constructive exhibit of Christian social ideals was accomplishing more than the denunciations of Moslem social customs. The latter might be more effective if the contrast were between the highest type of Christian ideals and the practises of the Moslem world. Unfortunately, as indicated above, Moslems are becoming better acquainted with examples of European manners that not only parade unrebuked, but are easily copied by those who make no pretense to social standing. When their own social system is attacked, Moslems would be more than human if they did not reply with their counter attack on the social habits of Christendom. Thus, instead of cooperation in constructive effort, each side is concerned mainly with scoring off the other, with plenty of targets easy to hit.

It has been noted by many observers that even the most unselfish social effort is sometimes misunderstood.

For instance, Malcolm writes: "It is almost inconceivable what misunderstanding of the doctor's attitude is possible in out-patient work in a Moslem country. He is a bad man trying to work off his sins. He is sent out by the English Government at a high salary. He is making a very good profit out of the work. He is an instance of the subjection of the infidel to the Moslem by the power of God. All these notions gradually die away under the systematic life and discipline of the hospital, with its atmosphere of trust and repose." [6]

Simon mentions similar arguments: "Some priests will tell the people that the white man is simply a slave of Allah and has been commissioned by Him to deliver Mohammedans from sickness and suffering. God, in fact, has punished the white men by putting upon them the task of healing the sick, whereas the Moslem priesthood would never think of defiling themselves with such servile ministrations. But this does not readily find acceptance." [7]

Dr. Long, of Robert College, told of service which he rendered in connection with a cholera epidemic in Constantinople. When asked what impression this service made, he replied that the average witness would probably conclude that he had some very deep sin to expiate and was taking this method of obtaining merit. Such misunderstandings will surely be temporary and are well worth risking.

4. *What is its present appropriateness?* As to the appropriateness of social effort at a time when traditions are becoming self-conscious and ashamed, on the one hand, and are being undermined by subtle and penetrating forces, on the other, there can be but one opinion. But

[6] *Five Years in a Persian Town*, p. 251.
[7] *Vital Forces of Christianity and Islam*, p. 97.

this effort must not be a partisan attempt to replace Moslem civilization with that of Christendom. It must not destroy faster than it can prepare to build up, it must allow time for new ideals to develop and translate themselves into practise, it must oppose social evils impartially without regard to their religion or label, and it must permit Orientals to follow their own tastes where actual moral issues are not involved. In attacking another social system we must remember how recently it was a commonplace for certain Christian theologians to justify slavery, and how today many questionable features of our economic system find strong supporters in churches.

5. *What is its ultimate justification?* As to the final justification of an attempt to transform the Moslem world socially, much depends on what we propose to do, and whether we really propose to do it. Is it justifiable to attack a great social system without a definite constructive program and the resources of determination to carry it out? If social effort among Moslems is really so urgent, is it right to undertake it on such a small scale? Can we comfort ourselves by saying that in any event every little helps? Can we justify social work for the Moslem world without condemning ourselves by the quantity of our output?

III. Concentration on Individual Evangelism

1. *Does this method represent the spirit of Christ?* The third group mentioned at the beginning of this chapter are those who think less of Islam as a system and more of personal work for individuals. This method surely represents the spirit of Christ in so far as it expresses sincere love for fellow men and is not carried

on in the spirit of sniping operations. The interest must be in men and their best development and not merely in change of theology and professions of faith.

Dr. Pennell, of the Northwest Frontier of India, tells of an object lesson which was a powerful aid in personal evangelism.[8] An English officer, sent on a diplomatic mission to Afghanistan, was seized by the Amir, confined in a vile prison for six months, and finally decapitated on his refusal to become a Moslem. His diary and the account of his death came to his sister some years later. Her reaction was to endow a bed in Dr. Pennell's hospital on the Afghan frontier for the welfare of the people who had killed her brother. The Afghans are occupied in constant feuds and their ruling passion is for revenge. Dr. Pennell says that the story of this bed, told to some sick or wounded Afghan lying in it, and reinforced by the loving attendance of native converts whom the patient has perhaps abused or maltreated in the bazaar, sends him back to his home with a very different feeling toward Christians.

2. *What has been the extent and character of its success?* For the reasons above mentioned evangelistic work among Moslems has not yielded anything like the results which it has obtained among some other religions, but it is a great mistake to suppose that Moslems do not become converted to Christianity. Especially in countries under non-Moslem rule many baptisms have taken place, including that of such men as Professor Sirajuddin, of Lahore, and Makhail Mansur, of Cairo.

A sketch of the latter is given by Dr. G. J. Hunt.[9] Mohammed Mansur spent twelve years as a student at Al Azhar and was considered one of the most brilliant

[8] *Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier,* pp. 70 ff.
[9] *Moslem World,* January, 1919, pp. 19-24.

and learned shiekhs. A Bible given him by a Protestant pastor was the means of his conversion. On his baptism he took the name Makhail. For eighteen years he held a series of semi-weekly meetings attended largely by Moslem students, the audience often overflowing the accommodations. "While he spoke with the utmost plainness, he was so unfailingly fair and frank and friendly that even though he did not succeed in convincing his opponent, he always won his good-will. . . . Remembering that he was regarded by them as a renegade from the faith, it was remarkable the respect they showed him. We have seen the crowded house a seething mass when he entered; as he quietly took his seat and bowed his head in silent prayer, a hush fell upon all. . . . He could go even to Al Azhar, as he often did, and talk freely with students and professors."

Dr. Speer on his last visit to Persia met many interesting converts.[10] At Meshed, a holy city to which pilgrimage is made, there was a group of forty-five believers and inquirers, all but one of whom had been Moslems. In Tehran a prominent physician who had studied in London is now "one of the best known and most influential Christians in Persia." At Tabriz a leading Persian doctor, belonging to one of the oldest and most respected Mohammedan families in Persia, and bearing the title, "The Glory of the Doctors," is another influential Christian.

A letter from a missionary in Persia, written in December, 1925, contains a remarkable story of a mullah (practically equivalent to a priest) who is also a sayyid, or descendant, of the Prophet and as such a wearer of a green turban, and a son of a mujtahid, or learned theolo-

[10] *Report on India and Persia,* pp. 403-425.

gian. "He had taught in a Moslem theological school for some years and was generally considered to be one of the most educated Moslems in the city" (of Tabriz). He attended the preaching service, had private talks with the missionary, and read with energy books that were lent him. Soon after, he arose in a meeting especially for Moslems, openly confessed Christ, and called on other Moslems to do the same. This was a very dangerous proceeding, as he clearly realized. In view of the likelihood of his assassination, he asked that he be buried in a Christian cemetery, thus indicating that his break with Islam was final and complete. He was put into jail more than once, but on release resumed his Christian testimony. A later report states that he was carried off by a mob from the missionary's house where he had taken refuge, was beaten, and once more lodged in jail. The result has been, not only to arouse the elements of public opinion which desire religious liberty, but to lead other Moslems to come out openly as Christians.

In the East Indies, especially in Sumatra, many thousands of converts from Islam are reported.[11] Social service, personal contacts, and friendship seem to be the main factors in this success. Large use has been made of literature, and there is evidence of numbers of secret believers who fear to confess their faith.

3. *What have been its limitations and disadvantages?* As to the limitations resting upon this method, the most prominent has been the death penalty in Moslem law for those who abjure their faith.[12] No public executions for this cause would be permitted in countries under European rule, and they have been formally declared as no

[11] Cf. Speer, *Report on India and Persia,* pp. 403-425.

[12] On this whole subject cf. Zwemer, *The Law of Apostasy in Islam.*

longer in order by certain Moslem governments. But there are many regions where the danger of assassination by some zealot would be very real. Missionaries have often advised Moslem converts to emigrate for their personal safety. Even where life is not threatened, there is social ostracism and economic boycott. Bishop Linton remarks on this point:

"I was preaching once to Persian Christians on the call of Christ to face even death for His sake. One of the best of them said to me afterwards: 'I would be willing to be put to death for my faith, indeed I would rejoice to be counted worthy of martyrdom. That would never make me hold back, but that is not the way of Islam today. And what I do find hard is the loss of old friends and relatives who now cut me in the street. And what I should fear more than death would be to be expelled from my home and my town; to see my wife and children driven to destitution, and myself an outcast from society.' "[13]

Dr. George A. Ford, of Sidon, calls attention to the lack of varied forms of employment in the Orient and the consequent economic helplessness of the convert who is disowned by his community.[14]

A further difficulty, most fundamental in character and being increasingly recognized by missionaries, is that of our failure to provide the Moslem convert with a Christian fellowship and surroundings in which he can feel at home. On this subject Rev. Arthur J. P. French says:

"Another . . . cause of the recoil of many actually earnest Moslem inquirers has been the deplorable tendency of Christians of the second generation and onwards to

[13] *Moslem World,* April, 1925, p. 161.
[14] *Ibid.,* July, 1914, p. 253.

become un-Indianized in dress, language, and social customs. The Mohammedan wishes, and rightly so, to carry over into Christianity his national dress, language, and social customs in so far as they are not definitely anti-Christian; he finds himself conspicuous in a semi-Anglicized society, a 'foreigner' in a religious community which seems to have lost all resemblance to those of the country of its birth. The Christianized Mohammedan is unwelcome in the Christian community and finds nothing in it to appeal to his national or racial instinct. In some of our churches he would be definitely repelled by a display of the figure of our Lord; in others by wholly irreverent behavior on the part of some of the worshipers, to which he has never been accustomed in his mosque. The Europeanized attitude of 'sitting to pray' and staring about one must shock the man whose very posture in prayer has been a matter of strict regulation and observance." [15]

Rev. J. G. Hunt, of the United Presbyterian Mission in Egypt, writes on the "loneliness" of the convert. He says:

"Any heart that knows how to sympathize must ache for the convert in his sense of isolation. It is easy to call up their faces—haunting faces—in the midst of Christian congregations, with a trace of undefined wistfulness that tells us they do not find themselves wholly a part of the worshiping throng. . . . (The convert) has a different vocabulary, different modes of thought, different viewpoints and customs. Even his clothes and facial characteristics often differ from theirs. . . . His greater danger . . . may often prove to be his sense of separation from the heart of the Christian community,

[15] *Moslem World*, January, 1916, p. 5.

his loneliness of soul for want of the human fellowship that should be his." [16]

Canon Gairdner notes that Eastern churches have through centuries of separation become strongly nationalistic in spirit and disinclined to welcome outsiders. Earlier in the same article he says: "The church or congregation which desires to be, sets out to be, and succeeds in being a home for those converted to Christ from Islam, is in itself a gospel—preaches thereby the best, highest, and most Christlike gospel of all, a gospel that will be most easily understood and most easily loved by those without, and will most powerfully attract them to come in." [17]

Above all this is the consciousness of the dark-skinned Moslem that he will never be accepted as a social equal of the Westerner. Professor Le Chatelier speaks of the deep conviction of the Moslem world that "materially, Christianity always gains to the detriment of Islam, and socially Christianity never accords what it promises." [18] The *African World*, published in Cape Town, in the issue of May 30, 1925, is quoted as saying: "The American white man may tolerate and give you all the educational, the religious, and all the other equalities, but not social equality nor political equality in their superlative degree." [19] Meanwhile, the Moslem papers are declaring that Islam recognizes no color line.

In view of these difficulties the fact that individual Moslems confess Christ is a testimony to the convincing power of the gospel.

4. *What is its present appropriateness?* The appro-

[16] *Moslem World*, April, 1918, pp. 158 ff.
[17] *Ibid.*, July, 1924, p. 238.
[18] *Ibid.*, October, 1912, p. 342.
[19] *Ibid.*, October, 1925, p. 331.

priateness of evangelistic methods at the present time is emphasized by the great changes all over the Moslem World. Never before have there been such possibilities of access, and never before such widespread openness of mind in spite of prejudice. If Christianity is a message for this present age to those who find it hard to maintain faith in the reality and the loving character of the Unseen, it has the best opportunity of all history to announce it to Moslems.

5. *What is its ultimate justification?* But, as in the case of social service, it is hard to justify halfway measures. To tell Moslems that we have a God of love, who welcomes those of every race and civilization as His children, and then to belie this comfortable assurance with the chilly reception we offer him in the Christian community, is to convict ourselves of insincerity. When Paul wrote to the Thessalonians that he had imparted to them, not the gospel of God only, but his own soul, he made it plain that he considered the verbal message of Christianity to be incomplete without a close personal fellowship. We owe to Moslems an opportunity to weigh intelligently as individuals the claims of Christ, but we also owe them a Christian brotherhood richer than that which they have known.

IV. Founding an Independent Christian Church

1. *Does this method represent the spirit of Christ?* We therefore come to the next objective of missionary effort—the organization of Moslem converts into a Christian church which shall be self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating. This aim recognizes that the Christian life demands not only individual communion with

God, but social fellowship and service making possible experiences and tasks which could not be achieved in isolation. It seems perfectly evident that Christ expected his disciples to live a community life, managing their own affairs, and enlarging their circle by bringing in others.

2. *What has been the extent and character of its success?* As to success, there are in the East Indies many congregations composed of former Moslems. Elsewhere, in regions where Moslems are in the majority, such as the Punjab and Persia, there are groups made up largely or wholly of converts from Islam. In India some strong Christian pastors were formerly Moslems. In general, however, there is no such organized church arising out of Islam as has come from the religions of Japan or China.

3. *What have been its limitations and disadvantages?* Those of us who find joining the church one of the best ways of extending our social contacts, and to whom the worship and activities seem perfectly natural, will have difficulty in appreciating the cost to the Moslem of such a transfer. In the first place, his old associates disown him and declare him an outcast. He has somewhat the experience which would await the white man in this country who should join a colored church. In the second place, the forms of religious expression are new to him and not always congenial. The quotation given above by Rev. Arthur French mentions some particular difficulties. Dr. D. B. Macdonald refers to an Al Azhar graduate who had been a member of one of the dervish orders before becoming converted to Christianity. On being asked whether he could still derive spiritual advantage from a *zikr* if it were purged of specifically Moslem references,

he answered emphatically that he thought he could.[20] Even among Christians there are those who feel lost without their liturgy, and others who are deeply stirred only by a service of considerable fervor.

It would seem desirable to employ much more largely than has been done the social customs and traditions which have always been associated with religion in the minds of the converts, instead of those which have acquired a halo of sanctity in the course of centuries in the West and which are no more essentially Christian. In this connection we meet in some places with a dilemma. A Christian church composed exclusively of ex-Moslems might well retain many of the forms in which their religious nature found most congenial expression. But such a church would be hampered in performing one of the important functions of Christianity—that of uniting those of different faiths in a single brotherhood and breaking down the walls between them. Moreover, when, as in some cases, converts from Islam are in a minority, the social atmosphere and forms of worship are likely to be of a type foreign to them. The only solution seems to be to sharpen our perception for the arbitrariness of many hallowed traditions and to be willing to enrich them freely from other forms that consist quite as well with the content of the Christian message.

4. *What is its present appropriateness?* These limitations of the Christian fellowship which we at present offer Moslems suggest the need of supplementing by further methods. Much of the conversion of Central Europe was effected by what today would be called social settlements, in the form of Benedictine monasteries with tracts of cultivated ground. The convert was given

[20] *Aspects of Islam,* pp. 168 ff.

more than a message of salvation and a creed to repeat. He was welcomed into a fellowship which provided not only spiritual edification, but teaching and practical training, and also he might find a retreat in times of danger. These outposts were strategically located and well manned. They did what itinerant evangelism could never have done. We are at once reminded that Islam owes much of its spread in Africa to just such methods.

Dr. Zwemer writes in the *Moslem World:*[21] "No single factor has been so constant and so powerful as the Moslem brotherhoods. . . . Their *zawias* (centers) are found everywhere." And a French writer in the *Moslem World*[22] writes: "The Moslem is essentially a collectivist, and we must know how in our missionary labors to adopt for the time being this collective spirit. An example of this was furnished by the early monastery of monks who labored to evangelize the barbarians of Europe. . . . Rather than multiply small stations, it seems preferable to establish an influential *zawia,* or 'holy house,' as our converts call it, where each will find his need satisfied; where the oppressed will find asylum; the traveler, a shelter; the sick, a relief; the orphan and widow, protectors; the persecuted Christian and the one deprived of resources and the means of livelihood, employment; the young, religious and technical instruction; the colporteur-evangelists of the future, a meeting place at the crossroads where the light of Christ will light each countenance."

It is at such places, where social activities can be provided and guided, that it will be possible to help the Moslem to adjust the best he brings with him to the best

[21] July, 1925, p. 220.
[22] January, 1917, p. 82.

that Western Christianity has to offer. In this way there might be raised up a type of Christianity congenial to the highest Moslem social and spiritual ideals and a real home.

5. *What is its ultimate justification?* The justification for the Christian church is that it provides adequate nurture and growth in Christian fellowship and service. If by reason of uncongenial features it fails to do this, it needs reconstruction. It should, on the one hand, offer a variety of forms and activities for different temperaments, and may thus be expected to reflect the civilization in which it grew up, and be shaped by the national and racial genius. On the other hand, it would be unfortunate if lines of cleavage within a nation coincided with those of class or race, separating those whom it is the main function of Christianity to unite. We need, then, a church for Moslems which shall supply Christian nurture in forms that are most congenial, and at the same time prepare for free exchange and mutual assimilation of spiritual gifts by contact with other Christian bodies. We need national churches to unite all the Christian forces of nations, and international churches to unite all the Christian forces of the world.

V. The Cooperative Development of a Better Type of Christianity

1. *Does this method represent the spirit of Christ?* This leads to the last objective mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, which is not satisfied by setting up in other lands churches that can maintain and extend themselves as independent ecclesiastical organizations, but seeks cooperation in the Christianization of the whole

social order, both intra-national and inter-national. Surely, nothing short of this represents the ultimate mind of Christ. When our present relations with Christians in non-Christian countries has been rid of the paternalism which has developed in the missionary enterprise, there should be possible large exchange of service. This will naturally be in general proportion to resources. Long after we have turned over the leadership of organized Christianity to the nationals of other countries, we shall need to cooperate closely with them in large tasks.

2. *What is the extent and character of its success?* The Christian missions, by their schools, social service, and spread of Christian ideals, have accomplished much to influence the Moslem world, but only a beginning has been made. Owing to the special obstacles, the main effort has been turned in other directions. The previous quotations indicate not only what has been done, but the unprecedented opportunities which are just opening to do very much more.

3. *What are its limitations and disadvantages?* There are no limitations in this task except those of our mind to undertake it. For some the breadth of the appeal blurs the perspective. It seems to them as if the gospel had more or less disappeared, whereas it is only being more fully and consistently applied. The vastness of the proposal discourages. Just as some have been comforting themselves with the thought that the churches of non-Christian lands were growing so fast that in a few years more they would relieve us of further support and foreign missionary work, a new definition of the objective makes it practically endless. But if there were any danger of the missionary enterprise being completed, we

should have to invent something else like it for our own good, to keep our vision and sympathies world wide.

4. *What is its present appropriateness?* In these days, when the problems of the world are constantly becoming more interdependent and are being broadcast to the consciousness of the most distant peoples, it is proper for Christianity to gird itself as never before and attack in real earnest a task which it professes to believe only religion can achieve, and which no other religion is able to achieve.

5. *What is its ultimate justification?* As we think of the charter and resources of Christianity, it is hard to see how we can undertake less. Such an objective will call us into fellowship with the whole world; it will destroy provincialism; it will permit Moslems to contribute and us to acknowledge any good they may have derived from Islam; it will throw us all back on the resources which only Christianity is able to supply and which shall never be discovered except when confronted with such an impossible task.

CHAPTER VI

THE CHRISTIAN MANDATE

The justification of mandates. The first paragraphs of Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations read:

"To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the government.

"The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandataries on behalf of the League."

Their practical limitations. This article has given rise to much cynical comment. It is said that leading powers among the Allies at once selected the territories of most strategic and commercial importance, without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants and in spite of their protests, and, incidentally, that the United States was invited to take over the mandate of least commercial value and most difficult to defend. These mandates are considered,

therefore, invasions of that right of self-determination in the interests of which the boundaries of the Central Powers were cut down. They are held to be excuses for exploitation and for protection of other national interests. At this point government heads remind us that they are not philanthropists with national treasuries at their disposal but representatives of public opinion and dependent upon it for their positions. They can carry out the measures that public opinion will stand for. If they run too far ahead of it, not only will their proposals be defeated by national legislatures, but they themselves may be turned out of office. The real difficulty with the mandatory idea is that public opinion has not yet been educated up to it. Taxpayers find their burdens sufficiently heavy already. They are not willing to have them increased except for reasons that manifestly affect national security or profit. International generosity responds to the temporary emergency of great spectacular disasters like an earthquake or famine, but is altogether too feeble a sentiment to support sustained effort for others on an adequate scale.

Ideals and Their Limitations

The ideal of democracy. The trouble seems to be, not with the conception, but with the performance, human nature being what it is. The same contrast is seen in connection with the democratic and missionary ideals. The word "democracy" has a double significance. On the one hand, it stands for universal brotherhood in which the welfare of every individual is to be taken into account.

Dr. Dewey says: "A democracy is more than a form

of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint community experience. . . . (It) is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and international territory" which keep men from perceiving the full power of cooperative activity. It is characterized by "widening of the areas of shared experience, and the liberation of a great diversity of personal capacities." (Page 101.) "If democracy has a moral and ideal meaning, it is that a social return be demanded from all and that opportunity for development of distinctive capacities be afforded all." (Page 142.) "It signifies a society in which every person shall be occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together more perceptible—which breaks down the barriers of distance between them." [1] (Page 369.)

"The supremacy within a character of an alert, sincere, and persistent interest in those objects and institutions which forward common ends among men . . . constitutes a kind of happiness with which others cannot be compared. It is unique, ethical, invaluable." [2]

Here we have the claim that democracy associates men in mutual service, that it breaks down barriers through perception of common interests, that it expects each to contribute and in turn to have his best capacities developed, and, finally, that for those who make such ideals supreme in their lives, it brings a unique happiness. This is a faith which is essentially dogmatic, but which to men of good-will commends itself as needing no external support.

Its practical limitations. The other significance of the

[1] John Dewey. *Democracy and Education.*
[2] Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics,* p. 301.

word "democracy" refers to certain types of political organizations which have been created in the hope of realizing the ideals above mentioned. They exhibit not only the defects characteristic of all institutions, but the weakness of human nature when put to the test. The practical expediency of some of these types is an exceedingly debatable question. Democracy as we see it is often a very unlovely thing. This would be freely admitted by many whose faith in the ideal remains unshaken. According to their way of thinking, the only cure for democracy is more democracy. The only hope of our political and social order as it exists is to criticize and stimulate it by the fundamental principles of universal human brotherhood.

The missionary ideal. The word "missionary" has the same double significance. On the one hand, it stands for an ideal even higher and deeper than that of democracy. If democracy stresses duties as well as rights, the missionary spirit stresses only duties. If democracy stands for world-wide brotherhood in theory, the missionary spirit stands for it in practise. It represents the outgoing love of God for all mankind without distinction of race or color, the love that came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister, that was willing to lay down life for the welfare of many. It contains the vitamines of willingness to sacrifice, without which democracy cannot achieve its best.

This sense of the word "missionary" accepts no criticism and needs no vindication. Those who cannot appreciate it convict themselves of moral littleness. Like the ideal of democracy, it offers no proof, but only a challenge.

Its practical limitations. The ill-repute of the word

"missionary" in some circles is due in part to defense reactions of small-minded and selfish people whose provincialism and self-indulgence are annoyed by ideals so broad and pure. But the dissatisfaction with the fringe of significance that surrounds the word "missionary" is due also to other causes. The history of missions has provided the church with some of its most inspiring examples of saintly living and the heroic sacrifice of big men and women who grew bigger through their work. It is impossible to deny, however, that missionary service has often appealed strongly to individuals with very narrow minds, that denominational zeal and paternalistic attitudes toward converts have often been too prominent. In short, both the workers on the field and the promoters at home have had their share of human frailty, which is the more obvious when seen against the background of the standards they profess. Here, again, the cure for the missionary enterprise is to make it more missionary. The hope of the world is to bring our imperfect performance of the missionary task up to the missionary ideals of Jesus Christ.

Criticism of mandates. The conception of a mandate needs the same criticism by high ideals. Certain backward nations undoubtedly need help. It is natural that the responsibility for aiding them should be primarily laid on advanced nations favorably situated in regard to resources, experience, and geographical location. If the help is given with real conscientiousness and sympathy, it would probably be generally acknowledged to be a blessing. As it is, there are individual representatives of the mandatory powers whose service represents great sacrifice and devotion, and who are appreciated accordingly.

What mandates need is an infusion of the purest missionary spirit. The handicaps placed upon political mandates in the form of the crudeness of governmental machinery, the reactionary character of home legislation, and the stinginess of taxpayers, are removed in the case of the missionary mandate.

An Ideal Mandate and What It Would Involve

The responsibility of American Christianity for a mandate. In what sense has American Christianity a mandate for the Moslem world? In the first place, American Christians have no mandate that is exclusive. Christians of other nationalities have been engaged in work for Moslems for many years. Our only desire for them is that they may lengthen their cords and strengthen their stakes. But at present America has a greater number of missionaries in Moslem lands than has any other one country, and more American money than that of any other nation has been invested in educational work in Moslem countries. No other nation has a list of institutions to compare with Robert College, the Woman's College at Constantinople, the American University at Beirût, the International Institute at Smyrna, the colleges founded by the American Board throughout Asia Minor, the American University at Cairo, the American College at Asyût, the American College at Tehran, Forman Christian College at Lahore.

A few facts regarding the larger of these institutions are as follows: The American University at Beirût announced in the fall of 1925 an enrolment of 1,217 students. Since it was desired to receive not more than 1,200, this necessitated turning many away, especially in

the lower classes. The students come from as far as Meshed, four hundred miles east of Tehran, and from the Sudan. Fifty automobiles arrived from Baghdad, bringing three hundred students. The sacred and intensely conservative cities of Nejef and Kerbela in Iraq sent representatives. Voluntary chapel exercises are well attended by both Christians and Moslems. Women are now admitted to all classes above the freshman.

At the same time Robert College reports a registration of 650 students on the opening day, and Constantinople Woman's College, one of 408. One third of these students are Turks.

Today America has by far the most wealth to invest. She has become a creditor nation, with great debts still outstanding against the nations of Europe. Of all the leading Christian nations her man-power was least affected during the World War. Her missionary work is well organized at home and on the field, and her missionaries are generally welcomed, since they are under less suspicion of political and commercial motives than some of those from other countries. For any great world task that was manifestly in our own interest, we should consider that our resources gave us a strong claim for first consideration.

What a mandate does not involve. A mandate for a large share of the Moslem world does not involve any invasion upon the right of self-determination of those peoples. Our business is not to impose an American type of Christianity but only so to hold up Christ that He shall draw by his own attractiveness all men to Himself and produce in them fruits according to their kind, such as we may never bring forth. A missionary mandate is not a concession for denominational exploitation.

For administrative reasons it may be well to divide the field among organizations, but this gives no right to declare a preserve or to indoctrinate with beliefs that will isolate these countries from all the rest of Christendom. A mandate confers no authority to dictate particulars of faith or ecclesiastical order, but only to serve for edification.

What we should desire for our own. Suppose children of our own blood had been kidnapped in infancy and were now growing up somewhere in the heart of the Moslem world, that we were unable to effect their release but were free to take them what we would, what should we most desire to do for these in whom we have a deep personal interest? First, we should be concerned to provide whatever made for the best physical development—adequate nutrition, exercise, care of organs, and protection from disease. It would pain us to think of those we loved being stunted in growth for lack of medical attention.

Next, we should see to it that educational advantages were made available, not merely bare schooling, but also the home surroundings that leave so much deeper an impress on mind and heart. We should realize that things that could be sent by parcel post would contribute only a small fraction of the desired benefit, and that close contacts of wholesome and contagious personalities would supply the decisive factors. We should be oppressed by the fact of the stifling social atmosphere of superstition and prejudice which those dear to us were forced to breathe, and should welcome any plan whereby this might be vitalized.

Finally, and supremely, we should long to have these children know and share our Christian faith and all that

it brings into our own lives. We should appreciate more keenly not only the message of the gospel, but all the influences and agencies by which the gospel is made fruitful for us. The fact that they were dependent for good literature on an infrequent visit from a colporteur, with his scanty stock of supplies, would not cause us to thrill with rejoicing.

What a mandate does involve. Dr. John Dewey, in the first paragraph of his epoch-making lectures on "The School and Society," says: "What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for all its children." What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that the Christian church wants for the children of the whole world. This is the mandate that the church, according to its ability, has for all mankind—Christian, Moslem, Buddhist, or Hindu. She derives this mandate from higher authority than that of the League of Nations. This authority is a government that cannot be turned out by an adverse vote. The execution of its plans depends, it is true, on the response of the Christian constituency, but though this constituency can refuse to recognize its obligation, it cannot vote it out of existence. Recognized or unrecognized, the obligation remains on Christians to treat the rest of the world, not as aliens or as step-children, but as their own flesh and blood. Such a program seems pretty stiff. It is not according to human nature. If it had been, there would not have been need for Christ to live and die.

Physical needs of Moslems. What would such a mandate involve in the case of the Moslem world? First, it would require meeting a lot of physical needs. "Medicine was long under the sway of the Arab authors. Avicenna, who lived from 980 to 1037, A.D., had more than a

hundred treatises ascribed to him, and from the twelfth to the seventeenth century was the chief guide for all medical studies in the universities of Europe." [3]

Quite apart from any obligation to repay this debt, we owe to all the world a full share of our scientific knowledge bearing on human health. There is great unnecessary mortality among Moslem children. There are multitudes of blind Moslems who might have their sight today, had their eyes received ordinary sanitary attention. There are diseases and abnormalities without number which could be relieved by medical and surgical skill. There are armies of women in Moslem harems who know nothing of competent physicians, trained nurses, hospitals, or the elements of sanitation. Is it nothing to you, who would not permit your families to live where the best medical aid was not available, that the bulk of the Moslem world lives without it?

Must we constantly remind ourselves that whatever we may do along this line is, of course, only as a means to conversion? If we answer in the affirmative, does it imply that we would withhold medical assistance from those who showed no disposition to become converted? Does it imply that such an assistance would be made conditional upon receiving tracts or listening to preaching? If a member of our own immediate family or community were a confirmed atheist, would we consider medical care for him wasted? Should a mission hospital be withdrawn from a region that was pitifully needy but spiritually unresponsive? Should such regions wait until they can supply their own hospitals?

If we answer the first question in the negative, does it imply that missionary doctors are concerned only to be

[3] Munro, *The Middle Ages*, p. 226.

as professionally efficient as possible? Are we to trust that healing done for Christ's sake will carry its own message?

As to the effect of this work, we should study such lives as those of Pennell,[4] or Shepard,[5] as examples of what big-hearted missionary physicians can do for the Moslem world.

Educational needs. A second great need is for mental development. Medieval Europe received much intellectual stimulus from Moslem thinkers. But since that time the thought of Islam has remained comparatively stationary while the thought of Christendom has experienced the most remarkable growth. Especially in recent years Moslems have become conscious of their backwardness and have been making efforts to advance which have been mentioned elsewhere. But as a whole the Moslem world is sunk in illiteracy and ignorance. A large proportion can neither read nor write. What elementary learning is current to any considerable extent is of little value, and many of the most learned people are still largely medieval in their knowledge and point of view. The resources at the disposal of the Moslem world for meeting its own educational needs are quite inadequate.

For what sort of a mandate does this situation create a need? If it calls on us to establish schools, under what conditions should they be carried on? Should we support such institutions only where we have complete control of the religious exercises, with the right to make them compulsory for all? Should we withdraw if our schools are comparatively fruitless in direct conversions,

[4] *Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier,* Theodore Leighton Pennell.

[5] *Shepard of Aintab,* Alice Shepard Riggs. Missionary Education Movement.

if we are forbidden to teach religion at all, as is the case in Turkey? Does education only make non-Christians the more dangerous? Have we any right to spend missionary money on purely secular schools in other countries? Are there conditions that might modify the answer to this question? If the Moslem world shows no disposition to permit educational evangelism, shall it be left to work out its own intellectual salvation? Should we concentrate entirely upon circulation of the Bible and evangelistic literature?

Social needs. A third great need is along social lines. Christendom has enough social problems of its own in spite of the fact that it has itself developed a civilization which has created these problems. The Moslem world will take over the bulk of them in the next few decades, and will have the additional problem of adjusting them to a static civilization of the medieval type. In particular, the Islamic teachings and traditions concerning women will be a heavy handicap. What shall we do about it? Have we any social responsibility as such? Shall we say that the best social fruit can spring only from Christian roots, and that therefore social influences which stop short of evangelistic effectiveness are not worth attempting? Shall we, on the other hand, trust that all social efforts which have back of them a Christian desire to help will prepare for a more favorable reception of the Christian message? If we believe in social effort, how shall we make this appeal in any way comparable to that of smart Western society? We are told that the best Christian home life is impressive to Moslems—*when they see it.* How can we enable them to see it on a sufficiently large scale and of a sufficiently inspiring quality? If a Christian *zawia* would be the best way to reach Moslem

men with social influences, what sort of a settlement would be the best way to reach Moslem women? Would the adequate financing and staffing of such settlements be worth while?

Need for Christian nurture. A fourth need is for Christian nurture. Evangelization is only a part of this. As noted above, many converts from Islam languish or fall away, not for lack of initial conviction, but because their surroundings lack the social and spiritual nourishment that they need—they have received more effective polemic against Islam than they have Christian nutriment. As Whitehead observes concerning the critical attitude of the eighteenth century philosophers of Europe regarding the abuses of the time, and speaking of those who forgot the need of constructive sympathy: "If men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants." [6] Would most of us thrive on the Christian fellowship which we have made available to the average Moslem convert? Here again settlements of the *zawia* type would be a great help.

Relative importance of the Moslem world. At this point someone might object that such a program is quite ideal, but not only impracticable in its demands, but relatively less important than other calls. The Moslem world is notoriously one of the least fruitful fields of missionary effort. It has yielded fewer converts and these have cost more per capita effort than those of other religions. Much of the prejudice of past centuries continues and in some places additional barriers have been raised. We are responsible for the best disposition of our limited funds and force. We should, therefore, employ these where they will bring the largest returns. In particular, when

[6] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 83-84.

countries like Turkey go so far as to forbid religious teaching in schools, we should withdraw our educational effort altogether, shaking the dust off our feet as a witness against them.

Argument for missionary withdrawal. This argument sounds plausible and is supported by many whose devotion to the missionary enterprise is unquestioned. It raises some interesting questions. In the first place, what is the justification for a missionary mandate? Is it what we get out of it, or what the people of the mandated territory gain? Is the standard of success the number of converts we can make, or the amount of service we can render? It may be replied that our service is not political or social or economic or intellectual, but spiritual, and that only such service rendered makes our effort worth while.

Our mandate is to transform all of life by means of Christian teaching. If this is hindered, we cannot hope to accomplish anything and might as well withdraw. We make converts, not to swell denominational reports, but because the supreme service we can render any man is to bring him to the knowledge and fellowship of Christ. Our love for him would be lacking if we were content to create for him social or intellectual blessings and leave his spirit untouched by the Christian message. Christianity is not mere philanthropy, and the missionary enterprise fails to fulfil its trust if it is satisfied to minister in social service without proclaiming that which is far more valuable. If other forms of effort do not open the way for the appointed means of grace, they are failures.

The argument criticised. Now there is much in this statement that must command assent. Let us consider its implications. Does it imply that missionary effort

is to be distributed over the world according to the present opportunities offered for Christian preaching and teaching and the response thereto? Surely we must be permitted to look ahead and plan for the kingdom of God in the future.

Suppose we neglect the Moslem world today in favor of more promising fields and withdraw from those regions and agencies where the exercise of our ministry is prohibited. What would be the general impression created? Would it be fair for the Moslems to conclude that the only interest of missionaries was in proselytism, since they were ready to leave when the opportunity for it was cut down; to think that missionaries care little for their general welfare, but only in achieving their conversion? Is the Moslem world never to be brought to Christ because it presents such difficulties now? What will be the effect on future effort of slackening at present? If we withdraw schools from Turkey, do we mean never to go back? If we do not mean this, will we find resumption of work easier in years to come?

Is our help needed? The Moslem world is finding the sluices of Western influence opened upon it. Is this the time for any sort of Christian help to be withdrawn? If a son, not a professing Christian and unwilling to be talked to on the subject, left his home town and for the first time met all the complex life and temptations of a great city, would we consider that he had forfeited the right to good influences, social and intellectual? Within the next few years the thought of the more intelligent of the Moslems will be fundamentally reconstructed. Is it worth while to bring to bear some Christian solutions of the chief problems they must deal with, even if we cannot attach to these Christian labels? Can anyone

reflect on the adjustments which over two hundred million fellow human beings must make to modern forces without more ample resources than seventh century legislation and the scholastic traditions of Islam, and remain unmoved?

Our vested interests. The favorite argument of imperialistic writers for the extension of territory is that national blood has been shed to explore and occupy these regions, so that now they must not be abandoned. This formula is invoked only when self-interest calls for advance. When the reverse is the case, the blood of martyrs has little moving appeal. The argument might be put in a much stronger form for effective cooperation with the Moslem world. Nowhere else have past discouragements been so severe. Nowhere else have Christian effort and the reaping of its fruits been so restricted. Yet faithful men and women have given their lives to this work, rendering what service they could rather than what they would. If today there are some new restrictions, there is no assurance that they will be permanent. And on the other hand, there are many avenues of approach opening which never existed before.

Our financial ability. Have we the means? The United States Treasury, in a statement of June 11, 1920, made the following estimate of expenditures for luxuries for the previous year:[7] For luxurious food and delicacies, $5,000,000,000; for luxurious service, $3,000,000,000; for joy riding, races, boxing, pleasure resorts, $3,000,000,000; for tobacco, $2,111,000,000; for carpets and luxurious clothing, $1,500,000,000; for candy, $1,000,000,000; for perfumery and cosmetics, $750,000,000.

[7] Quoted in Cubberley, *Introduction to the Study of Education,* p. 344.

These with others bring a total of $21,811,000,000 for luxuries in one year. Under such circumstances how much can a nation like this afford for the Moslem world?

Our legislators may judge that public opinion would not support them in assuming any sort of a political mandate. But a mandate for Christian service cannot be voted upon by Congress. It is open to any extent to those who wish to undertake it. It appeals to the churches of America for a larger share than can justly be expected from any other people.

A Call to Real Effort

A Christian survey of the field. In 1924 a series of conferences was held in the Near East under the chairmanship of Dr. John R. Mott, to promote the closer cooperation of Christian forces working in the Moslem world. Regional conferences were held in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and a general conference at Jerusalem. The report of these conferences calls attention to the fact that "in proportion to their importance and extent, missions to Moslems have received vastly less attention, fewer missionaries, and less adequate financial support than those to any other great non-Christian religion." [8]

It notes the increasing accessibility of the great bulk of Moslems resulting from improved communications, changed political conditions, the effects of the World War, and the unsettling of former religious beliefs. It surveys great sections that are practically unoccupied, with a total population of 36,000,000, and other centers of vast populations, such as India, where the bulk of missionary effort has been turned in other directions. In most parts of the Moslem world where there are Chris-

[8] *Conference of Christian Workers among Moslems,* 1924, p. 13.

tian missionaries, various circumstances have led the latter to give their main strength to other peoples. Now, when so many of the obstacles that have hindered approach to Moslems are removed, there is a fresh and more urgent call to the Christian church to undertake this task.

The conferences stressed larger use of the oriental churches as agencies for reaching Moslems, and in particular as furnishing real homes for Moslem converts. They call for social workers and especially for workers among women, who need individual approach. They call attention to the fact that in Iraq there are as yet no women doctors. Much is said about the need for literature at this time when the Moslem world is developing new tastes for it. Magazines with uplifting ideals for women, boys, and girls would have a warm welcome and a large service. As from many other mission fields, there is a call for prizes to be offered to stimulate the production of new types of literature by natives.

Finally, there is earnest stress on personal quality and special training of workers with Moslems, and on the spiritual dynamic that is needed. "There is nothing in the Bible or in the experiences of the church to suggest that this dynamic is available cheaply. Each marked release of the Holy Spirit of God in human service must be at the cost of definite surrender and prayer."

A more strenuous spirit demanded. A mandate for Moslems will cost much. We cannot hope to bring them the kind of friendship that will be of real value without further expenditure. Here is the real crux. There are many persons who believe in the missionary enterprise and are willing to give it a certain amount of support.

They attend missionary meetings and express enthusiasm for fine missionary addresses. They are prominent in local missionary societies. Their contributions may fairly be called generous. They are regarded as pillars of the cause. But they have an understanding with themselves that the claim of this enterprise is always to be kept in hand, and that it is never to become their master. They are willing that it should take what they choose to give, but not that it should ask for more. The children of such persons are not likely to volunteer for the foreign field, but if they do, they at once encounter opposition, secret or open. Many who were proud when their sons offered themselves for the war in France would shudder if these young men approached the candidate secretary of their Board.

A mandate for Moslems calls for a different spirit. In the words of Bernard Lucas, "Let it be said at once, and as emphatically as possible, that such mere 'interest' is not worth keeping up and the sooner it dies of starvation, the better, both for the church at home and the missionary abroad. It is not interest, but passion, the passion that comes from deep living and high thinking, that the church needs. The problem is not the financial one of an increasing expenditure and an unequally progressive income; it is the problem, far more serious and grave, *of a national life which is unequal to its imperial expansion.*" [9]

The unselfish expansion of Christianity, seeking to enrich the lives of all mankind by fellowship and the sharing of our best, is a costly proposition. Any other would be unworthy of the cause it represents and the need it goes to meet.

[9] Lucas, *The Empire of Christ*, pp. 153 ff.

Why we have not had greater success. There is a feeling in the minds of many that missionary effort for Moslems has been demonstrated to be a hopeless task, or so nearly so that our limited resources may well be employed in more promising fields. Such persons should learn a few facts:

1. The direct Protestant missionary effort for Moslems has been, in general, *sporadic* in character. Henry Martyn, translator of the New Testament into Persian, Karl Gottlieb Pfander, author of the *Mizan-ul-Hakk,* or *Balance of Truth,* and Ion Keith-Falconer, pioneer missionary to Arabia, stand out as striking instances of men who devoted themselves primarily to work among Moslems. Martyn died in 1812, Pfander went out in 1826, and Keith-Falconer not until 1885. There were, of course, others also engaged in this work, but very few. No other such outstanding task of the Christian church has been taken up in so fragmentary a way.

2. Much of the effort in Moslem countries has been by choice or apparent necessity *deflected* to other peoples. When in 1815 the Church Missionary Society [10] sent out William Jowett to the Levant, the main policy in mind was the reviving of the Oriental churches which might be agencies for reaching Moslems. The missionary work of the American Board, begun in the Near East in 1820, and established in Turkey, Syria, and Persia, was for many excellent reasons concentrated upon providing stimulus to the Armenian, Syrian, and Nestorian churches. The same type of reasons turned the United Presbyterians, who settled in Egypt in 1854, toward the Coptic church. In India the work among Hindus and low castes

[10] Cf. Stock, *History of the Church Missionary Society,* Vol. I, pp. 224 ff.

absorbed the great bulk of the effort. In China not one in a hundred of the missionaries is even touching the Moslem problem. In Africa the main concern is to reach Negroes before they become converted to Islam, rather than to deal primarily with Moslems.

3. Undoubtedly a partial explanation for this state of affairs is that work for Moslems has been *peculiarly difficult.* While strong prejudice against a change of religion has been common in the non-Christian world, in most parts there have been individuals and groups of no particular social standing, whose conversion was not greatly resented. Under the shadow of Islam, however, apostasy of any member of the faith has been punishable with death. Forms of missionary effort, such as public preaching, have been altogether impossible or heavily handicapped. The traditions of hostility toward Christianity have been more keenly felt than by any other religion.

4. The occupation and points of contact with the Moslem world have been in most cases *quite recent.* It was not until 1865 that Dr. Smith and Dr. Van Dyck completed their translation of the Bible into Arabic. Dr. Zwemer says that in 1880 "there was not a single Protestant missionary between Alexandria and the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, nor southwards from the Mediterranean almost to the Niger and the Congo."[11] Keith-Falconer's pioneer mission to Arabia, as noted above, was founded in 1885, and the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church did not take up its work in the Persian Gulf until 1892. In a number of fields systematic effort for Moslems is a matter of the past few years, and in others it has not developed at all.

[11] Zwemer, *Islam a Challenge to Faith,* p. 204.

5. The methods employed have on the whole been *too militant* in tone. This was most natural. To tackle a job like that of the Moslem world demanded fighting blood. The more irenical temperaments tended toward types of work where the opposition was less bitter. It was not that missionaries to Moslems have been harsh in spirit, but that the work called for men of iron and tempted them to controversy. It is now generally acknowledged that much of the literature for Moslems has been too polemic, and that while it may have convinced some and silenced others, it tended to alienate a still larger number. The present emphasis is on materials and methods which will attract rather than on those which undertake to confute.

Put all these things together and consider. *Que voulez vous?* What could naturally be expected when the most difficult problem has received the least effort? It is not that the work is hopeless, but that the measures taken have been altogether inadequate. If those who have concentrated upon work for Moslems have been a mere handful, in scattered sections, and working single handed or in very small groups; if the bulk of effort of the apparently considerable number of missionaries in Moslem lands has actually been deflected in other directions; if the obstacles encountered in reaching Moslems are quite exceptional as compared with those that bar the way to other peoples; if fields have been for the most part occupied only for a few years; if the methods have been on the whole too controversial in character; how can we expect God to open the windows of heaven and pour out blessings superabundant?

APPENDIX

I

GLOSSARY

For a number of these words more than one spelling is current, due largely to the facts, first, that some writers prefer the more scientific, and others the more customary rendering of Arabic words; and second, that in different regions pronunciations differ. In particular, Arabic *Q* may be represented by Q, K, or C; and *Kh* by K or C. *Dh* and heavy *D* are pronounced as Z in many sections, and *W* as V. Some variant spellings are given here in parentheses. There are some consonants in Arabic which are unlike any in English. No attempt will be made to indicate these. Vowels are pronounced as in the Romance languages. Accented *a* is the same as "a" in "father," though somewhat flatter in tone; unaccented *a* is also long, but it is pronounced more hurriedly. Approximate phonetic pronunciation of a few of the following words is suggested in italic type, although, as already noted, it is impossible to convey an accurate idea of the sound of certain consonants.

AH MA DI' YA (*Ah-ma-dee' ya*): a Moslem sect founded within fifty years in northwest India

A' LIM (plural, U la ma'): a learned man

AL LAH': God; a proper name, like Jehovah

A MIR' (Ameer or Emir): ruler; commander

BA HA' I (*Ba ha' ee*) (Behai): a Persian Protestant sect founded by Beha Ullah about 1866

BE' DOU IN (Badawin): nomad Arabs of the desert

BER' BER: the race inhabiting the north and northwest coast of Africa from pre-Mohammedan times

BEY (Beg): a title of respect for men of position

CA LIPH' (*Ka-leef'*) (Khalif): leader; title of the head of the Moslem State

COP' TIC: the old Christian Church of Egypt

DHIK' R (*Zik' r*) (Zikr): "remembering"; an emotional religious ceremony performed by members of the dervish orders

DER VISH' (Darwish): a religious mendicant (same as *faqir*); member of a dervish order

DRUZE (Druse): a heretical sect with headquarters in Mount Lebanon

FA QIR' (*Fa-keer'*) (Fakir): a religious mendicant

FAT' WA (Fetva): a religious or judicial pronouncement made by a legal authority

HA DITH' (Hadis): traditions of sayings or deeds of Mohammed or his companions; used to supplement the Koran as a basis of canon law

HA'FIZ: one who has committed the entire Koran to memory

HA'RIM' (*Ha-reem'*) (Harem): the women's apartments in a Moslem household; in India the word *zenana* is used

HAJ (Hajj): the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to be performed once in a lifetime by all Moslems having the means.

HIJ'RAH (Hegi'ra): the so-called flight of Mohammed from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D.

IJ'MA': the agreement or consensus of learned doctors; one of the recognized methods of settling disputed points of law

IJ'TIHAD': an authoritative decision on religion or law; orthodox Sunnis hold that the authority to make such a decision has ceased since the four great legal heads

IKH'WAN': brethren; name used for members of a sect; applied to communities organized by Ibn Saud

I'MAM': leader or model; used of the person who leads the appointed prayers, of the heads of legal schools, of the head of the Moslem State, of the Shia representatives of God, seven or twelve in number

JI'HAD': a war against countries not under Moslem control, in theory considered obligatory

KA'BYLE' (*Ka bile'*): a Berber race living in Algeria

KA'DI (Qadi, Qazi, Cadi): a judge

KA'FIR: an unbeliever; an infidel

KHI'LA'FAT: the Arabic name for the Khalifate; a movement in India to support the Khalifate

KO'RAN' (Quran): a collection of Mohammed's sayings, supposed to have been verbally dictated by the Angel Gabriel

KUT'TAB: an elementary school; same as *maktab*

MA'DRA'SA (Medresseh): a school of higher learning

MAJ'LIS (Mejliss): conference; congress; used of the Persian parliament

MAK'TAB: an elementary school

MAM'ELUK (Mamluk'): a possession; a slave; warriors who sometimes became rulers

MIN'ARET: the tower of a mosque from which the call to prayer is made

MON'GOL (Mogul', Mughal'): a people from Central Asia who invaded India and the Levant; representatives of these founded a famous dynasty in India

MOSQUE (Masjid): a place for worship which should contain a niche to indicate the direction of Mecca, a tank for ablutions, and a pulpit for the Friday sermon

MU'EZ'ZIN (Muedhdhin): the man who gives the call to prayer

MUF'TI: a learned doctor of law

MU'HAR'RAM: the first month of the Mohammedan year, in which the Shias celebrate the death of Hussein.

MUJ'TA'HID: the highest grade of learned doctor, still held among the Shias, but not among the Sunnis since the four great legal heads

MUL'LAH (Mollah): Persian form of Arabic *Maulawi;* Indian, *Maulvi;* a learned man

OT'TO MAN (Osman'li): a branch of Turks named from Osman or Othman, an early leader

PA SHA' (Pa'sha): a title of rank in Turkey or Egypt

PIR: a Sufi religious leader or holy man

PUR'DAH (Pardah): curtain; seclusion of women of social position

RA MA DAN' (Ramazan): the ninth month of the Mohammedan year, set aside for fasting between sunrise and sunset

SA NU SI' YAH (Senussi): a powerful dervish order with headquarters in North Africa

SAY'YID (*Sy'yid*) (Syed): lord; descendant of Mohammed

SAL'JUQ (Seljuk): a branch of Turks who migrated from Turkestan and came into control of Baghdad in 1055 A.D.

SHA RI' AT: the sacred or canon law

SHEIKH (*Shaykh*): leader; head of tribe; religious leader; head of dervish order

SHE RIF' (*Shĕ reef'*): a descendant of Mohammed; ruler of Mecca

SHI'A (*Shee'ah*): a large Mohammedan sect comprising most Persians, which regards Ali and the following Imams as prophets

SU'FI: a school of thought, originally ascetic, which developed very influential mystical doctrines

SUL TAN': ruler; emperor

SUN'NA: the customs sanctioned by Mohammed and his companions; this is handed down in the Hadith

SUN'NI: the leading Mohammedan sect which follows the four great schools of law

SU'RA: a division or chapter of the Koran

TAN ZIM': a movement in India to advance the Moslem community and resist encroachment

TA'TARS (Tartars): a race of central Asia which invaded southeast Asia and eastern Europe

TEK'KE (Tekye): a dervish monastery

U LA MA': plural of *alim,* a learned doctor

UR'DU: a mixture of Arabic and Hindi; the *lingua franca* of India

WAH HA'BI: a Puritan Moslem sect with headquarters in Central Arabia

WAKF (Waqf): property dedicated to pious or charitable use; also for secular purposes. Turkish plural of this word is *evkaf*

ZA'WI A: a monastery, especially of the settlement type

ZIK'R (*Zik'r*): same as *dhikr*

II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In preparing this bibliography an effort has been made to limit it, as far as possible, to books now in print and readily available. There are, however, certain outstanding volumes which are out of print, but which will be invaluable for reference to those engaging in a study of the Moslem world. Such books have been included with an explanatory note.

If a more extensive bibliography on this subject is desired, attention is called to one included in *The Presentation of Christianity to Moslems,* published by the Committee of Missionary Preparation in 1917, and *Selected Bibliography of Missionary Literature,* compiled by J. L. Murray, together with its supplement, published by the Student Volunteer Movement, New York. The quarterly, the *Moslem World,* contains many book reviews of volumes that appear from time to time.

The titles in the following list marked with a double star (**) are books which would be excellent for a leader desiring background material.

A single star (*) before a title indicates a book that would probably rank as next in importance for this purpose.

A dagger (†) before a title indicates that the book is out of print, but available in many libraries.

Books marked "MEM" are published in England, but they are available in the United States through the Missionary Education Movement and may be ordered from denominational headquarters.

The following books are recommended as the nucleus of a small reference library for groups desiring to purchase a few volumes. They are not necessarily the best books on the subject, but they are helpful, and, for the most part, recent, moderate in price, and easily obtainable. For details concerning author, publisher, and price, consult Bibliography below.

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Outline of the Religion of Islam, An. H. U. Weitbrecht Stanton.
Selections from the Qur'an. H. U. Weitbrecht Stanton.
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Six articles from different parts of the Moslem world, which discuss the strong and weak points of Islam and those of Christianity which attract or repel. Dr. D. B. Macdonald adds a summary.

****Young Islam on Trek.** Basil Mathews. Missionary Education Movement, New York. 1926. Cloth, $1.00; paper, 60 cents.

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An illustrated biography of this great missionary; vivid and interesting.

Shepard of Aintab. Alice S. Riggs. Missionary Education Movement, New York. 1920. Cloth, $1.00; paper, 75 cents.

The life of a great medical missionary to Turkey. Useful for background material.

III

STATISTICAL SURVEY OF THE MOSLEM WORLD

The following table is based on "A New Census of the Moslem World," by Dr. Samuel M. Zwemer, which was prepared for "Christian Literature in Moslem Lands" and which also appeared in *The Moslem World* for July, 1923. New figures have been used in a number of instances where more recent census reports have become available or where important movements of population have materially changed the proportion of Moslems among the inhabitants of particular countries. Many of the figures are necessarily estimates, but these have been adopted only after careful research and after comparison of the most reliable authorities. While there are some important variations from the figures contained in Dr. Zwemer's "Census" as far as a few individual countries are concerned, the totals of the two sets of figures vary by only about 5,700,000, the estimate here given for the Moslem population of the world being 240,562,864, while Dr. Zwemer's estimate in 1923 was 234,814,989.

Grateful acknowledgment for the painstaking work required in preparing the estimates in this statistical survey is made to Mr. S. W. Boggs, F.R.G.S., Geographer of the Department of State, Washington, D. C., and a compiler of the material for the maps in the *World Missionary Atlas.*

Abbreviations Used in the Following Tables

AGF—Annuaire Général de la France et de l'étranger
ASF—Annuaire Statistique de la France
Cmd—Great Britain, government publications, Command Paper Series
IRM—International Review of Missions
MW—Moslem World Quarterly Review (figures give volume and page)
PHB—Peace Hand Books—H. M. Stationery Office, 1920
RMM—Revue du Monde Musulman (figures give volume and page)
SYB—Statesman's Year Book

Country or State	*Total Population*	*Moslem Population*	*Per cent Moslem* (a) less than 1%	*Authority*
North America Total		11,000		
UNITED STATES	114,511,514	11,000	(a)	Est. based on 1920 census, racial statistics
Central and South America Total		174,351	(a)	
ARGENTINE	8,698,516	7,520	(a)	RMM 4: 314
BRAZIL	30,645,296	100,600	(a)	*Ibid.*
GUIANA, BRITISH	297,691	24,800	8.3	Est. based on SYB, 1922
GUIANA, DUTCH	113,181	15,431	13.7	SYB, 1922
TRINIDAD	391,279	26,000	6.6	Est. based on SYB, 1922
Australia	5,436,794	25,000	(a)	For. Affairs 1: 3: 139
Polynesia		15,000		
FIJI	162,604	15,000	9.3	MW 9: 265
Europe Total	c. 460,000,000	7,058,949	1.5	
ALBANIA	831,877	584,675	70.0	SYB, 1925 and AGF, 1924
BULGARIA	4,861,439	672,500	13.8	SYB, 1925 and PHB No. 22, p. 8
GREECE	4,977,380	20,000	(a)	AGF, 1925 and est.
HUNGARY	7,987,143		(a)	SYB, 1925
RUMANIA	17,393,149	44,087	(a)	SYB 1925

Country or State	*Total Population*	*Moslem Population*	*Per cent Moslem* (a) less than 1%	*Authority*
Russia	105,536,000	4,400,000	4.17	Com. Yr. Bk. of Soviet Union
Yugoslavia	12,017,323	1,337,687	11.1	SYB 1925
Africa Total	c. 130,000,000	**61,998,342**	47.7	
Abyssinia	10,000,000	4,000,000	40.0	SYB 1925 and correspondence
Belgian Congo	11,008,221	1,764,000	16.0	Est. based on report of Gov. rep't, 1917, and PHB No. 199, p. 47
Ruanda-Urunda Mandate	5,000,000	7,500	(a)	"Rapport sur l'administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendent 1924," pp. 9, 17.
British Africa		15,585,990		
Gambia	240,000	28,800	12.0	PHB No. 112, p. 17
Sierra Leone	1,541,311	300,000	19.5	SYB, 1925 and est.
Gold Coast	2,078,043	101,400	4.9	SYB, 1925 and PHB No. 93, p. 13
Nigeria	18,070,608	11,000,000	61.0	SYB, 1925 and est.
Union of South Africa	6,928,580	50,037	(a)	SYB, 1925 and IRM 14: 562
Basutoland	498,781	102	(a)	SYB, 1925 and IRM 14: 562

Country or State	*Total Population*	*Moslem Population*	*Per cent Moslem* (a) less than 1%	*Authority*
Swaziland	133,563	9,051	(a)	SYB, 1925 and IRM 14: 562
Bechuanaland Prot.	152,983			
Southern Rhodesia	803,620			
Northern Rhodesia	1,003,750			
Nyasaland	1,175,842	73,000	6.2	SYB, 1925 and IRM 14: 562
Zanzibar with Pemba	197,000	183,600	93.0	SYB, 1925 and 1922
Kenya	2,360,000	427,000	18.1	SYB, 1925 and For. Affairs 1: 3: 139
Uganda	3,127,455	73,000	2.4	SYB, 1925 and PHB No. 96, p. 52
British Somaliland	344,000	340,000	99.0	SYB, 1925 and est.
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	5,912,402	3,000,000	51.0	SYB, 1925 and est.
BRITISH AFRICAN MANDATES	5,090,435	626,000	12.3	
Cameroons	550,000	200,000	36.3	SYB, 1925 and est. based on Cmd. 1647 (1922)
Togoland	188,265	125,000	66.0	SYB, 1925 and est. based on PHB No. 10, p. 24

Country or State	*Total Population*	*Moslem Population*	*Per cent Moslem* (a) less than 1%	*Authority*
Tanganyika Territory	4,124,438	300,000	7.3	Cmd. 1732 (1921) and Cmd. 1428 (1921), p. 30
Southwest Africa	227,732	1,000	(a)	SYB, 1925 and IRM 14: 562
EGYPT	12,750,918	11,658,148	91.8	SYB, 1925
FRENCH AFRICA		24,858,204		
Algeria	5,802,464	4,971,424		SYB, 1925
Morocco (Fr. zone)	5,400,000	5,200,000	97.0	SYB, 1925 and est.
Tunisia	2,095,090	1,891,280		SYB, 1925
French West Africa				
Senegal	1,266,116	1,266,000	99.0	SYB, 1925 and est. based on PHB No. 100, p. 3
Guinea	2,026,321	1,700,000	84.0	SYB, 1925 and est. based on PHB No. 103, pp. 5, 6
Ivory Coast	1,301,832	260,000	20.0	SYB, 1925 and est.
Dahomey	974,597	340,000	35.0	SYB, 1925 and est. based on PHB No. 105, p. 6
Mauritania	284,598	270,000	95.0	SYB, 1925 and est. based on PHB. No. 106, p. 9

Country or Unit	Total Population	Moslem Population	Per cent Moslem (a) not less than 1%	Authority
French Indo-China	20,000,000	1,500,000	7.5	YB, 1925 and est. based on Annuaire de Gouv't, 1922
Upper Volta	3,000,000	450,000	14.8	YB, 1925 and est. based on Annuaire de Gouv't, 1922
Niger	1,140,564	1,140,000	99.9	YB, 1925, and est.
French Equatorial Africa (Congo)	9,000,000	2,700,000	30.0	Est. based on PHB No. 102, p. 17
French Somali Coast	70,000	64,000	91.4	PHB. No. 103, p. 16
FRENCH AFRICAN MANDATES	3,870,000	750,000	24.5	
Cameroon	2,000,000	375,000	19.6	A.Y.P., 1921, p. 411 and est. based on Cmd. 1647 (1922)
Togoland	970,000	375,000	39.0	A.Y.P., 1921, p. 411, and est. based on PHB No. 10, p. 24
Madagascar (incl. Mayotte and dep.)	3,962,161	75,000	2.2	YB, 1925 and MW 4: 151
ITALIAN AFRICA	1,800,000	1,500,000	83.3	
Libya	800,000	600,000	75.0	YB, 1925 and est.
Eritrea	400,000	300,000	74.5	YB, 1925 and PHB No. 126, p. 19

Country or State	*Total Population*	*Moslem Population*	*Per cent Moslem* (a) less than 1%	*Authority*
Italian Somaliland	650,000	649,000	99.0	PHB No. 128, p. 14
LIBERIA	2,000,000	300,000	15.0	PHB No. 130, p. 20
PORTUGUESE AFRICA		230,000		
Guinea	289,000	100,000	34.6	Est. based on Westermann MW 4: 150
Mozambique	3,120,000	130,000	4.2	*Ibid.*
SPANISH AFRICA		594,500		
Rio de Oro and Adrar	80,000	79,500	99.0	Est. based on PHB No. 124, pp. 8 and 17
Ifni	20,000	20,000	100.0	*Ibid.*
Morocco (Sp. zone with Tangier)	600,000	495,000	82.5	Est. of Count Merry del Val. MW 10: 408
Asia Total	c. 960,000,000	171,280,222	17.9	
AFGHANISTAN	12,000,000	12,000,000	100.0	SYB, 1925
AMERICAN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	10,350,730	586,999	4.4	SYB, 1922
ARABIA (except Oman and Aden)	10,000,000	10,000,000	100.0	SYB, 1925
BRITISH ASIA		72,245,772		
Cyprus	310,709	61,422	19.7	SYB, 1925
Aden and Perim	54,923	54,000	99.0	SYB, 1925

Country or State	*Total Population*	*Moslem Population*	*Per cent Moslem* (a) less than 1%	*Authority*
Sokotra and Kuria Muria	12,000	12,000	100.0	SYB, 1925
Bahrein Island	120,000	119,000	99.0	SYB, 1925 and est.
India and Dependencies	318,942,480	69,815,000	21.9	SYB, 1925 and suppl. est.
Ceylon	4,504,549	302,532	6.7	SYB, 1925
Maldive Islands	70,199	70,199	100.0	MW 13:67
Straits Settlements	833,769	258,719	29.2	SYB, 1925 and MW 9:379
Federated Malay States	1,324,890	420,840	31.8	*Ibid.*
Protected Malay States	1,123,264	758,060	67.3	*Ibid.*
British North Borneo	257,804	200,000	77.5	SYB, 1925 and est.
Brunei	25,444	24,000	98.0	SYB, 1925 and est.
Sarawak	600,000	150,000	25.0	SYB, 1925 and MW 9:379
BRITISH MANDATES	3,806,464	3,411,590	90.0	
Palestine and Transjordan	957,182	770,890	80.0	SYB, 1925
Iraq (Mesopotamia)	2,849,282	2,640,700	92.5	SYB, 1925
CHINA				
China proper	411,491,940	6,433,000	1.5	China Cont. Committee
Dependencies	16,540,000	2,703,000	16.3	*Ibid.*

Country or State	*Total Population*	*Moslem Population*	*Per cent Moslem* (a) less than 1%	*Authority*
DUTCH EAST INDIES	49,350,834	36,000,000	73.0	SYB, 1925 and est. of W. G. Shellabear corrected by population increase.
FRENCH ASIA	20,255,630	341,860	1.7	
India	272,427	13,260	4.9	SYB, 1925 and PHB No. 77, p. 18
Indo-China	19,983,203	328,600	1.6	SYB, 1925 and MW 8: 269
French mandate Syria and the Lebanon	3,000,000	1,613,804	53.6	SYB, 1925
OMAN	500,000	500,000	100.0	SYB, 1922
PERSIA	9,480,000	9,350,000	98.8	SYB, 1925
PORTUGUESE Timor	377,815	9,000	2.4	SYB, 1925 and est. based on PHB No. 80, p. 3, and W. G. Shellabear MW 9: 379
RUSSIAN ASIA	29,402,000	10,200,000	34.75	Com. Yr. Bk. of Soviet Union
SIAM	9,207,355	150,000	1.6	SYB, 1925 and est. of W. G. Shellabear MW 9: 379
TURKEY (incl. European Turkey)	9,000,000	8,350,000	93.0	Est. based on various sources

Summary of Total Moslem Population

North America	11,000
Central and South America	174,351
Australia	25,000
Polynesia	15,000
Europe	7,058,949
Africa	
British Africa	15,585,990
British African mandates	626,000
Egypt	11,658,148
French Africa	24,858,204
French African mandates	750,000
Italian Africa	1,549,000
Portuguese Africa	230,000
Spanish Africa	594,500
Other countries	6,146,500
Asia	
Afghanistan	12,000,000
Arabia	10,000,000
British Asia	71,245,772
British Asian mandates	3,411,590
China and Dependencies	9,136,000
Dutch East Indies	36,000,000
French Asia	341,860
Persia	9,350,000
Russian Asia	10,200,000
Turkey	8,350,000
Other countries	1,245,000
Total Moslem Population	240,562,864

IV

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